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Abstract
This dissertation examines variation in the provision of foreign direct
investment (FDI) incentives. If FDI is crucial for economic growth, why
do some countries offer high levels of incentives to attract FDI, while other
countries do not? This study identifies the political dimensions behind FDI
incentives provision in democratic countries.
I argue that provision of FDI incentives depends on the distributional
consequences of FDI and a country’s executive regime type. FDI inflows
compete up wages and drive down rents, which implies that labor prefers
high levels of FDI and FDI incentives, while native capital opposes FDI and
FDI incentives. These preferences towards FDI incentives are moderated,
however, by a country’s executive regime type. In parliamentary democ-
racies, legislative cohesion engenders large, stable political coalitions. This
leads to policies that are beneficial to a broad majority of a country’s popu-
lation, namely labor. As a result, parliamentary democracies provide higher
levels of FDI incentives. By contrast, presidential democracies feature strong
separation of powers, which means policy coalitions will be temporary and
i
unstable. Coalition instability means that the beneficiaries of FDI incentives
must work to convince institutional actors to support FDI incentives. This
drives down the level of incentives because some institutional actors prefer
lower levels of incentives compared to others and the beneficiaries will accept
any incentives level approved. As a result, presidential democracies provide
lower levels of FDI incentives.
After deriving testable hypotheses using the tools of game theory, I ex-
amine the politics of FDI incentives provision using an original cross-national
dataset of FDI incentives generated with machine learning techniques. I em-
pirically analyze this dataset with pooled and fixed effects maximum likeli-
hood estimation models. I then explore the politics of FDI incentives provi-
sion in two complementary case studies from Poland, a parliamentary democ-
racy, and Romania, a presidential democracy. A final empirical chapter uses
unique survey data from Poland to study individual-level attitudes towards
FDI incentives. The cross-national statistical analysis reveals that higher
levels of legislative cohesion are associated with greater provision of FDI in-
centives. The case study research shows that parliamentary democracies are
associated with higher levels of FDI incentives and presidential democracies
are associated with lower levels of FDI incentives. Finally, the survey data
analysis shows that labor prefers FDI incentives to a greater extent than
native capital.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Our globalized world is and will be characterized by the rapid flow of
people, money, capital, and goods across national borders. Led by multina-
tional corporations (MNCs), one of the main features of globalization today
is significant change in the nature of global production (Bordo et al. 1999).
While there has been an immense outpouring of scholarly literature on the
political economy of trade, scholars have only recently begun to seriously
examine the politics of foreign direct investment (FDI). For some analysts,
the increasingly interconnected nature of the world means that states have
no choice but to accept reality and submit to the dictates of global forces.
Others suggest that states have even more important roles to play in exerting
influence over domestic populations, resources, economies, and cultures.
Attracting FDI has become an extremely important goal for many
1
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states. One prevalent method employed by states to attract FDI inflows has
been the provision of FDI incentives, which can be broadly divided into three
categories (Cass 2007). First, states provide fiscal incentives. These include
tax holidays, tax reductions, investment allowances, tax credits, accelerated
asset depreciation, preferential export profits treatment, tax deductions, and
exemptions from import duties. Second, states provide financial incentives
such as cash grants, subsidized facilities, and infrastructure, such as roads or
utility links. Third, states offer investment promotion agencies that provide
marketing services and assist companies in navigating bureaucratic obstacles
that are often part of the investment process.
In this dissertation, I present a new approach to the politics of foreign
direct investment incentives. I limit my focus to a subset of countries, democ-
racies, in order to control for important differences between democracies and
autocracies. The theory I propose takes a cue from the intuition that FDI
inflows create domestic winners and losers. I argue that FDI incentives policy
reflects the preferences of winners and losers from FDI inflows. The theo-
retical and empirical literature on FDI suggests that workers tend to benefit
from FDI inflows (Lipsey and Sjoholm 2004, 2005), while returns to domestic
capital in the FDI host country decline (Haddad and Harrison 1993; Feenstra
and Hanson 1997; Aitken and Harrison 1999). The translation of FDI incen-
tives preferences into policy, however, is moderated by political institutions.
As such, I focus on executive regime type, defined as whether or not a country
has a parliamentary or presidential system. Parliamentary systems feature
2
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high levels of legislative cohesion, which imply stable political coalitions that
are broadly representative. Large, stable coalitions suggest that the interests
of labor are taken into account to a greater extent, which in turn implies
that parliamentary systems provide higher levels of FDI incentives.
By contrast, presidential systems have separation of powers, which
means that more institutional actors must be satisfied in order for policy
changes to be enacted. One consequence of presidential systems is the preva-
lence of unstable political coalitions. This means that the beneficiaries of
FDI incentives have to “sell” the FDI incentives policy to the institutional
actors. This drives down the level of FDI incentives because some institu-
tional actors prefer lower levels of incentives as compared to others. The
beneficiaries of FDI incentives, however, will accept whatever level of incen-
tives is offered. On whole, this, implies that presidential systems offer lower
levels of FDI incentives.
In the remainder of this chapter, I present an overview of FDI and
provide reasons for why it should be studied. Next, I preview the relevant
political science literature in which I situate my approach to the politics of
FDI incentives. I then provide the motivating question and puzzle for my
dissertation. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of my argument
and a roadmap to the dissertation.
3
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1.2 Foreign direct investment
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), an investment is
considered FDI if at least a 10% stake in the company in question is un-
der the control of a foreign firm (Lipsey 2001). Hymer’s (1976) work was
crucial for showing that FDI and portfolio investment are distinct analytical
categories of global capital flows. Among others, Kindleberger (1969) and
Dunning (1988) built upon Hymer’s insight that FDI responds to imperfect
markets in order to advance knowledge about MNCs. According to these
scholars, by organizing cross-border production hierarchically and internaliz-
ing transactions, MNCs engaging in FDI may provide solutions to imperfect
allocations of property rights. Caves (1996) notes that FDI usually adopts
the form of mobile international capital, but is specific to a host country
industry. MNCs, as the originators of FDI, are forces behind the movement
of FDI across national borders.
A particular case of FDI may be considered either horizontal or verti-
cal. Horizontal FDI is motivated primarily by the desire to produce goods
and services for consumers in the host country. An example would be how
Toyota has built car manufacturing facilities in the U.S., which produce ve-
hicles for the U.S. market. Toyota also has factories in the United Kingdom,
France, and Portugal, which produce for the European market. By repli-
cating manufacturing sites, Toyota’s strategy is aimed at market access and
thus is representative of a horizontal FDI approach.
4
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On the other hand, vertical FDI seeks to take advantage of international
factor price-differences to produce goods for export. For example, consider
the following hypothetical case. Prior to 1991, the Soviet government ex-
pended considerable resources to develop an important node for the Soviet
military industrial complex in Kharkiv, Ukraine. As such, the Soviet gov-
ernment built significant science and technology education infrastructure as
well as a number of interrelated state enterprises in Kharkiv. Since the fall of
the Soviet Union, however, Kharkiv’s military technology industry has been
greatly underutilized. Workers, while highly skilled and trained, are paid
low wages. In order to take advantage of low wages for this highly skilled
workforce, a foreign company could invest in Kharkiv and export technology
products more cheaply than possible in other contexts. By exploiting a fa-
vorable factor price and focusing on exports, the foreign company would be
exemplifying a vertical FDI strategy.
Research on FDI is important for at least two major reasons. First,
as an important dimension of cross-border capital flows, FDI has grown im-
mensely since 1990 (see Figure 1.1). Compared to almost negligible levels in
the 1970s, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNC-
TAD) estimates FDI flows at $US 1.46 trillion in 2013. As a percentage of
gross fixed capital formation, FDI has greatly increased since 1990, albeit
with a serious dip following the 2006 global recession (Figure 1.2). FDI has
also grown significantly as a percentage of world GDP (Figure 1.3).
5
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Figure 1.1: Global FDI Inflows, 1970-2012
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Figure 1.2: FDI as a Percentage of World Gross Fixed Capital Formation
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Figure 1.3: FDI Inflows as a Percentage of World GDP
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FDI is also considered to be an important topic of study because it is
seen as crucial for economic growth and development (UNCTAD 1992, 1999).
Scholars propose at least five ways that FDI promotes economic growth and
development. First, and perhaps most importantly, FDI contributes to eco-
nomic growth through transfers of technology. According to Borensztein et
al. (1998), technological progress takes place through a process of ‘capital
deepening’ in the form of the introduction of new varieties of capital goods.
MNCs possess more advanced ‘knowledge,’ which allows them to introduce
new capital goods at lower cost. Second, FDI fosters ‘spillovers’ or positive
externalities for local economies. (Caves 1974; Blomstrom 1986; Blomstrom
and Kokko 2003; Spencer 2008). The increase in competition that occurs as
a result of foreign entry may be considered a benefit, in particular if it forces
7
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local firms to introduce new technology and work harder. Third, it has been
suggested that FDI inflows increase wages and employment in host countries
(Feenstra and Hanson 1997). Fourth, FDI inflows benefit economies that
promote exports (Bhagwati 1978) and raise tax revenues (Feldstein 2000).
Finally, there is evidence to suggest that a positive relationship exists be-
tween FDI and economic stabilization (Laski 1998).
1.3 FDI incentives in political science
Given the economic growth and development consequences of FDI, it is
unsurprising that many states are heavily involved in seeking to attract FDI.
As regards the politics associated with FDI incentives, two major explana-
tions exist. The first may be termed the convergence thesis. Due to greater
interstate competition for a limited pool of investment capital, states adopt
increasing levels of incentives (Guisinger 1985; Stopford and Strange 1991;
Thomas 2000). As capital mobility and financial integration have grown over
time, especially since the 1960s and 1970s, states have had no choice but to
compete with one another to retain existing capital and bring in additional
capital. By providing fiscal, financial, or other incentives, states create neg-
ative externalities for other states also seeking FDI. In order to compete
successfully, states must match the incentives offered by other states. As
incentives provision necessitates immediate budgetary consequences, states
incur an increasingly limited ability to offer other services. Despite straining
8
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resources to attract investment, MNCs continue to invest as if the incentives
did not exist, as the incentives do not make a particular country any more
attractive, as all states offer the same incentives.
The second major explanation relies on the distinction between demo-
cratic and autocratic political institutions. A country’s institutional environ-
ment sends signals to investors, especially with respect to property rights pro-
tection and policy credibility (Rolfe and White 1992; Rondinelli and Brupitt
2000). A country that maintains stronger economic and political conditions
should provide a better investment environment and, by extension, better re-
turns on investment. In order to compensate for worse locational conditions,
countries might provide incentives to attract FDI. Li (2006) argues that lev-
els of FDI incentives provision differ between democracies and autocracies
because property rights protection and policy credibility vary significantly
across the two institutional environments. Democracies feature political in-
stitutions that strengthen the rule of law, secure property rights, and make
radical policy changes difficult. By contrast, autocracies may characterized
as having greater uncertainty with regard to property rights protection and
the rule of law, as expropriations and policy changes to the detriment of for-
eign companies are more common. The logic here is that autocracies must
offer more incentives than democracies in order to attract the same level of
FDI.
9
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1.4 Question of dissertation
Given the expected positive benefits of FDI, it might be predicted that
governments, especially in developing countries, would all provide high levels
of FDI incentives. Using data from 18 post-socialist democracies, I show that
the evidence does not bear this prediction out. The study of post-socialist
countries adds value for a number of reasons. Broadly, the post-socialist
cases offer a unique environment in which to consider theories developed
in other geographical contexts (King 2000). In particular, analysis of the
post-socialist cases adds nuance to existing work on the consequences of the
interaction between economic and political regime transitions. In a sense,
the post-socialist context acts as a quasi-experimental setting in which to
analyze policy choice (Weimer 1997; Frye 2010). All the formerly socialist
countries embarked on democratic and market transitions at the same time
and started with roughly similar economic characteristics, legacies of the
planned socialist economy. These included concentration of property under
state control, price controls, and limited availability of domestic capital. In
addition, the world economy was quickly globalizing at the moment of post-
socialist transition, which had consequences for the post-socialist countries
(Dorobantu 2010). In sum, the post-socialist cases provide opportunities for
comparative analysis in a quasi-experimental setting.
Figure 1.4 uses data from Cass (2007) and depicts FDI incentives for
the 18 post-socialist democratic countries. Following the European Bank
10
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for Reconstruction and Development’s (EBRD) methodology, Cass evaluates
a variety of factors, including tax rates, tax holidays, tax credits, grants,
subsidized locations, and free trade zones. Using this data, Cass builds a
composite index of FDI incentives. Higher scores on the Cass index corre-
spond to more generous levels of FDI incentives.
Figure 1.4: FDI Incentives in Post-Socialist Democracies
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Figure 1.5 employs data on property rights protection from the Heritage
Foundation’s 2014 Index of Economic Freedom. According to the Heritage
Foundation, the property freedom score measures the extent to which a coun-
try’s laws protect private property rights and the degree to which the coun-
try’s government enforces such laws. In addition, the property freedom score
provides an assessment of the likelihood of expropriation, considers judicial
independence and corruption as well as the ability of individuals and busi-
11
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nesses to enforce contracts. A higher score corresponds to stronger property
rights protection in a particular country. While property rights protection is
not the main focus of my dissertation, it serves as a useful alternative lens
through which illustrate government FDI policy.
Figure 1.5: Property Rights in Post-Socialist Democracies
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In Figures 1.4 and 1.5, depiction of FDI incentives and property rights
protection in post-socialist democratic countries demonstrates significant het-
erogeneity. This begs the question: if FDI is important for economic growth,
why do some democracies provide generous levels of FDI incentives, while
others do not?
12
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1.5 Puzzle of dissertation
In seeking to answer this question, an interesting puzzle emerges. It
appears that within the subset of post-socialist democracies, a correlation
exists between executive regime type and provision of FDI incentives.
Figure 1.6: FDI Incentives, Property Rights, and Executive Regimes in Post-
Socialist Democracies
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For example, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia are all parliamentary
regimes, while Romania, Georgia, and Armenia are all presidential or semi-
presidential regimes. As Figure 1.6 shows, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia all
provide relatively high levels of investment incentives and have high prop-
erty rights protection scores. On the other hand, countries like Romania,
Georgia, and Armenia provide few of these incentives and have low property
freedom scores. What might explain why parliamentary democracies offer
13
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more generous FDI incentives than presidential democracies?
1.6 The argument
My answer to this question synthesizes insights from two prominent ap-
proaches in the political economy literature. First, I draw on theories con-
cerning the distributional consequences of capital flows. The basic idea here
is that trade and factor flows affect the welfare of owners of different fac-
tors of production, such as labor and capital (Stolper and Samuelson 1941;
Mundell 1957). In line with thoughtful work by Pinto and Pinto (2008),
Pandya (2010), Pinto (2013), and Pandya (2014) on the politics of foreign
direct investment, I build on the specific factors model of international trade
to derive predictions about preferences towards foreign direct investment in-
centives. I assume a host economy with two industries and three factors.
Capital is fixed in each industry, while labor is mobile between the two in-
dustries. FDI inflows to one of the two industries affect the returns to both
labor and capital across the economy. FDI inflows compete wages up by
increasing labor demand, while rents to capital are pushed down. As such,
FDI serves as a complement to labor and a substitute for capital. It follows
that labor prefers FDI and capital opposes it. I extend this a step further
by positing that labor prefers FDI incentives, while capital opposes them.
As FDI incentives constitute a budgetary allocation, I assume that FDI in-
centives are indirect government transfers designed to benefit one group in
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society over another.
Second, I adopt the approach taken by Persson, Roland, and Tabellini
(1997, 1998b, and 2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2005) for characteriz-
ing the differences between parliamentary and presidential regimes in terms
of coalition stability and government transfers. Legislative cohesion, which
may be used to describe parliamentary regimes, refers to disciplined voting
by members of a governing coalition. Parliamentary regimes feature large
governing coalitions, which necessarily are more broadly representative. As
labor constitutes a greater number of individuals in a society, parliamentary
coalitions thus are more representative of labor than of capital. I expect that
the preferences of labor are more consistently supported in parliamentary
regimes, which implies that parliamentary regimes provide higher levels of
FDI incentives.
On the other hand, presidential systems have separation of powers,
which can be understood as the requirement that policy changes be approved
by a greater number of institutional actors. An important consequence of the
presidential system is unstable political coalitions. As a result, FDI incentives
beneficiaries must “sell” FDI incentives policy to institutional actors. This
means that that the level of FDI incentives provided is lower, because some
institutional actors prefer lower levels of incentives compared to other insti-
tutional actors. FDI incentives beneficiaries, though, will accept whatever
level of incentives is offered. Taken together, this suggests that presidential
systems offer lower levels of FDI incentives.
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1.7 Plan of dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is as follows. In Chapter 2, I describe the
relevant literature on the politics of FDI and the politics of FDI incentives.
Having provided the appropriate scholarly context, I characterize my theo-
retical approach in greater deal and note the central predictions I examine in
the quantitative and qualitative portions of the dissertation. In Chapter 3, I
present a formal derivation of my theory of the politics of FDI incentives pro-
vision. I apply the Baron-Ferejohn legislative bargaining model to substanti-
ate my predictions about how executive regime types condition equilibrium
levels of FDI incentives in democracies. Chapter 4 presents cross-national
empirical analysis, which utilizes an original dataset of FDI incentives to
explore my theoretical predictions.
Chapters 5 and 6 present qualitative evidence from Poland, a par-
liamentary democracy, and Romania, a semi-presidential democracy. The
analyses in these two chapters probe the mechanisms of my theory and pro-
vide insight into the politics behind FDI incentives in two formerly socialist,
recently anointed European Union (EU) member states. Poland is a par-
ticularly interesting case because it was the first post-socialist country to
implement radical reforms and adopt a range of measures to establish a mar-
ket economy (Lewis 1994). The changing political role of the trade union
Solidarity from massively popular anti-regime actor to neoliberal regime in-
sider and back again also makes Poland a rich case (Ost and Weinstein 1998).
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An archetypal case of protracted post-socialism, Romania has experienced a
problematic regime transition and a flawed founding election, which helped
former communist-era nomenklatura to remain in power (Crowther 2010).
As Gross and Tismaneanu (2005) note, Romania has faced a slower pace of
democratization, political instability, and pervasive corruption. These factors
help make Romania an interesting contrast to Poland.
Chapter 7 presents analysis of an original dataset of individual level
preferences towards FDI incentives in Poland. Chapter 8 concludes and offers
directions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Theory and literature review
2.1 Introduction
As noted in Chapter 1, FDI has increased rapidly in recent years and is
considered to play a major role in economic growth and development. De-
spite the importance of FDI, countries around the world do not all offer high
levels of FDI incentives. In this chapter, I set up discussion of my theory of
the politics of FDI incentives provision by first characterizing the politics of
FDI and the politics of FDI incentives literatures. Broadly speaking, these
literatures have focused primarily on the role of democracy in affecting FDI
flows and provision of FDI incentives. Next, I describe my theory of the
politics of FDI incentives provision, which draws on two distinct theoreti-
cal approaches. I apply the specific factors model of international trade to
FDI inflows, following the work of scholars such as Pinto and Pinto (2008),
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Pinto (2013), and Pandya (2010, 2014). I also rely on the work of Persson,
Tabellini, and Roland (1997, 1998b, 2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2005),
who study the policy implications of executive regime types. I then describe
equilibrium provision of FDI incentives, in which executive regime type is
a key political institution that moderates the translation of preferences to-
wards FDI incentives, as derived from FDI’s distributional consequences, into
policy.
2.2 Overview of the literature
2.2.1 The politics of foreign direct investment
Scholarly research on the relationship between FDI and politics has
grown notably in recent years. In linking investment outcomes to politi-
cal institutions, one set of explanations focuses on the differences between
democracies and autocracies. For some scholars, autocracies are seen as
more conducive to FDI because autocratic leaders are less concerned with
domestic political pressures and can thus provide more credible commitment
to policies beneficial to MNCs (Oneal 1994). According to Li and Resnick
(2003), democratic political institutions have three deleterious consequences
for FDI. First, democratic constraints on elected politicians tend to weaken
the oligopolistic or monopolistic positions of MNCs, potentially also increas-
ing pressure to tax MNCs at higher rates. Second, democratic institutions,
such as elections and transparency requirements, prevent host governments
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from offering otherwise generous financial and fiscal incentives to foreign in-
vestors. Third, broader access to elected officials in democracies and wider
political participation offer institutionalized pathways through which indige-
nous businesses can seek protection from foreign competition.
On the other hand, some have predicted that democracies are better for
FDI because they offer lower political risks, which in turn decrease the costs
associated with internalizing production (Jensen 2003). Political risks for
MNCs that are connected to a host country’s regime type include national-
ization and expropriation risk; the possibility of unfavorable revisions of tax
rates, depreciation schedules, or tariff rates; the imposition of capital con-
trols, devaluations, and unexpected interest rate changes, all of which may
affect profitability of investments. As such, democratic institutions may have
a positive effect on FDI because democracy provides checks and balances on
elected officials, which in turn reduces arbitrary government intervention,
lowers the risk of policy reversal, and strengthens property rights protection
(North and Weingast 1989; Li 2009). In other words, controls imposed by
democratic institutions have the effect of limiting policy uncertainty.
The second major approach in the literature focuses on the role of po-
litical constraints, which takes its cue from the transactions costs literature
(Williamson 1979). Tsebelis (1995, 2000) defines these political constraints
as veto players. According to veto players theory, fundamental political dif-
ferences between countries are closely connected to the number of individual
or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change to the status
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quo. As Henisz (2000a) notes, frequent and potentially arbitrary changes in
economic policies increase investor uncertainty and raise hurdle rates for pri-
vate investment. In addition, institutional environments in which economic
returns can easily be secured through political channels leads individuals to
reallocate resources from economic to political activities. Once an investment
has been made in a country, it is often costly to withdraw. As such, investors
are particularly concerned about policy changes after assets have been de-
ployed abroad. In countries where governments are significantly constrained
from policy changes by political institutions, such as those with a greater
number of veto players, investors are more comfortable making investments
(Henisz and Williamson 1999; Henisz 2000a, 2000b).
Another treatment of the politics of FDI examines the link between
investment and politics through the lens of class conflict. According to the
most prominent account in this approach, known as the triple alliance hy-
pothesis, host governments, domestic businesses, and foreign capital collude
in order to exploit workers (Evans and Gereffi 1982). The prediction here
is that domestic business owners would support foreign investment inflows
as contributing to their strength, while workers would oppose foreign invest-
ment and the costs it brings for worker political strength. My approach relies
on evidence to the contrary, namely that labor is a more consistent supporter
of FDI than domestic capital. In addition, the alliance between domestic and
foreign capital has proven to be unstable and short-lived, when it has existed
(Dominguez 1982).
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A fourth explanation characterizes FDI as footloose capital, which may
negatively affect labor via economic insecurity and income volatility (Scheve
and Slaughter 2004). As economic production has become increasingly glob-
alized, MNCs have greater access to foreign factors of production and thus
an enhanced ability to substitute away from workers in any particular geo-
graphic location. The result is that workers feel more insecure because FDI
increases a company’s elasticity of demand for labor. As labor demand elas-
ticity increases, wage and employment volatility also increase, which raises
worker insecurity. As Pinto (2013) suggests, though, FDI implies a flow of
capital with management responsibility and often involves fixed, illiquid as-
sets. This indicates that FDI is less footloose than portfolio investment, for
example. In other words, while the threat of exit of FDI from a particular
market is real, greater barriers exist as regards exit compared to other forms
of financial flows.
In post-socialist countries, scholars have adopted a few different per-
spectives to explain the politics behind FDI inflows. On one hand, some
accounts rely on purely domestic factors. Beyer (2000) suggests the effec-
tiveness of authorities responsible for privatization and low tax levels have
positive effects on FDI inflows, while a larger number of veto players is detri-
mental. Carsten and Toubal (2004) argue that country risk factors, such as
political uncertainty and instability are important deterrents of FDI. Other
explanations of FDI inflows to post-socialist countries apply theories with a
stronger international focus. Bandelj (2008) draws on constructivist views in
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suggesting that FDI inflows to Central and Eastern Europe should be viewed
as a socially constituted relational process, negotiated by practical economic
actors. In this account, the relational nature of FDI suggests that invest-
ment flows are shaped not only by the host country’s economic and political
characteristics, but are channeled through the existing network of social rela-
tions between countries. Drahokoupil (2008) argues that the pressures of the
transnational environment on FDI inflows should not be overstated, as these
factors need to be translated by domestic actors. In particular, Drahokoupil
suggests that international factors have encouraged the development of so-
called “competition states” in Central and Eastern Europe. The competition
state, in effect, promotes FDI-friendly policies and puts downward pressure
on wages and taxes.
In light of rising income inequality around the world, scholars have
begun to more closely examine the relationship between FDI inflows and in-
equality. According to Bradley et al. (2003), the literature on the drivers
of income inequality can be divided into two approaches. First, it can be
argued that income inequality is a product of domestic factors, such as la-
bor markets and political institutions. Second, inequality may result from
a greater elasticity of demand for labor, as globalized capital can credibly
threaten to relocate from a host country elsewhere. Studies of the impact
of FDI inflows on income inequality have returned mixed results. Jensen
and Rosas (2007) focus on capital inflows to Mexico from 1990 to 2000, find-
ing that Mexican states that attracted higher levels of FDI enjoyed lower
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income inequality relative to states with less FDI inflows. On the other
hand, Reuveny and Li (2003) test the impact of FDI on income inequality on
69 countries from 1960-1996, concluding that FDI increases inequality. Mi-
haylova (2015) studies data from ten post-socialist countries in Central and
Eastern Europe, noting that the effect of FDI on income inequality depends
on levels of economic development and human capital. The effect of FDI
inflows on income inequality likely has consequences for demand for FDI and
FDI incentives. yet significant uncertainty remains about the nature of the
relationship between FDI and inequality.
2.2.2 The politics of FDI incentives
According to Dunning (1988), MNCs make decisions about foreign invest-
ments according to the OLI framework, which consists of three dimensions:
ownership, location, and internalization. Ownership means that firms engage
in FDI projects because of characteristics specific to the company, such as
intangible assets, technological capabilities, or product innovation. Internal-
ization means that a firm draws upon its capacities in order to coordinate
activities internally in the value-added chain, as opposed to licensing or con-
ducting a joint venture. Location means that firms exploit institutional and
productive factors of the target setting. As such, FDI incentives fall under
the location dimension of the OLI framework.
MNC decisions to invest abroad are affected by the locational charac-
teristics of the host country. These include factor endowments, level of eco-
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nomic development, macroeconomic conditions, and political context (Dun-
ning 1988; Caves 1996). Incentives to attract foreign investors can be seen as
direct government intervention in capital markets, which affects the alloca-
tion of scarce financial resources, influences government revenues, and favors
particular groups at the expense of others (Antaloczy, Sass, and Szanyi 2011).
More explicitly, Li and Resnick (2003) suggest that investment incentives
represent a transfer of benefits from domestic taxpayers to foreign investors.
Other accounts, such as the one I propose below, present FDI incentives as
indirect transfers to the domestic beneficiaries of FDI.
Some scholars posit that FDI promotion programs can cause rent-
seeking behavior when governments directly pick winners and losers in the
market, discriminate against small and local firms, and design incentives pro-
grams without sufficient input from a broad array of domestic stakeholders.
Insofar as MNCs pursue monopolies, incentives may strengthen this impulse
and ability to monopolize host markets (Moran 1999). Those who benefit
from FDI incentives may then use their political power to affect the policy
process, turning FDI incentive programs into the objects of political conflict.
Existing explanations of the politics of FDI incentives fall into two main
categories. One approach relies on the convergence thesis. In this view, gov-
ernments have increasingly chosen to adopt incentive programs under condi-
tions of intensifying competition among national governments for limited in-
vestment capital (Guisinger 1985; Stopford and Strange 1991; Thomas 2000).
With increasing capital mobility and financial integration, governments have
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had to compete with one another to keep existing capital and attract ad-
ditional capital. In order to attract a mobile factor of production such as
FDI, one government might expand use of a policy instrument that increases
the rate of return to that mobile factor, such as corporate tax exemptions,
deployment of investment promotion agency resources, or direct subsidies
to companies. These policy changes create negative externalities for other
states competing for the mobile factor.
From the perspective of game theory, this resembles an n-person “Pris-
oner’s Dilemma” in which every government has a dominant strategy of seek-
ing to make its market more attractive than its neighbors’ markets (Thomas
2000). In the game’s suboptimal equilibrium outcome, the mobile factor re-
mains distributed as before, but all countries and their citizens are worse off
because the costs associated with providing tax exemptions, funding invest-
ment promotion agencies, or paying subsidies are not balanced by the benefits
of increased investment. On the other hand, the owners of the mobile factor
of production reap increased rewards.
Another explanation focuses on how democratic or autocratic political
institutions affect a country’s provision of FDI incentives. According to Shah
and Toye (1978), tax incentives may affect investment via the “illusory com-
pensating effect.” For host countries that lack proper infrastructure, updated
technology, and natural resources, offering generous incentives to attract FDI
might be a way to compensate for these weaknesses. However, the compen-
sating effect of incentives is not merely economic. Janeba (2002) argues that
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countries with low credibility are not attractive hosts for FDI and so gov-
ernments in these countries offer incentives to make up for the credibility
gap. The host institutional environment also sends a signal to investors,
particularly regarding the extent of property rights protection and govern-
ment policy credibility. Host countries with better economic and political
locational conditions provide a better investment environment and therefore
higher returns. In order for host countries with more attractive locational
characteristics to successfully attract FDI, governments need not offer the
same levels of incentives as countries with worse locational conditions. As
such, weak property rights protection and low policy credibility in a country
are predicted to be associated with generous incentives to attract FDI.
Li (2006) builds on this approach by examining the differences between
democracies and autocracies with regard to FDI incentives provision. Put
simply, democracies and autocracies offer different levels of FDI incentives
because they differ significantly with regard to property rights protection and
policy credibility. As FDI usually entails fixed costs and challenges in relo-
cating an investment once made, foreign investors face higher costs in terms
of monitoring and enforcing property rights (Frieden 1994). One consequence
of this is declining bargaining power for foreign investors vis-a-vis host gov-
ernments over time, potentially exposing foreign investors to expropriation,
contract issues, and corrupt bargains (Kobrin 1988). Democratic political
institutions, such as a constrained executive, an independent judiciary, and
an open civil society, work together to strengthen the rule of law and secure
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property rights. With the power of leaders constrained, democratic political
institutions also permit diverse interests to gain political representation, and
raise the costs of providing private benefits, which make a state’s commit-
ment to the rule of law more credible (North and Weingast 1989).
Insofar as the rule of law in democracies entails policy credibility and
stronger property rights protections, democratic countries may offer lower
levels of incentives to be equally attractive locations for FDI as autocratic
regimes. Assuming that FDI incentives are contracts between host govern-
ments and foreign investors, Li (2006) finds additional support for the pre-
diction of lower FDI incentives in democracies and higher FDI incentives in
autocracies. In line with the bargaining model in international business (Ko-
brin 1987), a better institutional environment gives host governments more
bargaining power with respect to foreign investors. As more democratic
countries usually have stronger property rights protections and policy credi-
bility, investors expect governments in these countries to uphold agreements
they make (Simmons 2000). This translates into greater bargaining power
on the part of governments in democratic countries, which implies that these
governments need not offer higher levels of incentives to attract investments.
A second reason why this prediction finds support is that because contract
risks are lower in democratic countries, risk adjusted returns from incentives
contracts should be higher for investors, given the same level of incentives.
As a result, investors see lower levels of incentives in democratic countries
equally as attractive as higher levels of incentives in autocratic countries.
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2.2.3 Problems with the literature
A crucial takeaway from this review of the politics of FDI and the poli-
tics of FDI incentives literatures is that certain aspects of domestic politics
have been largely ignored. As Pinto (2013) notes, globalizing forces, degree
of democracy, and level of institutional constraints are indeed important de-
terminants of FDI flows, but because FDI has domestic distributional conse-
quences, the literature needs to include a greater focus on domestic politics.
Specifically, Li’s (2006) article elicits concerns. First, Li assumes that
democracies are homogenous for the purposes of analysis, which is a sig-
nificant assumption, but one shared by many prominent scholars, such as
Przeworski et al. (2000). However, others such as O’Donnell (1994), Zakaria
(1997), Levitsky and Way (2002), and Smith and Ziegler (2008) suggest that
democracies come in a variety of shapes and sizes, some of which are more or
less autocratic than others. It follows that consideration of differences across
the set of global democracies should be examined more carefully.
In particular, the set of post-socialist democracies has had unique tra-
jectories due to the recent past. In furthering ideas about legacies, Ekiert
(2003) contends the impact of communism was greatest on specific paths of
reform and types of transformations during the first post-socialist decade.
Pop-Eleches (2007) argues for the importance of historical legacies in study-
ing the post-socialist countries, while acknowledging that structural condi-
tions alone have not predetermined outcomes in these countries. For ex-
ample, those post-socialist countries with favorable legacies, such as longer
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histories of statehood, democracy, and bureaucratic competence, have had
different experiences with democracy than countries with less favorable lega-
cies. Mishler and Rose (1997) note one particularly distinctive feature in
post-socialist countries, the virtual absence of positive trust in political in-
stitutions. Though healthy skepticism is said to facilitate democratic society
more than blind trust, the overall pattern in post-socialist countries is one of
severe skepticism that borders on outright distrust of political institutions.
The point here is that the legacies of communism help to differentiate the
post-socialist democracies from each other as well as democracies in other
regions. This calls into question Li’s assumption about the homogeneity of
global democracies.
Second, Li assumes that domestic political institutions within democra-
cies, such as executive regime type, are unrelated to government spending on
FDI. Persson et al. (1997, 1998, 2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2005) have
noted, both theoretically and empirically, that a country’s executive regime
type has consequences for the level of domestic spending. In the theory of
the politics of FDI incentives provision I detail below, I seek to address the
lack of focus in the literature on domestic politics by taking into account do-
mestic distributional consequences and the impact of executive regime type
on the level of FDI incentives offered by democratic governments.
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2.3 Theory
In this section, I outline my theory explaining the underprovision of FDI
incentives by democratic presidential regimes and the more generous provi-
sion of FDI incentives by democratic parliamentary regimes. The theoretical
framework I propose here draws on Rodrik (1995) to analyze the demand
and supply conditions of economic policy making. On one hand, individ-
ual preferences and related incentives to organize politically constitute the
demand side of policymaking. On the other hand, the interaction between
politicians’ objective function and the incentives created by political insti-
tutions constitute the supply side of politics. The ultimate policy outcome
depends on politicians’ ability to effect policy changes, which is a function of
institutions that regulate policymaking. To achieve the equilibrium policy,
demand and supply conditions must intersect. Individual preferences, aggre-
gated through politically relevant collective actors, interact with politicians’
objective function in the right institutional setting to produce the policy.
I first describe demand for FDI incentives before turning to supply of FDI
incentives. The section concludes with a characterization of equilibrium FDI
incentives provided in both presidential and parliamentary democracies.
2.3.1 Demand for FDI incentives
In characterizing demand for FDI incentives, I follow a common strategy
employed in the political economy of trade literature, which relies on expected
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returns to factors of production, namely labor and capital. As a baseline,
I assume that economic agents are rational, forward-looking and seek to
maximize the present value of their expected income. In the political economy
of trade literature, the idea that trade and factor flows impact the return of
owners of factors of production is well accepted (Stolper and Samuelson 1941;
Mundell 1957).
In the political economy of trade literature, scholars such as Rogowski
(1989) have examined how relative factor intensities affect the political pres-
sures for and against free trade. In countries with high labor-to-capital ratios,
meaning that capital is the scarce factor, workers are expected to favor free
trade, while capital owners tend to favor protection. This is because workers
benefit from the export of labor-intensive goods and the import of inexpen-
sive capital goods under free trade, while capital owners benefit from higher
prices of capital goods under protection.
Recent work has adopted the returns to factors approach and applied
it to the politics of FDI. For example, Pinto and Pinto (2008) and Pinto
(2013) examine the existence of partisan cycles in FDI performance. These
scholars predict that an incumbent government’s partisanship affects foreign
investors’ decisions: pro-labor governments encourage inflows of the type of
investment that complements labor in production, while pro-capital govern-
ments promote the entry of investment that substitutes for labor. Pandya
(2010) argues that FDI preferences are a function of FDI’s distributional
effects, in particular that labor supports FDI inflows and that this support
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is greater among individuals with high skill levels. Most recently, Pandya
(2014) suggests that FDI’s distributional consequences and a country’s level
of democracy help to explain why politicians chose whether or not to restrict
foreign ownership. In this view, politicians choose foreign ownership regula-
tions when they privilege the interests of a narrow elite, while they support
liberalization when there are political incentives to raise incomes for a broad
range of people.
Following these scholars, I apply the specific factors model of interna-
tional trade to FDI inflows in order to derive distributional consequences for
groups within an FDI host country. According to the theoretical and em-
pirical literature on FDI, workers tend to benefit from FDI inflows (Lipsey
and Sjoholm 2004; 2005), while the return to domestic capital in the host
country tends to fall (Haddad and Harrison 1993; Aitken et al. 1996; Feen-
stra and Hanson 1997; Aitken and Harrison 1999; Feliciano and Lipsey 1999;
Figlio and Blonigen 2000; Lipsey and Sjoholm 2005). By way of FDI, MNCs
hire local workers and introduce more efficient production technologies that
increase labor productivity. Wages tend to be higher in foreign firms. On
the other hand, host country businesses face higher production costs due to
greater labor demand.
Consider a host country economy with two industries and three fac-
tors. Capital is specific to each industry, while labor is mobile across the
two industries. FDI inflows increase the supply of productive capital in one
industry, while the supply of productive capital in the other industry remains
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fixed. Given a certain technology that determines the ability of the foreign
investor to complement either factor of production, an inflow of FDI affects
the returns to labor and capital in the host country across the two indus-
tries. When an inflow of FDI competes wages up by increasing labor demand
and thus pushes rents down, labor favors foreign investment and capital op-
poses it. Assuming that FDI complements labor, labor prefers greater FDI
inflows. By contrast, because FDI substitutes for domestic capital, domestic
business owners oppose FDI. A consequence of increasing returns to labor
and decreasing returns to capital is a decrease in income inequality in the
host country. This occurs because the income of labor rises with increased
demand induced by FDI inflows, while the income of capital declines because
a greater portion of rents have to be paid to labor as wages. The result is a
speeding up of the convergence of the incomes of labor relative to capital.
I posit that while FDI incentives do not directly benefit workers, they
can be considered resource allocations or government transfers designed to
favor one constituency, workers, over another constituency, domestic capital
owners. It follows, then, that those actors who may be harmed by FDI
would seek to limit FDI inflows and thus would not be in favor of FDI
incentives, while those who would benefit from FDI inflows would support
FDI incentives.
With preferences defined, I make the assumption that individual work-
ers and individual owners of capital are able to overcome the collective action
problem to advocate as groups for their preferred policies. For workers, labor
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unions are the primary vehicle for accomplishing this, while business asso-
ciations provide the solution to the collective action problem for domestic
capital.
2.3.2 Supply of FDI incentives
In explaining supply of FDI incentives, I begin by examining the moti-
vations of individual politicians. Why do democratic politicians behave the
way they do? Following the logic of Buchanan (1989), I assume that politi-
cians, like all individuals, seek to further their own narrow self-interest. As
Besley (2004) notes, the most basic self-interest for a politician in a democ-
racy is re-election. From a simple perspective, democracy entails a principal-
agent relationship between the electorate and politicians. The electorate
(the principal), in essence, delegates authority to politicians (agents) on pol-
icy matters. What happens if politicians act contrary to the interests of
the electorate, thus creating a moral hazard? In democracies, situations of
moral hazard are addressed via the reelection mechanism. If politicians do
not do their jobs as per the requirements of the electorate, voters “throw the
bums out.” Put otherwise, self-interested politicians behave in the interests
of voters because if they do not, they lose their jobs.
Democratization, which expands societal political participation, plays
an important role with respect to the politics of FDI incentives. Buena de
Mesquita et al. (2009) define the “selectorate” as that subset of a country’s
population that has political voice and define “winning coalition” as the
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proportion of the electorate whose support is sufficient for leaders to remain
in power. When a country democratizes, the size of both the selectorate and
winning coalition increase, which requires politicians to gain the support
of a larger proportion of the population, as compared to conditions under
autocratic rule. As such, the larger selectorate under democracy gives labor
more political influence as compared to autocracy.
Political institutions, particularly executive regimes, play an important
role in shaping the level of FDI incentives. In his typology of majoritarian
and consensual democracies, Lijphart (1999) articulates two key dimensions,
the executive-parties dimension and the federal-unitary dimension. The con-
trasts noted in Lijphart’s executive-parties dimension, in particular, help to
highlight differences between the two major types of executive regime, pres-
idential and parliamentary. In parliamentary systems, which generally have
executive power sharing across parties, relative balance between executive
and legislative branches, multiple parties, proportional representation, and
corporatist interest groups, politicians are under pressure to form larger coali-
tions to gain and remain in power. By contrast, presidential systems feature
concentrated executive power, a dominant executive vis--vis the legislative
branch, a two-party system, majoritarian and disproportional electoral sys-
tems, and pluralist interest group systems. This structure is less conducive
to large, stable coalitions.
Stepan and Skach (1993) provide a rich description of the differences
between presidential and parliamentary regimes, which helps to highlight how
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each system conditions coalition formation. As they put it, the essence of a
pure presidential regime is mutual independence. This means, among other
things, that there are few incentives for coalitional cooperation. The office
of the president is indivisible and while the president may select members
of other parties to serve in her cabinet, they are selected as individuals and
not as members of an enduring and disciplined coalition. A president may
ultimately be able to advance her legislative agenda by cajoling or purchasing
a legislative majority, but repeated majorities will be difficult to obtain.
On the other hand, Stepan and Skach characterize a pure parliamentary
regime as a system of mutual dependence. Under a parliamentary regime,
the incentive structure is such that creating and maintaining single-party or
coalitional majorities is encouraged.
Over the course of a number of scholarly works in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, Persson, Roland, and Tabellini developed a series of formal mod-
els to characterize the differences between presidential and parliamentary
regimes with regard to coalitional stability and government transfers. In
explaining coalition stability under different regimes, Persson, Roland, and
Tabellini (1997, 1998b, 2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2005) employ two
key theoretical concepts, separation of powers and legislative cohesion. Sep-
aration of powers between legislative and executive authority means more
institutional actors that must be satisfied for a policy to be approved. Pers-
son et al. (1998b) note that separation of powers allows the design of a system
of checks and balances that fulfills two conditions. First, there is a conflict
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of interests between the executive and the legislature. Second, legislative
decision-making requires joint agreement by both bodies. One consequence
is that policy coalitions are unstable in presidential systems. This means that
the beneficiaries of FDI incentives have to successfully “sell” FDI incentives
policy to institutional actors.
In the simplest case, where the institutional actors include only a pres-
ident and parliament, this setup resembles a duopsony. In other words, the
beneficiaries of FDI incentives (i.e. workers) sell the FDI incentives policy to
the two institutional “buyers,” the president and parliament. The president
and parliament, however, have different preferences over spending on FDI
incentives. Because the president represents the entire country, she bears
the full cost of the FDI incentives policy. This implies that she has a lower
appetite for spending. By contrast, each individual legislator only bears a
fraction of the cost. In other words, if the cost of the FDI incentives policy is
$1 million and the legislature has 100 representatives, each representative’s
district only bears 1/100 of the cost ($10,000) but receives the full benefit of
FDI incentives. As a result, the legislature prefers a higher level of spending.
Because the beneficiaries of FDI incentives need the institutional actors to
agree on the “price” of FDI incentives, the FDI incentives are priced at the
lower level preferred by the president. In sum, FDI incentives are offered at
a lower level in presidential regimes
Persson et al. (2000) employ the idea of legislative cohesion, originally
developed by Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) to characterize parliamentary
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regimes. Legislative cohesion refers to disciplined voting by members of a
governing coalition. This arises when it is costly for a majority coalition to
break up, for instance, because it loses valuable agenda-setting powers asso-
ciated with being in power. The result is that the governing coalition has
strong incentives to vote together on proposed legislation. One of the features
of parliamentary regimes is the power to associate a vote on a bill with a vote
of confidence on the entire governing coalition. Coalition partners, who fear
the risk of losing the agenda setting power associated with being in the gov-
erning coalition, have strong incentives to form a stable majority that does
not shift from issue to issue (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998). Under parlia-
mentary regimes, however, higher provision of government transfers and thus
higher tax rates occur because the equilibrium transfer policy must be jointly
optimal for all voters represented in the governing coalition. There are more
voters represented in the governing coalition in a parliamentary regime as
compared to a presidential regime, because parliamentary governing coali-
tions are larger. In turn, all partners in the governing coalition have strong
incentives to collude given the significant costs of losing the agenda-setting
position under non-cooperation.
2.3.3 Equilibrium FDI incentives
The type of executive institution, either presidential or parliamentary,
affects the supply of FDI incentives. In presidential regimes, which feature
separation of powers, politicians are not motivated to form stable coalitions.
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As a result, workers must bargain with institutional actors to obtain FDI
incentives, which drives down the level of incentives provided.
In parliamentary regimes, which are characterized by legislative co-
hesion, politicians have greater incentives for collusion because the vote of
confidence mechanism provides the potential for premature coalition dissolu-
tion. As a result, the large, stable coalitions in parliamentary systems must
satisfy a larger number of constituents in the interest of maintaining sta-
bility. Because labor outnumbers capital, parliamentary coalitions support
policies that benefit labor to a great extent. It follows that higher levels of
FDI incentives are supported in parliamentary systems, to the benefit of a
large portion of the population.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I set the stage for the introduction of my theory of the
politics of FDI incentives provision by characterizing the relevant literatures
on FDI and FDI incentives. After identifying gaps in the extant literature,
I present my theory. I first argue that FDI inflows have distributional con-
sequences, namely that labor benefits from FDI inflows and FDI incentives,
while capital is hurt by FDI inflows and FDI incentives. I then posit that,
within democracies, the type of executive regime moderates the translation
into policy of FDI incentives preferences. Due to variation in coalition stabil-
ity, parliamentary systems provide generous levels of FDI incentives, while
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presidential systems provide lower levels of FDI incentives. In Chapter 3,
I formalize my theoretical approach using the tools of game theory. I de-
rive testable hypotheses, which I subsequently examine in the cross-national
empirical analysis of Chapter 4. The post-socialist case studies presented
in Chapters 5 and 6 allow me to dig deeper into the mechanisms underpin-
ning my theoretical approach. Simultaneous political and economic trans-
formations as well as intensification of globalization around the moment of
transition make the post-socialist cases particularly worthy of examination.
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Chapter 3
A political economy model of
FDI incentives
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, I characterize the literature on the politics of FDI and
FDI incentives, identifying gaps that merit further analysis. I suggest that
the politics of FDI incentives literature, in particular, would benefit from
a greater focus on domestic politics. In particular, the literature overlooks
heterogeneity among democracies and the impact of political institutions,
namely executive regimes, in explaining the provision of FDI incentives. I
address these issues by combining theories concerning the distributional con-
sequences of FDI inflows and the policy effects of executive regime types to
build a theory of the politics of FDI incentives provision. My theory pre-
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dicts that parliamentary democracies, characterized by legislative cohesion,
provide generous levels of FDI incentives. On the other hand, I predict that
presidential democracies, which feature separation of powers, do not provide
generous levels of FDI incentives.
For the purposes of this chapter and the empirical analysis in Chap-
ters 4, 5, and 6, I make an important assumption about differences between
parliamentary and presidential democracies. As noted above, I characterize
parliamentary democracies as featuring legislative cohesion and presidential
democracies as having separation of powers. In the interest of facilitating
the derivation of testable hypotheses in this chapter and examining these
hypotheses in the subsequent empirical chapters, I assume that parliamen-
tary and presidential democracies can be both located on a continuum of
legislative cohesion. Parliamentary democracies, which feature the vote of
confidence mechanism that encourages stable coalition formation, have high
levels of legislative cohesion. At the opposite end of the legislative cohesion
continuum, presidential democracies have conflicting interests, which results
in unstable coalitions. Compared to parliamentary democracies, legislative
cohesion is lower in presidential democracies.
In this chapter, I present a formal derivation of the logic behind my
theory of the politics of FDI incentives provision. Using the tools of game
theory, I derive a testable hypothesis relating directly to my main theoretical
prediction, that higher levels of legislative cohesion in parliamentary systems
leads to higher provision of FDI incentives. I also derive a second testable
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hypothesis examining the interaction effect of FDI inflows on my main the-
oretical prediction. This hypothesis suggests that the interaction between
legislative cohesion and FDI inflows leads to lower provision of FDI incen-
tives.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. I first characterize the
legislative bargaining framework that underpins my model by way of a brief
literature review. I then present models for parliamentary and presidential
regimes, examining the effect of legislative cohesion on equilibrium provision
of FDI incentives. For each model, I describe the actors and their available
actions, before presenting actor utilities. Next, I describe the order of play
before moving to a discussion of the equilibrium solution concept and equi-
librium. I then conduct simple comparative statics exercises on each model.
This process allows me to demonstrate how the mechanisms of legislative
bargaining in each executive regime and the consequences of legislative cohe-
sion influence equilibrium levels of FDI incentives provided. I then present a
testable hypothesis derived from this approach.
The next set of models focuses on how FDI inflows interact with leg-
islative cohesion to influence the equilibrium provision of FDI incentives in
parliamentary and presidential regimes. As the legislative bargaining process
remains the same as in the first two models, I focus only on the utility con-
sequences of FDI inflows for actors in each executive regime type. For each
of the two models, I describe the actors and their available actions, before
presenting actor utilities. After deriving equilibrium levels of FDI incentives,
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I then conduct simple comparative statics exercises, which allow me to char-
acterize the specific role of FDI inflows. I also present a testable hypothesis
based on conclusions drawn here. I then sum up results from the analysis in
a concluding section.
3.2 Legislative bargaining over FDI incentives
The approach I use in this chapter draws on Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989)
seminal model of policy choice in small groups, which they describe as “leg-
islative bargaining.” Baron and Ferejohn, in turn, build upon Rubinstein’s
(1982) model of two-player bargaining. As McCarty and Meirowitz (2007)
describe it, Rubenstein’s model postulates that two players seek to decide
how to divide $1. The players take turns making offers, meaning that player
1 makes proposals in periods 0, 2, 4, 6,...N, while player 2 makes proposals in
the other periods. Until a proposal is accepted by the other player, the game
continues. One key feature of the Rubinstein model is that in order for agree-
ment on allocation to be reached, unanimous consent is required. As it were,
this approach eliminates a number of important political settings where only
a simple majority or supermajority is required for agreement. The key move
by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) was to extend the basic Rubinstein model to
a simple majority rule with three or more bargainers.
As Gehlbach (2013) notes, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) consider a sin-
gle policy problem, which concerns the distribution of a resource among a
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legislature governed by majority rule. This resource is rival and excludable.
According to social choice theory, there is no Condorcet winner in this en-
vironment if the number of legislators is three. In other words, collective
preferences can be non-transitive, even if individual preferences are transi-
tive. However, as the Rubinstein and Baron-Ferejohn models show, with a
small number of restrictions on the set of equilibria, it is possible to charac-
terize the nature of the equilibrium policy chosen by the collective.
The Baron-Ferejohn model has been generalized and applied to a num-
ber of important questions in political science and economics. Chari et al.
(1997) use the model to analyze split-ticket voting and government spending
under different democratic executive regimes, arguing that overall spending
is too high only if a president’s powers are limited. These authors suggest
that overall spending is always high in a parliamentary system, relative to
a presidential system. Eraslan (1999) uses the model to study corporate
bankruptcy and focuses particularly on how surplus resources, after initial
bargaining, are allocated among negotiating partners. A class of two-level
models by Iida (1996) and Mo (1994) examine international agreement rat-
ification using Baron-Ferejohn models. Tarrar (2001) extends these models
and finds that whether domestic constraints benefit an executive in obtaining
agreement ratification can depend crucially on whether the other executive
is also constrained. Tarrar (2005) then uses Baron-Ferejohn models to exam-
ine international agreement ratification across presidential and parliamentary
executive regimes. To my knowledge, the models presented in this chapter
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are the first to analyze FDI incentives using the Baron-Ferejohn framework.
The basic setup for the models draws on Weingast et al. (1981), Chari
et al. (1997), and Baqir (2002). In the models presented in this chapter, the
resource to be distributed is a shared tax base. As noted above, I assume
that FDI incentives are indirect redistributive transfers to a particular group
in society. For the remainder of the chapter, I refer to these transfers as
spending on FDI incentives.
Since the individual legislator’s district bears only a fraction of the cost
of spending on FDI incentives, each legislator has an incentive to overspend.
This is the case for legislators in both parliamentary and presidential regimes.
On the other hand, the executive’s district bears the full cost of the FDI
incentives spending, which implies that the executive lacks the same incentive
to overspend as the legislator. Actors bargain in the context of a simple one-
period legislative “ultimatum game,” in which the agenda setter makes a
take-it or leave-it offer to the other actors. In both executive regimes, the
agenda setter is a member of the legislature. I assume also that both regime
types throughout are democracies.
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3.3 Baseline models: parliamentary and
presidential regimes
3.3.1 Parliamentary regime
Actors
Assume there are N legislators bargaining over a divisible resource
x ≥ 0, which here is taken to mean spending on FDI incentives. When
presented with a proposal xi, each legislator can either accept or reject the
proposal.
Actor utilities
All legislators are assumed to have complete information. Spending on
x provides each legislator with benefits according to the function g(x). As-
sume also that g(x) satisfies the following conditions (Inada 1963):
1. The value of the function g(x) at 0 is 0, i.e. g(0) = 0.
2. The function is continuously differentiable.
3. The first derivative of g(x) is g′ > 0. This implies that the function is
strictly increasing in x.
4. The second derivative of g(x) is g′′ < 0, which implies that the function
is concave with a global maximum and decreasing marginal returns.
5. The limit of the first derivative is positive infinity as x approaches 0, i.e.
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g′(0) =∞.
6. The limit of the first derivative is 0 as x approaches infinity, i.e. g′(∞) = 0.
In order to pay for x, legislators use tax revenue. Assume that taxation
of constituents imposes a constant marginal cost of unity on each legislator.
This means that each legislator pays the same, constant amount for extract-
ing this tax revenue. Each legislator represents an equal-sized constituency,
such that her constituents only need to pay x
N
of the cost. The a term de-
notes legislative cohesion, which represents the effects on coalition stability
associated with different executive regime types. The multiplicative term ax
represents the impact of legislative cohesion on a particular aspect of govern-
ment spending, FDI incentives. I assume a > 0. By including the ax term
in each actor’s utility function, I ensure the institutional effects of legislative
cohesive play a key role in the subsequent bargaining games.
I define the utility of each legislator i ∈ 1, 2, ..., N as
ui(x) = g(x)− x
N
+ ax (3.1)
I proceed under the assumption that each legislator has quasi-linear
utility, which implies that her utility is strictly quasi-concave in x and that
a unique ideal point exists for each legislator, where marginal benefits equal
marginal costs.
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What is each legislator’s preferred level of x ? I proceed by maximizing
ui.
max
x
g(x)− x
N
+ ax
The first order condition for this maximization problem is given by
g′(x)− 1
N
+ a = 0 (3.2)
In order to solve for x, I first isolate g′(x)
g′(x) =
1
N
− a
I then apply the inverse of g′ to both sides of the equation
g′−1(g′(x)) = g′−1(
1
N
− a)
Simplifying the left hand side, I obtain
xi = xL = g
′−1(
1
N
− a) (3.3)
Order of play
In order for x to pass, the proposal needs the support of n = N+1
2
votes.
The agenda setter is the representative of a majority of the legislators, such
as the prime minister. The agenda setter makes a take-it or leave-it offer to
the current legislative session, which is considered bargaining under a “closed
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rule.” This basically means that no amendments can be made to the proposal.
After the legislature decides to accept or reject the proposal in this single
period, the game is over. The order of play is as follows:
1. The agenda setter proposes x1.
2. The legislature chooses to accept or reject x1. If the legislature accepts,
x1 is implemented. If the legislature rejects x1, a status quo policy xs is
implemented, where xs < xL .
3. The game ends.
Equilibrium solution concept and equilibrium
The equilibrium solution concept I use here is subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (SPNE). This means that each legislator plays Nash, meaning
that she provides a best response to a best response in each subgame of
the overall game. I characterize the SPNE to this game using the usual
backwards induction method. If the agenda setter proposes x1 < xL, she
knows that the legislature will reject it. In addition, the agenda setter would
not propose any x1 < xL because this would fail to satisfy her own utility. As
a result, the agenda setter will propose x∗=xL, which the legislature approves
by majority rule. In equilibrium, where P stands for parliament, then:
x∗P = xL (3.4)
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Comparative statics
To examine the effect of legislative cohesion of equilibrium levels of FDI
spending, I conduct a simple comparative statics exercise. Taking equation
3.3, I maximize with respect to a, the legislative cohesion parameter. Note
that in light of the Inada conditions assumed earlier, g′ is positive.
max
a
g′−1(
1
N
− a)
By the chain rule, and because of the properties of g(x) enumerated above,
it follows that
−g′′−2(−1) > 0
As assumed in the Inada conditions, g′′ is negative. This reduces to
g′′−2 > 0 (3.5)
As equation 3.5 shows, the effect of increasing legislative cohesion is
positive.1 In other words, increasing levels of legislative cohesion have the
effect of increasing the equilibrium level of FDI spending in the context of
parliamentary regimes.
1Equation 3.5 indicates that the first derivative of the equilibrium result in equation
3.3 is positive. In other words, the effect of the legislative cohesion term a has a positive
effect on the level of FDI incentives spending x.
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3.3.2 Presidential regime
Actors
Assume now that there are N legislators and an independent executive
bargaining over the divisible resource x ≥ 0, spending on FDI incentives.
Individual legislators can accept or reject the proposal x. Once the proposal
is approved by the legislature, the legislative agenda setter presents the pro-
posal to the independent executive, who can accept or reject it. All actors
have complete information.
Actor utilities
Individual legislator utilities are identical to those described in the par-
liamentary regime. For the executive’s utility, assume that the Inada condi-
tions hold and that the executive has quasi-linear utility, meaning that her
utility is strictly quasi-concave in x and that a unique ideal point exists for
her. The executive holds the power of veto and represents the entire country.
In presidential regimes, legislative cohesion a also impacts the equilibrium
provision of FDI incentives. However, I posit that presidential regimes have
lower levels of legislative cohesion, which in turn affect levels of spending on
FDI incentives. By setting the ax term as negative, I indicate that the low
levels of legislative cohesion in presidential regimes negatively impacts the
level of FDI incentives provided. I represent the executive’s utility as follows:
uE(x) = g(x)− x− ax (3.6)
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The executive’s preferred level of x is found by maximizing uE.
max
x
g(x)− x− ax
The first order condition for this maximization problem is given by
g′(x)− 1− a = 0
In order to solve for x, I first isolate g′(x)
g′(x) = 1 + a
I then apply the inverse of g′ to both sides of the equation
g′−1(g′(x)) = g′−1(1 + a)
Reducing the left hand side, I obtain
xE = g
′−1(1 + a) (3.7)
Order of play
In order for x to pass, the proposal needs the support of n = N+1
2
votes.
Under a presidential regime, the agenda setter is the representative of the
largest party in the legislature. This could be, for example, the speaker of the
House of Representatives in the U.S. Congress. The legislative agenda setter
makes a take-it or leave-it offer to the current legislative session, under a
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“closed rule.” No amendments can be made to the proposal. The legislature
decides to accept or reject the proposal in this single period.
The bargaining game between the legislature and executive follows,
with the legislature acting as agenda setter. Based on what it decides, the
legislature then makes a take-it or leave-it offer to the executive x2. After the
executive decides to accept or reject the proposal, the game ends. I outline
the game below.
1. The legislative agenda setter proposes x1.
2. The legislature chooses to accept or reject x1. If the legislature accepts,
x1 is to be sent to the executive. If the legislature rejects x1, a status quo
policy xs is to be sent to the executive, where xs < xL . The policy sent to
the executive is x2.
3. The legislature proposes x2 to the executive.
4. The executive chooses to accept or veto x2. If the executive accepts, x2 is
implemented. If the executive vetoes x2, a status quo proposal xs is imple-
mented, where xs < xE < xL.
5. The game ends.
Equilibrium solution concept and equilibrium
Once again, the equilibrium solution concept is SPNE and I solve the
game using backwards induction. The intuition is similar to a Romer and
Rosenthal (1979) type model, which features some symmetric loss function
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around an ideal point. The executive, as the veto player, will accept any
proposal that is closer to her ideal point xE than to the status quo xs. The
executive will accept any proposal xi that is further to the right than xs, up
to the point where xi is so far to the right that it makes her worse off than
xs. This can be represented as xE + (xE − xs) = 2xE − xs. The idea is that
as xs converges on xE, the range for which the executive accepts a proposal
collapses to a single point.
Given the strict quasi-concavity of the executive’s utility function and
the assumption that xs < xE, we can define a value of x ≡ x˜E > xs such that
uE(xs) = uE(x˜E). Assume also that uE(xs) > uE(xL). The executive’s best
response is therefore to accept any proposal x1 = x˜E and to veto any other
proposal. The legislature’s strategy, then, is to propose x1 = x˜E. As result,
the equilibrium is (where Pr stands for president):
x∗Pr = x˜E, (3.8)
Comparative statics
To examine the effect of legislative cohesion, I again conduct a simple
comparative statics exercise. Taking equation 3.7, I maximize with respect
to a, the legislative cohesion parameter. Note that in light of the Inada
conditions assumed earlier, g′ is positive.
max
a
g′−1(1 + a)
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By the chain rule, and because of the properties of g(x) enumerate above,
it follows that
−g′′−2(1) < 0
As assumed in the Inada conditions, g′′ is negative. This reduces to
−g′′−2 < 0 (3.9)
As equation 3.9 demonstrates, the effect of low legislative cohesion on
the equilibrium level of FDI spending in presidential regimes is negative.
3.3.3 Discussion
The comparative statics exercises for both the parliamentary and presi-
dential models return two basic conclusions: high levels of legislative cohesion
in parliamentary regimes have a positive effect on the equilibrium level of FDI
spending, while low levels of legislative cohesion in presidential regimes have
a negative effect. A simple comparison of equilibrium outcomes from the two
models demonstrates that preferred levels of spending on FDI incentives in
presidential systems x∗Pr is lower than spending in parliamentary systems x
∗
P .
As uE(xs) > uE(xL), this means that x
∗
P = xL > x
∗
Pr = x˜E.
Accordingly, I produce the following hypothesis:
H1: Democratic governments with higher levels of legislative cohesion provide
higher levels of FDI incentives
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3.4 FDI inflows and executive regimes
It is possible that opposition to FDI inflows gains strength as the level of
FDI inflows increases. Following Rogowski (1989), it is likely that the domes-
tic beneficiaries of increased FDI inflows will seek to maintain or accelerate
FDI inflows, while those injured will endeavor to slow or stop inflows. As
more foreign companies capture more of the domestic market share, domestic
capital collective action through lobbying may be facilitated at higher levels
of intensity, as smaller groups are more easily able to overcome the collec-
tive action problem (Olson 1965). More intense lobbying by domestic capital
may weaken politician support for FDI incentives in both presidential and
parliamentary systems. In order to explore these claims, I run two additional
comparative statics exercises on actor utilities from the parliamentary and
presidential models above. As the legislative bargaining framework in each
model remains the same, I do not repeat it below. To represent FDI inflows,
I introduce the additional parameter b .
3.4.1 Parliamentary regime
All legislators are assumed to have complete information. Spending on
x provides each legislator with benefits according to the function g(x). As
above, assume also that g(x) satisfies the usual Inada conditions. Legisla-
tors have quasi-linear utility, implying that each legislator has strictly quasi-
concave utility in x and a unique ideal point exists for each legislator where
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marginal benefits equal marginal costs.
In order to pay for x, legislators use tax revenue. Assume that taxation
of their constituents imposes a constant marginal cost of unity on each leg-
islator. This means that each legislator pays the same, constant amount for
extracting this tax revenue. Each legislator represents an equal-sized con-
stituency, such that her constituents only need to pay x
N
of the cost. Levels
of legislative cohesion impact the level of spending on FDI incentives, which I
represent as a. I now introduce a new parameter b, which represents the level
of FDI inflows. The multiplicative term bx denotes the combined effect of
FDI inflows on FDI incentives spending. I assume that b > 0. The inclusion
of the bx term in each actor’s utility function ensures that the consequences
of FDI inflows on FDI incentives spending play a role in the following bar-
gaining games. I define the utility of each legislator i ∈ 1, 2, ..., N as
ui(x) = g(x) + ax− ( x
N
+ bx) (3.10)
What is each legislator’s preferred level of x ? I proceed by maximizing
ui.
max
x
g(x) + ax− ( x
N
+ bx)
The first order condition for this maximization problem is given by
g′(x) + a− ( 1
N
+ b) = 0
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In order to solve for x, I first isolate g′(x)
g′(x) =
1
N
+ b− a
I then apply the inverse of g′ to both sides of the equation
g′−1(g′(x)) = g′−1(
1
N
+ b− a)
Reducing the left hand side, I obtain
xi = xL2 = g
′−1(
1
N
+ b− a) (3.11)
Comparative statics
In order to determine the effect of FDI inflows on the equilibrium level
of FDI incentives provided, I conduct a simple comparative statics exercise by
maximizing xL2 with respect to b. Note that in light of the Inada conditions
assumed earlier, g′ is positive.
max
b
g′−1(
1
N
+ b− a)
By the chain rule, and because of the properties of g(x) enumerated above,
it follows that
−g′′−2(1) < 0
As assumed in the Inada conditions, g′′ is negative. This reduces to
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−g′′−2 < 0 (3.12)
As equation 3.12 demonstrates, the effect of increasing levels of FDI
inflows on the equilibrium level of FDI spending in a parliamentary regime
is negative.
3.4.2 Presidential regime
In the presidential regime model, I focus only on the executive’s utility,
as this determines the equilibrium level of FDI spending. As before, assume
that the Inada conditions hold and that the executive has quasi-linear util-
ity, meaning that her utility is strictly quasi-concave in x and that a unique
ideal point exists for her. The executive holds the power of veto and repre-
sents the entire country. The legislative cohesion and FDI incentives effect
is represented as before by ax. As with the parliamentary model in this sec-
tion, the bx term represents multiplicative effect of FDI inflows. I denote the
executive’s utility as follows:
uE(x) = g(x)− (x+ ax+ bx) (3.13)
The executive’s preferred level of x is found by maximizing uE.
max
x
g(x)− (x+ ax+ bx)
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The first order condition for this maximization problem is given by
g′(x)− 1− a− b = 0
In order to solve for x, I first isolate g′(x)
g′(x) = a+ b+ 1
I then apply the inverse of g′ to both sides of the equation
g′−1(g′(x)) = g′−1(a+ b+ 1)
Reducing the left hand side, I obtain
xE2 = g
′−1(a+ b+ 1)
Comparative statics
In order to determine the effect of FDI inflows on the equilibrium level
of FDI incentives provided, I conduct a simple comparative statics exercise by
maximizing xE2 with respect to b. Note that in light of the Inada conditions
assumed earlier, g′ is positive.
max
b
g′−1(a+ b+ 1)
By the chain rule, and because of the properties of g(x) enumerated above,
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it follows that
−g′′−2(1) < 0
As assumed in the Inada conditions, g′′ is negative. This reduces to
−g′′−2 < 0 (3.14)
As equation 3.14 demonstrates, the effect of increasing levels of FDI
inflows on the equilibrium level of FDI incentives in a presidential regime is
negative. The above exercises can be taken together to return the following
hypothesis:
H2: The interaction between legislative cohesion and FDI inflows has a neg-
ative effect on levels of FDI incentives provided in democracies
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented a formal derivation of my theory of the
politics of FDI incentives provision. Using a version of the Baron-Ferejohn
legislative bargaining model, I examine how legislative cohesion affects politi-
cian preferences for FDI incentives and how bargaining under different ex-
ecutive regimes produces different equilibrium levels of FDI incentives. I
then explore the interaction effect between increasing levels of FDI inflows
and legislative cohesion on equilibrium levels of FDI incentives. As a re-
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sult, I derive two testable hypotheses. The first hypothesis suggests that
democratic governments with higher levels of legislative cohesion provide
more generous FDI incentives. This implies that parliamentary democracies,
which feature greater legislative cohesion, will be expected to provide higher
levels of FDI incentives. The second hypothesis posits that the interaction
between legislative cohesion and FDI inflows has a negative effect on FDI
incentives provided. In Chapter 4, I empirically examine both hypotheses
using a unique cross-national dataset. Chapters 5 and 6 explore the mecha-
nisms of the first hypothesis in two qualitative case studies from the set of
post-socialist countries.
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Chapter 4
Legislative cohesion and FDI
incentives: results from
cross-national empirical
analysis
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I test the two hypotheses described in Chapter 2 and
formally derived in Chapter 3. According to my theory of the politics of
FDI incentives provision, FDI inflows have distributional consequences that
shape the preferences of domestic groups with respect to FDI incentives.
As moderated by executive regime type, democratic governments implement
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FDI incentives policies based on domestic preferences. FDI inflows compete
up wages for labor and push down the rents received by domestic capital.
As a result, labor prefers incentives to attract FDI, while domestic capital
opposes FDI incentives. Parliamentary regimes, which feature greater leg-
islative cohesion are expected to provide higher levels of FDI incentives. By
contrast, presidential regimes are characterized by lower legislative cohesion
are expected to provide lower levels of FDI incentives. As noted previously,
Hypothesis 1 suggests a positive relationship between legislative cohesion and
levels of FDI incentives offered. Hypothesis 2 focuses on the interaction ef-
fect between legislative cohesion and FDI incentives. Higher FDI inflows do
not necessarily result in greater support for FDI incentives, in part due to
the fact that greater threats to host firms may intensify opposition to FDI
incentives provided. This greater opposition to FDI incentives may weaken
the effect of legislative cohesion. Hypothesis 2, then, predicts a negative
relationship between the interaction of legislative cohesion and FDI inflows
with FDI incentives provided.
To test these hypotheses, I use webscraping and automated content
analysis techniques to build an original dataset of FDI incentives based on
U.S. government documents. I combine my FDI incentives dataset with data
from the Quality of Government database (Teorell et al. 2013). After running
a pooled ordinal probit model, I then examine whether the unbalanced panel
structure of my dataset requires a alternate analytical model specification
by conducting likelihood ratio tests for temporal and regional-level depen-
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dencies. Based on results from the likelihood ratio tests, I then run a fixed
effects ordinal probit model with allowances for temporal and regional-level
dependencies.
The rest of the chapter is as follows. The next section describes the
data, including dependent, independent, and control variables. In line with
my focus on post-socialist countries, I then provide descriptive statistics com-
paring post-socialist countries to the rest of the world. Next, I present the
pooled ordinal probit model and results, providing interpretation with the
assistance of changes in predicted probabilities visuals. I then present the or-
dinal probit model adjusted for the unbalanced panel data structure, describe
results, and present changes in predicted probabilities visuals. A conclusion
sums up.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Dependent variable
Scholars studying FDI incentives are faced with the problem of a paucity
of data. To date, empirical work on FDI incentives in political science has
been largely limited to Li (2006). In Li (2006), the author builds a cross-
national database of tax incentives for FDI, including value-added tax, cor-
porate income tax, property tax, licensing fees, import duties, and sales
tax incentives. The author uses 53 documents covering individual countries
from 2001, called “Country Commercial Guides,” from the U.S. Commercial
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Service, a bureau within the U.S. Department of Commerce. Using manual
coding techniques, the author assigns a value of 1 or 0, depending on whether
the country offered a particular incentive. The level of tax incentives in a
country is then derived by adding up the values on the six types of incen-
tives, ranging from 0 to 6. A higher score corresponds to a higher level of
FDI incentives.
While Li (2006) makes an important step towards a better understand-
ing of the politics of FDI incentives, the dataset used is limited for at least
two reasons. First, the number of observations in Li (2006) is rather small,
at 53. This raises questions about the representativeness of the sample used.
The small sample size is also low for most MLE type models, such as the ordi-
nal probit models Li uses. As King and Zeng (2001) point out, the statistical
literature suggests that logit coefficients are biased in small samples (under
about 200). Second, the “Country Commercial Guides” contain additional
information on FDI incentives beyond tax incentives that would ostensibly
be relevant to the analysis of the politics of FDI incentives, such as whether
or not a country has specialized agencies dedicated to promoting FDI or
assisting foreign companies in navigating bureaucracy.
With these critiques in mind, I build on Li (2006) to develop a larger
dataset and an expanded measure of FDI incentives. In 2003, the U.S.
Commercial Service began calling the documents that contain investment
information on different countries around the world “Investment Climate
Statements.” In order to efficiently collect and classify these documents on
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a larger scale, I used the R software program to collect 1400 “Investment
Climate Statements” from 2005-2014. Each of the documents corresponds to
an individual country-year. I then conducted automated content analysis to
classify the documents in line with Li (2006). After using webscraping tech-
niques to collect and preprocess documents (Feinerer et al. 2008), I hand
coded 140 documents as per Li’s approach, while adding an additional vari-
able to represent whether a country had an “investment promotion agency.”
135 countries are covered in the dataset. Wells and Wint (2002) note that
investment promotion entails the provision of information to potential in-
vestors, creating an attractive image of the country as a place to invest, and
providing services to prospective and current investors. Investment promo-
tion agencies (IPAs) typically provide these services (Cass 2007). I argue
that the existence of an IPA in a country is an important indicator of provi-
sion of FDI incentives and thus include it as a seventh binary variable in my
index of FDI incentives, which ranges from 0-7.
After manual coding was completed, I used the R software to run a
series of four training algorithms, which classified uncoded documents as
per the manually coded documents (Stewart and Zhukov 2009; Jurka et al.
2011). When running the training algorithms, however, I noticed that two
algorithms, support vector machines (SVM) (Pouteau et al. 2012) and ran-
dom forests (Forests) (Breiman 2001), coded the country documents as either
having many more incentives or many fewer incentives than the other two
algorithms, Logitboost (Friedman et al. 1998) and general linearized models
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(GLM) (Jurka 2012). The ultimate result was that the number of incen-
tives coded was significantly lower than expected, given Li’s (2006) data.1
As such, I re-ran the training algorithms with only Logitboost and GLM,
which provided more consistent results. It should be noted that the typical
approach to analyzing results using machine learning techniques assumes a
larger sample size than used here, although a number of studies employ these
techniques on sample sizes comparable to the one used here (e.g., Hopkins
and King 2010). Instead of presenting typical precision and accuracy diag-
nostics, I report data on agreement across the two training algorithms. If
both algorithms agree across all observations, agreement would be equal to
1. As compared to algorithm agreement across the original four algorithms,
agreement between logitboost and GLM is much higher across the board
with no variables having agreement less than 0.72. I also report data on the
proportion of documents that were machined-coded 1.
Table 4.1: Machine Learning Algorithm Diagnostics
Variable Agreement Proportion Coded 1
Value-added tax 0.815 0.172
Corporate tax 0.72 0.131
Property tax 0.913 0.113
Licensing fees 0.928 0.111
Import duty 0.801 0.178
Sales tax 0.928 0.114
Investment promotion agency 0.767 0.163
1I thank Quan Li for providing replication data.
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In order to check coding reliability, I provide a comparison of manually
coded and machine coded observations for each of the seven variables as well
as the total incentives coded for each observation.
Table 4.2: Reliability Checks
Variable Correlation
Value-added tax 0.753
Corporate tax 0.696
Property tax 0.845
Licensing fees 0.929
Import duty 0.746
Sales tax 0.721
Investment promotion agency 0.748
Total incentives 0.784
Figure 4.1: Univariate Distribution of FDI Incentives
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4.2.2 Independent variables
In order to test Hypothesis 1, I employ the Political Constraints Index
III (Henisz 2000) from the 2013 Quality of Government Dataset. The index
measures the feasibility of policy change, defined as the extent to which a
change in the preferences of a political actor would lead to a change in gov-
ernment policy. The index ranges, theoretically, from 0 to 1 and includes
the following: the number of independent branches of government with veto
power over policy change, counting the executive and the presence of an ef-
fective lower and upper house in the legislature (more branches leading to
more constraints); the extent of party alignment across branches of govern-
ment, measured as the extent to which the same party or coalition of parties
controls each branch (decreasing the level of constraint); and the extent of
preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch, measured as legisla-
tive fractionalization in the relevant house (increasing constraints for aligned
executives and decreasing constraints for opposed executives).
As it is constructed, higher Political Constraints Index III scores corre-
spond to lower feasibility of policy change and thus lower legislative cohesion.
However, my main argument suggests that greater legislative cohesion leads
to higher levels of FDI incentives provision. In order to make the results more
intuitive, I invert the Political Constraints Index III scale so that higher scores
correspond to higher legislative cohesion. This variable is called Legislative
Cohesion. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, I expect a positive relationship
between Legislative Cohesion and FDI Incentives. Figure 4.2 depicts the
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univariate distribution of the Legislative Cohesion variable.
Figure 4.2: Univariate Distribution of Legislative Cohesion
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In order to test Hypothesis 2, I create an interaction term for the re-
lationship between legislative cohesion and FDI inflows, Legislative Cohe-
sion*Inflows. By definition, FDI constitutes net inflows of investment that
acquire a sustained management interest (10% or more of voting stock) in
an enterprise operating in an country other than that of the investor. FDI
consists of the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-
term capital, and short-term capital. The variable, drawn from the World
Bank, is measured by net inflows divided by GDP. The range for the FDI
inflows variable is from -161.240 to 172.716. Negative values for the FDI
inflows variable indicate that a capital outflow has taken place. I construct
the interaction term by multiplying the FDI inflows variable by the inverse
Political Constraints Index III variable. The interaction term ranges from
-35.093 to 53.638. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, I predict that the effect of
legislative cohesion on FDI incentives, conditioned on the level of FDI in-
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flows, will be negative. Figure 4.3 depicts the univariate distribution of the
Legislative Cohesion*Inflows variable.
Figure 4.3: Univariate Distribution of Legislative Cohesion*Inflows
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4.2.3 Controls
All control variables are drawn from the Quality of Government database.
I account for five potentially confounding factors. These include FDI inflows,
level of democracy, economic development, size of economy, and interstate
competition. By controlling for FDI inflows, I account for significant dif-
ferences across countries with regard to the volume of FDI inflows, which
may affect provision of FDI incentives. Countries that receive a high volume
of FDI inflows and are more open may be more likely to respond to FDI
incentives competition (Mutti 2003). This suggests that FDI incentives are
higher in these countries. I expect that the level of FDI inflows is positively
associated with the level of FDI incentives. As above, the FDI inflows con-
trol variable, represented below as Inflows, is based on data from the World
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Bank.
Within the universe of democracies, there is significant variation in
property rights protection (Kaufmann et al. 2004, Sunde et al. 2007). In
democracies where property rights protection is weaker, governments may of-
fer FDI incentives to improve locational attractiveness. Additionally, policy
predictability is higher in democracies (Jensen 2003; Li and Resnick 2003;
Pinto 2013). I expect, then, that at higher levels of democracy, tax incen-
tives are lower and vice versa. I use Polity 2 scores to control for level of
democracy (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2013). The Polity 2 scores present
a spectrum of governing authority ranging from fully institutionalized au-
tocracies to mixed, or incoherent, authoritarian regimes to fully institution-
alized democracies (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). The Polity 2 score used here
is a modified version of the Polity variables to facilitate use in time-series
analyses. It alters the combined annual Polity score by converting ”special”
instances of Polity scores to conventional Polity scores, which range from -10
to 10 (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2013). Regimes with a score of -6 to -10
are considered autocracies. As I am analyzing variation in FDI incentives
provided in democracies, I subset out autocracies from the analysis. This
variable is called Democracy.
The size of a country’s economy may affect the level of tax incentives in
a number of ways (Guisinger 1985). Large countries usually have large mar-
kets, as compared to smaller countries, which means that the larger countries
may have greater bargaining power with respect to foreign investors. In addi-
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tion, larger countries may have numerous levels of government, which would
make coordination on FDI incentives, as well as other policies, challenging.
Smaller countries, by contrast, may have smaller and more centralized gov-
ernments, making policy coordination easier. As such, I expect that the size
of a country’s economy is negatively related to the level of FDI incentives.
Following a number of studies such as Resnick (2001) and Li and Resnick
(2003), I use log purchasing power parity GDP from the World Bank for size
of economy and call this variable Size.
A country’s level of economic development may also affect provision of
FDI incentives. As FDI incentives entail budgetary consequences, it can be
postulated that highly developed countries are able to offer FDI incentives
more readily than less developed countries. On the other hand, FDI incen-
tives may send a signal to investors that a country needs to offset certain
locational disadvantages by offering generous incentives to foreign investors.
To control for level of economic development, I use log purchasing power
parity GDP per capita from the World Bank and represent this variable as
Development.
The final two control variables are External Pressure and External
Pressure Squared. Tax competition may occur within a region because of
shared political and cultural characteristics as well as resource endowments
(Guisinger 1985). Because tax incentives entail budgetary consequences, gov-
ernments are unable to offer unlimited incentives. The point is that tax incen-
tives are likely to decline once above a certain threshold. Following Li (2006),
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I compute an average level of incentives index for all countries in a region to
represent the nonlinear effect of international tax competition.2 The effect of
external pressure should be positive, while external pressure squared should
have a negative effect on the level of FDI incentives. Descriptive statistics
for all variables are provided in an appendix to the chapter.
4.3 Post-socialist cases
Before proceeding to the cross-national analysis, I briefly compare the
post-socialist cases to other countries. As noted above, the post-socialist
cases offer a unique environment in which to consider theories developed
in other parts of the world. The singular nature of simultaneous politi-
cal and economic development that post-socialist countries have undergone
since 1989 implies that the post-socialist context acts as a quasi-experimental
setting in which to analyze policy choice.
In this section, I provide descriptive statistics comparing the set of post-
socialist countries3 to the rest of the world. The first set of graphs shows the
univariate distribution of the FDI incentives variable between the two sets
2The regions are as follows: Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central
Asia); Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic); North Africa
and the Middle East (including Israel, Turkey and Cyprus); Sub-Saharan Africa; Western
Europe and North America (including Australia and New Zealand); East Asia (including
Japan and Mongolia); South-East Asia; South Asia; the Pacific; and the Caribbean.
3The post-socialist countries include Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bul-
garia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Russia, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine.
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of countries. As is evident, both sets of countries follow a roughly similar
right-skewed distribution.
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Figure 4.4: Univariate Distribution of FDI Incentives, Post-Socialist Coun-
tries
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Figure 4.5: Univariate Distribution of FDI Incentives, World
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The next set of graphs depict scatterplots for both sets of countries.
While the post-socialist scatter plot shows a modest increase in the density
of FDI incentives when moving from 2 to 3 incentives provided, the world
scatter plot is less clear.
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Figure 4.6: Univariate FDI Incentives and Legislative Cohesion, Post-
Socialist Countries
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Figure 4.7: FDI Incentives and Legislative Cohesion, World
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FDI Incentives and Legislative Cohesion, World
Table 4.3 provides descriptive statistics comparing the post-socialist
and world country sets. While the mean level of FDI incentives is nearly
identical across both sets of countries, the standard deviation for the post-
socialist countries is smaller. However, an F-test demonstrates that the dif-
ference between these two standard deviations is not statistically significant.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics for FDI Incentives, Post-Socialist Countries
vs. World
Subset Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Post-socialist countries 2.646 0.977 0 5
World 2.673 1.18 0 6
Further exploratory analysis is undoubtedly required to compare and
contrast the post-socialist countries with other countries around the world.
4.4 Pooled ordinal analysis
4.4.1 Empirical strategy
The analysis begins with a simple pooled model. While the cross-
national level of FDI incentives is likely continuous, this continuum is latent
and unobservable. The FDI incentives variable I have constructed, however,
is observable and consists of eight ordered categories, ranging from 0 to 7.
The latent model is specified below:
y∗i = β0 + β1 LegislativeCohesioni + β2 LegislativeCohesioni ∗ Inflowsi
+ β3 Inflowsi + βk Controli + i (4.1)
81
4.4. POOLED ORDINAL ANALYSIS
where y∗ is the continuous latent variable, the βs are unknown parameters
for independent variables and various control variables, while i is the error
term. First, β1 measures the effect of legislative cohesion on the level of FDI
incentives. I expect that this is positive, based on Hypothesis 1. β2 is the
effect of legislative cohesion on the level of FDI incentives, conditioned on the
level of FDI inflows. As noted in Hypothesis 2, I expect this to be negative.
Instead of y∗i , I observe the FDI incentives variable yi, which is rank
ordered and limited in terms of the number of categories. I therefore use
ordered probit to estimate the effects of the explanatory variables, Legisla-
tive Cohesion and Legislative Cohesion*Inflows, on the continuum of FDI
incentives offered by different countries. Because hypotheses are directional,
I use a one-tailed test.
4.4.2 Results
In Tables 4.4 and 4.5, I present the results of cross-national empirical
analysis. Table 4.4 does not include the interaction term, while Table 4.5
does. In Table 4.4, Model 1 is the most basic and includes only Legislative
Cohesion and Democracy. Model 2 adds Inflows, while Model 3 includes
controls for economic development and size of economy. Model 4 adds the
external pressure and external pressure squared variables. Table 4.5 follows
a similar pattern, where Model 1 includes only Legislative Cohesion and
Democracy. Model 5 adds the interaction term and the FDI inflows variable.
Model 6 includes controls for economic development and size of economy,
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while Model 7 adds the external pressure and external pressure squared vari-
ables.
Table 4.4: The Effect of Executive Regime Type on FDI Incentives
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Legislative Cohesion 0.484∗ 0.54∗∗ 0.314 0.237
(0.261) (0.265) (0.268) (0.269)
Inflows - 0.0001 -0.0001 0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Democracy -0.018∗ -0.018∗ 0.008 0.005
(0.01) (0.01) (0.011) (0.011)
Size - - -0.008 -0.009
(0.029) (0.029)
Development - - -0.256∗∗∗ -0.254∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.044)
External Pressure - - - 1.628
(1.25)
External Pressure Squared - - - -0.271
(3.09)
N 740 726 716 716
AIC 2253.823 2220.031 2135.077 2128.081
(Standard errors in parentheses)
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10
Table 4.4 demonstrates mixed results for my main hypothesis. Mod-
els 1 and 2 indicate that the effect of Legislative Cohesion on the level of
FDI incentives provided is statistically significant and positive. However,
Models 3 and 4 show that this relationship is positive, but not statistically
significant. Lower AIC scores indicate better model fit, so based on the AIC
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scores provided for Models 1 and 2, Model 2 is the best fit among models
returning positive and significant results for Legislative Cohesion without the
interaction term.
Table 4.5: The Effect of Executive Regime Type on FDI Incentives with
Interaction Term
Variable Model 1 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Legislative Cohesion 0.484∗ 0.988∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗ 0.711∗∗
(0.261) (0.309) (0.312) (0.312)
Legislative Cohesion*Inflows - -0.074∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.026) (0.026)
Inflows - 0.035∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.013) (0.013)
Democracy -0.018∗ -0.019∗ 0.006 0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.011)
Size - - -0.008 -0.008
(0.029) (0.029)
Development - - -0.257∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.044)
External Pressure - - - 1.739
(1.251)
External Pressure Squared - - - -0.545
(3.093)
N 740 726 716 716
AIC 2253.823 2214.031 2128.361 2121.226
(Standard errors in parentheses)
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10
Models 5, 6, and 7 depicted in Table 4.5 include the interaction term.
In these models, the coefficients for non-interacted terms represent the con-
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ditional effect of each non-interaction term on the dependent variable, con-
ditional on the value of the interacted variable being zero. This means that
values for the non-interacted terms correspond to those cases in which the
level of FDI inflows equals zero. Model 1 is repeated from Table 2 in order
to demonstrate that Legislative Cohesion is positive and significant across
all four models, as expected. Taken together with results from Table 4.4,
I find partial support for Hypothesis 1, that governments with higher lev-
els of legislative cohesion are associated with higher levels of FDI incentives
provided.
The coefficient for the interaction term is negative and significant across
Models 5, 6, and 7. These results support Hypothesis 2 that, as moderated by
the level of FDI inflows, the effect of legislative cohesion on FDI incentives
provided is negative. AIC scores, which provide an assessment of relative
model fit, suggest that all four models fit the data similarly. Lower AIC
scores indicate better model fit, so by this metric Model 6 fits the data best.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show partial support for the posited negative effect
of democracy on the level of FDI incentives provided, as suggested by Li and
Resnick (2003) and Li (2006). The basic idea here is that more democratic
countries need not offer as high levels of FDI incentives in order to be as
attractive to foreign investors as less democratic countries. The effect of
FDI inflows on the level of FDI incentives, which can be interpreted as those
instances when legislative cohesion equals 0, has mixed support across Tables
4.4 and 4.5. While Table 4.4 does not provide support for the expected
85
4.4. POOLED ORDINAL ANALYSIS
positive relationship between these variables, Table 4.5 does. The results in
Table 4.5 could be interpreted as meaning that FDI inflows reinforce efforts
to provide more FDI incentives. The control for size of economy was not
significant in the any of the models in which it was employed, while the
control for level of development was negative and significant across all models
in which it was used. The fact that the level of development was found to
be significant suggests that more advanced economies do not need to offer
high levels of FDI incentives in order to attract FDI. Controls for the effect
of FDI incentives competition were not significant across any models.
In order to present a more intuitive picture of the results from this first
stage of analysis, I provide visuals depicting changes in predicted probabilities
for the main hypothesis tested, at both low and high levels of FDI incentives.
Model 2 serves as the basis for the visuals below. Low levels of FDI incentives
correspond to when the FDI incentive index equals 0, while high levels of FDI
incentives correspond to when the FDI incentive index equals 4. I choose
4 as the high level of FDI incentives because the number of observations
for this category was significantly higher than the number of observations
for categories 5, 6, and 7 combined. Each visual includes 95% confidence
intervals.
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Figure 4.8: Change in Predicted Probabilities, FDI Incentives=0
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Holding the other variables to their means or medians, Figure 4.8 shows
changes in predicted probabilities for the effect of Legislative Cohesion when
the level of FDI incentives equals 0. The probability of the level of FDI incen-
tives being 0 decreases from 0.081 to 0.019 as Legislative Cohesion increases.
The narrow confidence intervals, after legislative cohesion approaches 0.3,
suggest a decreasing level of uncertainty about this effect. The larger con-
fidence intervals at lower levels of Legislative Cohesion are likely due to the
relatively few observations on the left hand side of the Legislative Cohesion
spectrum.
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Figure 4.9: Change in Predicted Probabilities, FDI Incentives=4
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Holding other variables to their means or medians, Figure 4.9 shows
changes in predicted probabilities for the effect of Legislative Cohesion when
the level of FDI incentives equals 4. The probability that the level of FDI
incentives equals 4 increases from 0.089 to 0.243 as Legislative Cohesion in-
creases. This provides support for Hypothesis 1. The confidence intervals
narrow as Legislative Cohesion approaches 0.1, but grow wider after Legisla-
tive Cohesion reaches 0.5. This suggests that uncertainty about the effect
increases after Legislative Cohesion reaches 0.5.
4.4.3 Model robustness
I ran robustness checks to reaffirm the above results. I conducted tests
using an alternative measure of differences between parliamentary and pres-
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idential regimes as well as a different measure of democracy. In order to
check the robustness of the legislative cohesion variable, I used the variable
dpichecks (Beck et al. 2001) from the Quality of Government database. This
variable is a measure of the number of veto players in a country, ranging from
0 to 17. I inverted the variable so that higher scores reflect higher levels of
legislative cohesion, as with the original Political Constraints independent
variable. Results were largely significant and robust for Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Next, I replaced the Polity 2 scores with combined Freedom House/Polity 2
scores. Here the scale ranges from 0 to 10, where 0 is the least democratic
and 10 the most democratic. Both Freedom House and Polity scores are
transformed to 0-10 scales and averaged. I subsetted out autocracies, de-
fined as having a Freedom House/Polity2 score of less than 2. Results were
largely significant and robust for both Hypotheses 1 and 2.
4.5 Panel data analysis
4.5.1 Potential issues
The dataset constructed for this chapter can be described as an unbal-
anced country-year panel. This means that each country does not have an
observation for each year accounted for in the data. As such, there are two
issues that the pooled ordinal model specification detailed above does not
address. First, the basic ordinal model does not account for country-level
heterogeneity. In other words, there may be omitted variables that impact
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why countries differ with regard to levels of FDI incentives. As my theory
assumes that differences between countries do have an impact on the level of
FDI incentives offered, it would appear important to account for this hetero-
geneity. Second, the pooled ordinal model does not address the effect of time
on levels of FDI incentives offered. In this section, I address these issues by
specifying a model that better takes into account the structure of my data. I
find the best approach to be one that employs an ordinal probit model with
region-level and time fixed effects.
4.5.2 Model fit comparison
In order to determine whether or not the above issues need to be ad-
dressed, I conduct likelihood ratio tests to compare restricted and unre-
stricted models, as per Beck et al. (1998). The restricted model is the
specification that omits the dummy variables accounting for temporal and
region-level dependencies. There are three unrestricted models that include
temporal, region-level, as well as temporal and region-level dummy variables.
I use region-level dummies instead of country-level dummies for the
following reasons. Initial analysis using country-level dummies resulted in
exclusion of 23 of 177 countries,4 due to lack of variation on the dependent
variable for these countries over the years observed. Region level effects do
4Omitted countries included: Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kitts and Nevis, Belize,
Luxembourg, Monaco, Andorra, Malta, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Azerbaijan, Iceland, Sao
Tome and Principe, Afghanistan, Maldives, Laos, Timor-Leste, and Micronesia
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not lead to this problem. According to studies by Bjornskov et al. (2010)
and Fischer (2010), the use of region fixed effects, defined by geographic
proximity or ethnic distance (language), takes into account regional hetero-
geneity, while assuming country-specific effects to be random. Assuming that
regional dummies sufficiently pick up unobservable between country hetero-
geneity, country-specific effects would be captured by the error term i,t. In
order to estimate region fixed effects, I employ regional dummy variables that
treat Eastern Europe and post-Soviet Union as the omitted category.5
Table 4.4 presents results from the likelihood ratio tests.
Table 4.6: Likelihood Ratio Test Results
Unrestricted model χ2 Degrees of Freedom p < 0.01
Temporal Dummy 38.24 6 Yes
Region dummy 71.06 9 Yes
Temporal and region dummies 115.30 15 Yes
A likelihood ratio test comparing the restricted and temporal dummy
unrestricted models yielded a χ2 statistic of 38.24 with 6 degrees of free-
dom. A likelihood ratio test comparing the restricted and regional dummy
unrestricted models yielded a χ2 statistic of 71.06 with 9 degrees of freedom.
Finally, a likelihood ratio test comparing the restricted and fully unrestricted
model (temporal and regional dummies) yielded a χ2 of 115.30, with 15 de-
5The regions are as follows: Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central
Asia); Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic); North Africa
and the Middle East (including Israel, Turkey and Cyprus); Sub-Saharan Africa; Western
Europe and North America (including Australia and New Zealand); East Asia (including
Japan and Mongolia); South-East Asia; South Asia; the Pacific; and the Caribbean
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grees of freedom. The probability of obtaining these results by chance is
zero. These results suggest that the null hypothesis of the restricted and
unrestricted models being equivalent should be rejected. As such, I conduct
the analysis below using ordinal probit models with region-level and time
fixed effects.
4.5.3 Empirical strategy
Similar to the pooled ordinal probit analysis, I assume a latent and un-
observable continuum of cross-national FDI incentives offered. The FDI in-
centives variable I have constructed is observable, however. The latent panel
model is specified below:
y∗i,t = xi,tβ + fi + jt + i,t (4.2)
where y∗i,t is the continuous latent variable, xi,t is a vector of independent
and control variables, βs are unknown parameters for the independent vari-
ables and various control variables, fi represents regional dummy variables,
jt represents year dummy variables, while i,t is the error term.
Instead of y∗i , I observe the FDI incentives variable yi, which is rank
ordered and limited in terms of the number of categories. This implies an
ordinal model specification, as in the previous analysis. However, the panel
data structure requires modification of the pooled model specification. As
noted by Hsiao (2014), Beck (2001), Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998),
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and others, fixed effects are appropriate if the intention is to make inferences
about observed units. As the dataset used in this chapter has fixed country
units and I do not propose making inferences about a unit grouping beyond
countries, a fixed effects specification is appropriate in addressing this region-
level heterogeneity. I note above why I use regional-level fixed effects, as
opposed to country-level fixed effects. To account for temporal dependence,
Beck et al. (1998) suggest using temporal dummies, which is the approach
I take here. In accounting for temporal dependence, I create a series of
dummy variables with 2005 as the omitted category. 2012 is omitted from
the analysis due to collinearity.
4.5.4 Results
In Tables 4.7 and 4.8, I present the results of fixed effects ordinal probit
analysis. Similar to the analysis conducted above, Table 4.7 shows results
without the interaction term and Table 4.8 provides results with the inter-
action term. Model 8 includes only Legislative Cohesion and Democracy.
Model 9 adds Inflows, while Model 10 includes controls for economic de-
velopment and size of economy. Model 11 adds the external pressure and
external pressure squared variables. Table 4.8 repeats Model 8 for compari-
son purposes, while Model 12 adds the interaction term and Inflows. Model
13 brings in the economic development and size of economy controls, while
Model 14 adds the regional competition variables.
As Tables 4.7 and 4.8 demonstrate, I find a consistently positive, sig-
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Table 4.7: The Effect of Executive Regime Type on FDI Incentives, Panel
Models
Variable Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11
Legislative Cohesion 0.476∗∗∗ 0.532∗ 0.5∗ 0.5∗
(0.28) (0.285) (0.288) (0.288)
Inflows - 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Democracy 0.035∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Size - - -0.013 -0.012
(0.034) (0.034)
Development - - -0.157∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.059)
External Pressure - - - -0.248
(1.533)
External Pressure Sq. - - - 2.63
(3.331)
N 740 726 716 716
AIC 2126.091 2091.544 2052.511 2054.923
(Standard errors in parentheses; Dummy variable coefficients excluded)
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10
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Table 4.8: The Effect of Executive Regime Type on FDI Incentives, Panel
Models with Interaction Term
Variable Model 8 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14
Legislative Cohesion 0.476∗∗∗ 1.321∗∗∗ 1.271∗∗∗ 1.269∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.331) (0.333) (0.333)
Leg. Coh.*Inflows - -0.128∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Inflows - 0.059∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Democracy 0.035∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.012) (0.021)
Size - - -0.012 -0.01
(0.034) (0.034)
Development - - -0.153∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.059)
External Pressure - - - 0.236
(1.533)
External Pressure Sq. - - - 2.38
(3.337)
N 740 726 716 716
AIC 2126.091 2070.769 2033.194 2035.924
(Standard errors in parentheses; Dummy variable coefficients excluded)
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10
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nificant relationship between Legislative Cohesion and FDI Incentives across
all models. This suggests reasonably strong support for Hypothesis 1. Sim-
ilar to the pooled ordinal analysis above, Models 12, 13, and 14 include the
interaction term. As in the pooled ordinal analysis, the coefficient for the
interaction term is negative and significant across Models 12, 13, and 14.
These results support Hypothesis 2, which suggests that as moderated by
the level of FDI inflows, the effect of legislative cohesion on FDI incentives
provided is negative.
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 also depict a positive relationship between levels of
democracy and FDI incentives, in contrast to the pooled models. The models
in Table 4.8 support the idea that FDI inflows are positively associated with
the level of FDI incentives provided. Table 4.8 shows support for the idea that
FDI inflows are positively associated with FDI incentives offered, while Table
4.7 does not provide support. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show that a country’s level
of economic development has a negative effect on the level of FDI incentives
provided, which is consistent with the pooled ordinal models. As before,
controls for size of economy and regional competition were not significant
across all models. Finally, based on AIC scores, Models 10 and 13 best fit
the data.
As above, I provide visuals depicting changes in predicted probabilities
for Hypothesis 1, at both low and high levels of FDI incentives. Model 8
serves as the basis for the visuals shown below. Low levels of FDI incentives
correspond to when the FDI incentive index equals 0, while high levels of FDI
96
4.5. PANEL DATA ANALYSIS
incentives correspond to when the FDI incentive index equals 4. I choose
4 as the high level of FDI incentives because the number of observations
for this category was significantly higher than the number of observations
for categories 5, 6, and 7 combined. Each visual includes 95% confidence
intervals.
Figure 4.10: Panel Data, Changes in Predicted Prob., FDI Incentives=0
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Holding other variables to their means or medians, Figure 4.10 shows
changes in predicted probabilities for the effect of Legislative Cohesion when
the level of FDI incentives equals 0. The probability of the level of FDI
incentives being 0 decreases from 0.031 to 0.013 as Legislative Cohesion in-
creases. The wider confidence intervals are likely related to the small number
of observations at low levels of Legislative Cohesion.
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Figure 4.11: Panel Data, Changes in Predicted Prob., FDI Incentives=4
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Figure 4.11 depicts changes in predicted probabilities for the effect
of Legislative Cohesion when the level of FDI incentives equals 4, holding
other variables to their means or medians. The probability of the level of
FDI incentives being 4 increases from 0.098 to 0.181 as Legislative Cohe-
sion increases. This supports Hypothesis 1. The wide confidence intervals
at low levels of Legislative Cohesion are, again, likely related to the small
number of observations at those particular levels of Legislative Cohesion. In
addition, the confidence intervals become wider after Legislative Cohesion
reaches 0.5, which suggests growing uncertainty about this effect at higher
levels of Legislative Cohesion.
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4.5.5 Model robustness
I ran the same robustness checks as for the pooled ordinal analysis to
reaffirm the panel analysis results, using the inverted dpi checks variable
and the combined Freedom House/Polity 2 variable. Results were largely
significant and robust for both Hypotheses 1 and 2.
4.6 Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter has explored the two hypotheses described
and derived in Chapters 2 and 3. Hypothesis 1 suggests that legislative
cohesion in democracies is positively associated with levels of FDI incentives.
Hypothesis 2 posits a negative association between legislative cohesion, as
moderated by FDI inflows, and the level of FDI incentives offered. In testing
these hypotheses with an original dataset generated using machine learning
techniques, I apply two model specifications. The first comprises a series of
pooled ordinal probit models and the second includes ordinal probit models
with region and time fixed effects.
Results from the pooled ordinal analysis provide mixed support for Hy-
pothesis 1, while the panel models are strongly supportive. Both the pooled
and panel models support Hypothesis 2. I find contradictory evidence re-
garding the contention that democracy has a negative effect on the level of
FDI incentives provided (Li 2006; Li and Resnick 2003). The pooled mod-
els indicate a negative relationship between democracy and FDI incentives,
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while the panel models suggest the opposite. There is also contradictory
evidence regarding the relationship between FDI inflows and levels of FDI
incentives offered. Some of the panel models indicate a negative relationship
between these variables, while some of the pooled models suggest the oppo-
site. Finally, the effect of level of development on FDI incentives provided is
negative across all pooled and panel models, as expected.
While this chapter has established support for my main hypothesis, the
large-N empirical analysis I conduct makes important assumptions about the
causal mechanisms underpinning my theory of the politics of FDI incentives
provision. In moving from causal effects to causal mechanisms, the analysis
in Chapters 5 and 6 shifts the focus to case studies of Poland and Romania.
These chapters consider the distributional consequences of FDI inflows and
executive regime type dimensions from a qualitative perspective.
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Chapter 5
Parliamentarism and FDI
incentives in Poland
5.1 Introduction
In previous chapters, I argue that the distributional consequences of
FDI inflows, conditioned by executive regime type, affect the level of FDI
incentives offered in democracies. I predict that labor prefers FDI and FDI
incentives, while domestic capital opposes FDI and FDI incentives. Evidence
from the cross-national empirical analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that demo-
cratic countries with higher levels of legislative cohesion are more likely to
offer generous levels of FDI incentives. In this chapter and Chapter 6, I shift
gears to take a more qualitative approach in order to explore the mecha-
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nisms underpinning my theory of the politics of FDI incentives provision.1
This chapter presents a case study of Poland, which has had a parliamentary
form of government since 1997. As discussed in Chapter 2 and modeled in
Chapter 3, parliamentary systems are characterized by legislative cohesion,
meaning that members of a governing coalition vote together in a disciplined
manner out of the fear of the coalition falling apart. The result of this
disciplined voting is that spending on FDI incentives must satisfy all voters
represented in the coalition. Because parliamentary coalitions are larger than
presidential coalitions, more voters and thus more workers are represented.
This drives up the level of FDI incentives spending in parliamentary regimes.
As Poland has a parliamentary regime, I expect FDI incentives to be more
generous in this country.
I first look at Poland’s transition from communism in order to under-
stand the constitution of labor and capital in the country since 1989. In
particular, I seek to contextualize the attitude of labor towards FDI and FDI
incentives by discussing labor weakness, party-union linkages, and the effect
of labor-party links on neo-liberal reforms. I then provide an overview of
deliberations between the executive and legislature over a particular episode
of FDI in order to preview how legislative cohesion works with respect to
FDI policy in Poland. Based on the nature of Poland’s transition and the
1I would like to acknowledge the generous support of the Alexander Dubcek Fund
(University of Minnesota) and the Andrew Dickinson Memorial Fellowship (University
of Minnesota, Department of Political Science). Author interviews cited in this chapter
received approval from the University of Minnesota Institutional Review Board, study
number 1409E53647.
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evolution of Poland’s integration into the global political economy, I then
characterize the preferences of labor and capital towards FDI and FDI in-
centives. Next, I describe Poland’s executive regime type, which began as
semi-presidential. Constitutional changes passed in 1997, however, converted
the system into a parliamentary regime. I then discuss my operationalization
of FDI incentives in the Polish case, which takes the form of the adoption and
expansion of special economic zones (SEZs). Based on evidence provided, I
evaluate my theoretical prediction for the Polish case. The chapter also adds
a discussion of a finding from the Polish case that may have implications for
theories based on the distributional consequences of FDI. A brief summary
concludes the chapter.
5.2 Transition
The collapse of communism gave way to at least three simultaneous
transformations in former communist countries (Przeworski 1995; Kuzio 2001).
Countries like Poland faced the challenges of marketization, democratization,
and institution building. Unlike other post-communist countries, such as
Russia or Romania, Poland did not face the fourth challenge, that of nation-
building (Kuzio 2001). After the annihilation of Poland’s sizeable Jewish
population during the Holocaust, the country took on a virtually monoeth-
nic composition.
At the beginning of transition, the Polish economy differed from other
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formerly socialist economies in a number of important ways. Hyperinflation
was critical, external debt was immense, and labor maintained a particu-
larly strong socio-political position. In contrast to other former members of
COMECON, a quasi-autarkic trading bloc dominated by the USSR, Poland
was less economically dependent on the USSR. In addition, economic cen-
tralization was less of a problem and private ownership in agriculture was
greater than in other formerly socialist countries (Balcerowicz 1994).
According to Przeworski (1991), the intention of economic reforms in
the post-communist period was to facilitate the creation of an economy that
rationally allocates resources and in which the state is financially solvent. In
order to accomplish these goals, a few key reforms were necessary. These
included price deregulation, shrinking the number of monopolies, lowering or
ending protective barriers, reducing state spending, more effective tax collec-
tion, and privatization. By design, these reforms lead to a fall in aggregate
consumption, which hurts many societal actors. Over the long-term, how-
ever, the reforms lead to a increase in aggregate consumption. This approach
led to Przeworski’s formulation of the famous “J” curve.
Observing the trajectories of different post-socialist countries in the
1990s, Hellman (1998) noticed that some countries had been more successful
than others in carrying out economic reforms. Hellman argues that the most
common obstacles to the progress of economic reforms in post-socialist coun-
tries have come from enterprise insiders who asset strip, commercial bankers
who benefit from arbitrage opportunities in distorted financial markets, lo-
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cal officials eager to maintain narrow monopolies, and the so-called mafia
that benefits from a continued shadow economy. In effect, these actors have
endeavored to prevent additional reforms in order to accrue rents for them-
selves, at great cost to the rest of society. Hellman calls this the partial
reform equilibrium.
Poland, however, has largely avoided the partial reform equilibrium.
This success can be largely traced to the role played by the trade union Sol-
idarity, which facilitated mass political action leading to the fall of Poland’s
Communist regime. According to Jowitt (1992), Poland was unique in the
post-communist world for having developed a non-regime oriented mass fol-
lowing during the Communist period. Though the 1980 strikes marked the
emergence of Solidarity as a major political actor, Garton-Ash (1999) traces
the rise of Solidarity to December 1970, when striking workers at the Lenin
Shipyard in Gdansk were murdered by the regime. After the 1980 strikes,
Solidarity membership grew to 10 million and the foundation for the mass
politics facilitating Poland’s transition from communism was laid.
However, mass politics do not necessarily guarantee successful politi-
cal outcomes. As Ekiert and Kubik (1999) note, mobilized masses are often
considered to be dangerous carriers of anti-systemic ideologies. In Poland
though, mass political protests signaled the breakdown of the authoritarian
order and created a widespread sense that there were alternatives to that
order. In addition, the protests gave opposition leaders a resource advantage
when bargaining with authoritarian elites and provided post-socialist leaders
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with a significant mandate for carrying out far-reaching economic and politi-
cal reforms (Bunce 2003). In effect, Solidarity emerged as the representative
of society against communism, moving beyond its identity as a trade union
defending the interests of workers to a movement of the entire nation against
an unwelcome political power (Bielasiak 1992).
With yet another wave of strikes engulfing Poland in spring and sum-
mer of 1988, the Jaruzelski government gave into demands for the relegaliza-
tion of Solidarity and allowed partially free elections to be held in June 1989.
When Solidarity took power in September 1989, with Tadeusz Mazowiecki,
an anti-Communist, Catholic, and Solidarity supporter, as prime minister,
the road to fundamental transformation was open (Slay 2000). In 1990, Sol-
idarity leader Lech Walesa won presidential elections and in October 1991,
Poland held entirely free parliamentary elections. The rapid change of lead-
ership and early, successful, free elections suggest that democracy quickly
took root in Poland.
Though the political and economic reforms pushed by the Solidarity-led
government were not promised to be easy, the fact that transition from com-
munism was widely supported by the population greatly assisted Poland in
avoiding the partial reform equilibrium. Once the “shock therapy” economic
reforms had begun, there was no going back. Although Solidarity’s influence
declined significantly as the bite of economic reform further depressed the
Polish economy, the role of the trade union in facilitating Poland’s transition
cannot be underestimated.
107
5.3. FDI, COHESION, AND LEGISLATIVE/EXECUTIVE
DELIBERATIONS
In short, Poland’s transition to market democracy took place relatively
quickly. By conducting early, free elections and avoiding the partial reform
equilibrium, Poland set the stage for successful long-term integration into
the global political economy. Assisted by broad popular support for regime
change and the painful reforms necessary for transition, Solidarity played
a crucial leadership role in ensuring that Poland’s steps forward were irre-
versible.
5.3 FDI, cohesion, and legislative/executive
deliberations
In this section, I use deliberations between the legislature and executive
over the passage of corporate income tax reforms in 1999 in order to preview
how legislative cohesion works vis-a-vis FDI policy in Poland. Corporate
income tax levels send an important signal to companies about the locational
attractiveness of a country. As such, the 1999 corporate income tax reforms
can be considered an episode of FDI policy in Poland.
Under prime minister Jerzy Buzek, a center-right coalition government
consisting of Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) and the Freedom Union
(UW) took power in 1997. UW’s senior representative was Leszek Balcerow-
icz, Poland’s leading proponent of the shock therapy reforms in the early
post-socialist period. One of Balcerowicz’s key goals was to reduce both cor-
porate income tax and personal income tax, as a way to continue Poland’s
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economic liberalization. After the AWS-UW government secured passage of
the reforms, center-left President Alexander Kwasniewski threatened to veto
the personal income tax reduction (Appel 2006), which served as one of the
only times Kwasniewski intervened directly in the legislative process in this
way. Balcerowicz saw the defeat of the personal income tax reform as a
personal humiliation and threatened to resign (Williamson 1999). However,
he ultimately remained in the coalition because his resignation would have
led to the collapse of the coalition, and thus the loss of important agenda
setting powers. In effect, this episode demonstrates how the pressures of
legislative cohesion preserved the AWS-UW coalition government and main-
tained momentum to pass the corporate income tax reform. Although the
main analysis in this chapter shifts the focus to a different FDI policy, special
economic zones, the account described in this section helps set the stage for
the discussion that follows.
5.4 Labor and politics
With the fall of communism, workers in Eastern and Central Europe
(ECE) have sustained a series of setbacks to their welfare and influence.
Although labor in the region has been included in neocorporatist forms, which
ostensibly seek to moderate conflicting interests between labor and capital
in an effort to show that cross-class cooperation leads to better outcomes for
all, this neocorporatism is seen as illusory (Ost 2000). Instead of serving as
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a mechanism for enhancing labor’s power, neocorporatist forms in the region
have legitimized labor’s marginalization, declining wages, and a weakened
welfare state. In Ost’s (2000) view, labor in the region is weak for three
reasons. First, workers have a weak sense of class identity, meaning that they
do not think of themselves as needing separate organizations to defend their
interests. Second, workers in private firms are skeptical of organizing out of
the belief that unions will hurt their chances to benefit from the new economic
system. Third, surviving unions are concentrated disproportionately in state-
owned and formerly state-owned companies, which limits union reach. As
such, unions have hurt themselves by lending legitimacy to neocorporatist
projects aimed at advancing neoliberal economic changes that limit labor’s
influence.
However, Ost (2009) suggests that union revival in the coming years
is more likely than ever. Among other reasons, such as EU incorporation
and the end of postcommunism, today’s generation of union officials in ECE
is more eager than its postcommunist predecessor to defend the interests of
workers and to shake conscious complicity with efforts to marginalize labor.
At the same time, Ost (2009) notes that continued distrust of unions, the
existence of many small firms, and issues related to the place of ECE in the
global supply chain will work against union strength.
Union-party links have also had consequences for the successful articula-
tion of worker interests. In the post-socialist context, the prevalence of legacy
unions has been problematic. Under communism, unions were typically allies
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of management, encouraged increased production, and often acted as social
welfare agencies to workers. In a market economy, unions need to deliver
concessions such as higher wages, job security, improved work conditions,
and checks on management. This, however, is precisely what post-socialist
unions have failed to do (Crowley 2004). The resulting lack of trust is com-
pounded by the fact that legacy unions are often the most visible remaining
institution associated with communism in post-socialist countries.
For Caraway (2008), the interaction between legacy unions and polit-
ical parties has significant consequences for the shape of the labor move-
ment. Legacy unions differ from other unions in that their existence depends
on retaining state support rather than building a membership base. After
democratization, legacy unions can no longer count on state sponsorship,
which means that legacy union leaders may switch party allegiances in or-
der to defend their inherited advantages. Avdagic (2004) notes that in the
post-socialist context, union-party links can be characterized as an inverse
dependency relationship. Put otherwise, parties have always been the strong
partner and unions are willing to go along with parties, as they have little
choice otherwise.
Explanations of the varying strength of union opposition to neoliberal
reforms have taken a few different forms. For one, scholars suggest that
labor-party links should be viewed in concert with other factors. Murillo
(2000) suggests that incentives created by partisan loyalties, partisan com-
petition, and unions explain interactions between unions and labor-oriented
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governing parties over reform. In this view, partisan competition, a lack of
union competition, and low partisan loyalty increase union militancy and
thus opposition to market-oriented reforms. Tafel and Boniface (2003) note
that government inducements and union strategic considerations also play
a role in labor’s response to economic liberalization. These authors assert
that unions will consent to reforms only when governing elites offer material
incentives that provide some compensation for short-term losses. In addi-
tion, labor leaders must consider how support for neoliberal reforms will
affect rank-and-file members support. Such accountability is likely to dilute
labor’s support for reform.
5.5 Polish labor
Broadly speaking, representatives of Polish labor have expressed support
for foreign investment. However, the decline of union density to 12%, com-
pared to the EU average of 23% in 2012 (OECD and Visser 2013) suggests
changes in union political strength in recent years. During the pre-transition
and early post-transition years, Solidarity continued to act as Poland’s most
fundamental representative of civil society (Goodwyn 1991). At the time,
Lech Walesa sought to mobilize Solidarity and its activists in favor of FDI.
For Walesa, foreign investment meant new jobs, technology, management,
corporate culture, and ethics, all of which would assist Poland’s entrance
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into the global economy.2 Long-time Solidarity activists add that there was
little choice but to accept the inevitability of foreign investment.3
However, an interesting pattern emerged with respect to labor union
support of liberalization. One of the key features of Poland’s early post-
socialist history was the high degree of politicization of the country’s unions,
which was unmatched elsewhere in East Central Europe (Avdagic 2004). For
one, Solidarity was closely allied with center-right governments in the early
and late 1990s. While in support of shock therapy, Solidarity also pushed
its allies in government in 1989-1990 to pass worker unemployment support
as well as structural benefits such as obligations for directors of state-owned
enterprises to consult with workers councils before mass layoffs (Tafel and
Boniface 2003). The subsequent post-communist economic crisis, though,
gave the government impetus to wind down worker support programs, which
put Solidarity in a awkward position. In this context, the former regime asso-
ciated trade confederation, the All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ),
sought to regain legitimacy by actively opposing the government and thus
claiming it was a better representative of workers than Solidarity. Though
this may have convinced some, once the OPZZ-allied Democratic Left Al-
liance (SLD) came to power in the mid-1990s, OPZZ was quick to defend
liberalization measures adopted by its allies in government (Robertson 2004).
As such, the politicization dynamic should be taken into account when con-
2Lech Walesa Institute, ”Foreign Investors in the last 25 Years,” Lech Walesa Institute
2014, Warsaw, Poland
3Author interviews, November 20, 2014, Gdansk, Poland
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sidering union support for economic reform measures, such as FDI incentives.
With regards to popular attitudes towards greater openness and eco-
nomic liberalization, most of the Polish public remained committed to tran-
sition in the initial post-communist period (Paczynska 2005). In addition,
workers began to see that foreign investment improved the competitiveness
of Polish firms (Domanski 2004), which increased support for FDI. More
concretely, studies exist to support the contention that FDI has a positive
effect on wages. Bedi and Cieslik (2002) use data from Poland from 1994-
1996 to conclude that workers in industries with a higher presence of foreign
direct investment enjoy higher wages. In addition, the authors find that
the magnitude of the foreign presence effect increases over time, suggesting
that workers in industries with greater foreign participation experience faster
wage growth. Faggio (2001) uses firm-level manufacturing sector data from
1994-1997 to conclude that the entry of foreign investors into a local labor
market is associated with higher average wages in companies with foreign
participation as well as in domestic firms. Onaran and Stockhammer (2008)
find that FDI has a positive effect on wages in Poland, but this is driven
largely by the capital intensive and skilled sectors.
Despite some degree of politicized support for economic liberalization
and accompanying inflows of foreign investment on behalf of unions, it ap-
pears that worker attitudes reflect the empirical evidence that FDI boosts
wages. As a result, I interpret this evidence as preliminary support for my
contention that labor supports FDI and FDI incentives in Poland.
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5.6 Domestic business
While Poland’s transition from communism saw initial increases in the
power of Solidarity, the growth of a strong business class was anything but
quick. As compared to other post-socialist countries, the emergence of a ro-
bust non-Communist elite and a mass social movement that was unaligned
with the regime meant that potential oligarchs and asset strippers among
the Communist nomenklatura would be harder-pressed to remain in power.
In addition, the pace of reform in the initial post-communist period ensured
that oligarchs and former communist insiders would be unable to capture
sectors of the economy nor sufficiently retain political power to block change
(Roland 2002). While “enfranchisement of the nomenklatura,” meaning al-
lowing communist elites to acquire state owned property prior to the ma-
jor privatization efforts, did take place in Poland, it was of short duration
(Nowak 1992). Even still, the awarding of assets to the former nomenklatura
did not result in the formation of robust business class early on in the transi-
tion. There was no business lobby to speak of until Poland’s economy gained
steam in the late 1990s.4
At the same time, the Polish business owners who did exist at the early
stages of the transition did voice opposition to FDI. As early as 1993, busi-
ness elites suggested that Polish entrepreneurs should be given preference to
acquire state-owned enterprises over foreign capital (Schoenman 2005). Gar-
4Author interviews, November 17, 2014, Warsaw, Poland
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dawski (2001) adds that Polish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
have felt threatened by foreign competition. There have been instances of do-
mestic manufacturers successfully voicing opposition to foreign investment in
SEZs, such as Unifi (fiber manufacturer) and Merloni (cookers manufacturer)
being refused permission to locate in the Lodz SEZ (Domanski 2004).
Since the accession to power in 2007 of Platforma Obywatelska (PO),
a pro-business, center-right party, Poland’s business class has made its influ-
ence felt more strongly. As Naczyk (2014) notes, PO has long maintained
links with PKPP Lewiatan, Poland’s largest employers’ association. While
PO had maintained a more open attitude towards foreign capital, as the
effects of the global economic crisis began to be felt in Poland, a number
of key Polish business leaders, some associated directly with PO, have been
using more economic nationalist language (Naczyk 2014). At the same time,
representatives of the Tusk government expressed interest in promoting Pol-
ish “national champions” while also supporting measures to make foreign
takeovers of Polish companies more difficult (Parkiet 2010).
At least two empirical studies provide support for the contention that
FDI inflows are harmful to Polish businesses. Altomonte and Resimini (2002)
use data from 1995-1998 to support the contention that FDI has a disruptive
effect on domestic business in Poland. According to this view, once a foreign
company is established, domestic businesses displaced by the presence of
a foreign company do not automatically adjust to the new reality, which
leads problems for domestic firms. In addition, using data form 1993-1997,
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Konings (2001) finds that firms in Poland with foreign participation perform
better than firms without foreign participation, also noting the presence of
the competition effect on domestic firms.
Domestic business in Poland lacked strength in the years immediately
following Poland’s transition from communism, though evidence exists to
suggest that domestic business was an early opponent of FDI and the use
of SEZs to facilitate foreign investment. While the pro-business PO party
articulated supported for foreign capital at the start of its term in office,
the negative effects of the global economic crisis have seen economic populist
attitudes expressed more frequently by PO leaders. Finally, there is empirical
evidence to suggest that domestic businesses in Poland are hurt by foreign
investment. Taken together, I make the preliminary conclusion that domestic
business in Poland opposes FDI and FDI incentives, as predicted by my
theory.
5.7 Poland’s executive regime type
As Linz (1990) suggests, “the superior performance of parliamentary
democracies is no accident.” For Poland, however, the road to successful
parliamentary democracy was neither direct nor short. After a brush with
semi-presidentialism, Poland became a parliamentary democracy following
constitutional changes passed in 1997 (Orenstein 2010). Under the 1992
interim constitution, the Polish president had power to dissolve parliament
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and exercise discretion over the formation of the cabinet, which was made up
of parliamentarians from the winning coalition and led by the prime minister
as formal head of government.
During the semi-presidential period, the president’s personality ap-
peared to dictate the extent of tensions between president and parliament
(Zubek 2011). Jaruzelski, the former communist leader, held the presidency
from 1989 to 1990 and exercised far-reaching restraint. Lech Walesa, the
former Solidarity leader, sought to maximize his powers at the expense of
parliament and regularly blocked cabinet-led legislative efforts. This eventu-
ally resulted in a government crisis in 1995 and the replacement of the then
prime minister, Waldemar Pawlak (Wiatr 1997). The election of Alexan-
der Kwasniewski in 1995 marked the beginning of a more passive presidency
(Jasiewicz 1999). The 1997 constitution, among other changes, removed the
president’s power to be consulted on executive appointments and the ability
to reject requests by the prime minister for appointing or dismissing min-
isters. In addition, the president lost the budget veto as well as the rights
to chair the cabinet and otherwise influence cabinet decisionmaking (Zubek
2011). It is safe to say that Poland’s executive regime type, after 1997, can
be classified as parliamentary.
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5.8 Special economic zones in Poland
One of the tools Poland has successfully used to attract FDI has been
special economic zones (SEZs). According to Ge (1999), an SEZ is a geo-
graphical area within a country where economic activities of a particular kind
are promoted by a set of policy instruments that are not generally applica-
ble to the rest of the country. In other words, a government that actively
uses SEZs may be seen as conducting economic policy in such a way that
favors certain geographical regions, economic activities, and interest groups
over others. That said, via the investment flows attracted, SEZs can gener-
ate new jobs, export growth, technology transfers, integration of foreign and
domestic industries, diversification, increased economic openness, and better
quality jobs (Saydikaharov 2012). The zone established in Shannon, Ireland
in 1959 is often touted as archetypal, having attracted a large number of
multinational corporations over the years (Chen 1995).
In Poland, SEZs were introduced as instruments of regional policy,
seeking to address structural unemployment resulting from the shuttering
of large, inefficient state-owned enterprises. After a team of Irish and Pol-
ish experts drafted a plan for the first Polish SEZs between 1992-1994, the
foundational law for the SEZs was passed in 1994. According to Gwosdz et
al. (2008), areas eligible for SEZs were originally the old industrial regions
requiring deep restructuring (Upper Silesia, Lodzki, Sudecki, and Staropolski
wojwodectwa), urban areas with industrial monoculture, agricultural regions
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dominated by former large state-owned farms in northern Poland, and un-
derdeveloped agricultural regions in eastern Poland exposed to recession and
social deterioration. In addition to brownfield projects, which are aimed at
redeveloping old industrial sites, SEZ policy has also sought to encourage
new, “greenfield” projects as well.
Companies are encouraged to take advantage of the SEZs in Poland
through preferential tax treatments, such as tax holidays and import duty
exemptions, as well as non-tax incentives that often pertain to employment
and licensing (Guagliano and Riela 2005). SEZs also offer infrastructure
and access to transportation networks. Poland’s 14 SEZs were established
between 1995 and 1997, with the first SEZ opening in the industrial town
of Mielec, a town of 60,000 where the major employer, an aircraft factory,
had gone bankrupt (Gwosdz et al. 2008). To date, SEZs have an impressive
track record of attracting large multi-national corporations, such as Saint-
Gobain, Fiat Powertrain Technologies Poland, Dell, Procter and Gamble,
Mondi Packaging Paper Swiecie, Sharp, Swedwood Poland, LG Electronics,
Shell Polska, and Rockwool Polska (PAIZ Poland 2014).
As the evidence below shows, the Polish government has supported SEZ
development, regardless of the political affiliation of the party in power. The
foundational law on SEZs5 was passed by the Polish Parliament under the
leadership of a coalition government headed by the Democratic Left Alliance
5Act of 20 October 1994 on special economic zones (Journal of Laws of 1994, No. 123,
item 600
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(SLD), the successor party to the Communist Party, and the Polish People’s
Party, which can be described as centrist, Christian Democratic, and agrar-
ian. A series of amendments, passed by subsequent governing coalitions
with respect to the foundational SEZ law, demonstrate continued support
for the SEZs. In 2000, the center-right Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS)-
led government passed an amendment6 that both limited state assistance to
companies as per EU accession requirements, but applied the cuts only to
companies investing after December 31, 2000 (Kislowska 2006). An amend-
ment7 passed by the SLD-led governing coalition in 2003 to harmonize Polish
law and policy with EU accession requirements was accompanied by provi-
sions that added real property tax exemptions for qualified enterprises in
SEZs. The amendment also extended incentives for SMEs under the foun-
dational law until 2011. In 2008, the center-right PO-led government passed
an amendment8 extending the legal life of the SEZs until 2020 as well as in-
creasing the physical size of the zones. Most recently, the PO-led government
passed a regulation9, akin to an executive order in the U.S. system, that has
extended SEZ activity until 2026.
6Act of 16 November 2000 on amendments to the Act on special economic zones and
amendments to certain other acts (Journal of Laws of 2000, No. 11117, item 1228)
7Act on Special Economic Zones of 20 October 1994, Journal of Laws No 188/2003,
item 1840)
8Act on Special Economic Zones of 20 October 1994 (Journal of Laws of 2007, no. 42,
Journal of Laws 0f 2008, no. 118, item 746)
9Regulation of Council of Ministers 23 July 2013 on Changes to Regulations of the
Special Economic Zones, items 968-981, 1007
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Figure 5.1: Special Economic Zones in Poland
Figure 5.1 depicts the proliferation of SEZs in Poland. What is most
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striking about the map is how SEZs have been allowed to expand beyond
their initial geographic locations. The Pomeranian SEZ, originally based
near Gdansk in northern Poland on the Baltic Sea, serves as prime exam-
ple. The Pomeranian SEZ is denoted by green dots in Figure 5.1. At the
moment, the Pomeranian SEZ includes territory in towns such Chojnice and
Kwidzyn, which are located 128 kilometers and 103 kilometers from the orig-
inal Pomeranian SEZ, respectively. Although these towns are not contiguous
to the Pomeranian SEZ located near Gdansk, they are legally attached to
it. The seemingly unfettered growth of SEZs suggests that they are politi-
cally popular due to success in attracting investment and jobs, which help
to improve local economic conditions. According to KPMG (2014), Poland’s
SEZs feature companies employing nearly 280,000 people, while the total
area covered by SEZs in Poland amounted to 16,200 hectares in 2014.
5.9 Cohesion or consensus?
In previous sections, I find preliminary support for my theoretical expec-
tations about the preferences of labor and domestic business towards FDI
and FDI incentives, namely that labor is supportive and domestic business
is opposed. I also establish that Poland’s executive regime type has been
parliamentary, since 1997. Additionally, I establish that support for one
type of FDI incentive, SEZs, has been in place across party lines and polit-
ical coalitions for many years. On one hand, the socialist left, represented
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by the SLD, has supported SEZs. The center-right AWS, the political arm
of Solidarity, also has supported SEZs. Finally, the centrist PO, with its
pro-domestic business bent, has repeatedly extended the life of SEZs. This
evidence suggests support for my theoretical prediction that Poland’s parlia-
mentary system facilitates stable, consistent support for higher levels of FDI
incentives.
However, this tentative conclusion must be reconciled with two issues.
First, I note above that support for SEZs has been provided recently by
the pro-domestic business PO party. The assumptions I make about the
distributional consequences of FDI inflows suggest that domestic business
and thus parties representing domestic business would oppose FDI incentives,
such as SEZs. However, this has not been the case with PO. Second, the
initial policy moves that introduced SEZs to Poland took place under a semi-
presidential system, in 1994. During the semi-presidential period, severe
conflicts between president and parliament were underway, which eventually
brought down the government in 1995. My theory predicts, by contrast, that
low legislative cohesion under Poland’s semi-presidential system would have
made policy changes favorable to labor more difficult. As a result, the timing
of the first SEZs legislation remains an issue with respect to my theoretical
approach.
One explanation to these issues is that the timing of the SEZs creation
and broad political support for them may be less surprising given domestic
political consensus about the country’s need to attract foreign investment in
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the early post-transition years. According to a current member of the Polish
parliament,10 an official from the National Bank of Poland,11 and Solidarity
activists,12 consensus across the political spectrum is the reason for consistent
support for SEZs and FDI incentives generally in Poland.
While my predictions about the preferences of labor and domestic busi-
ness with respect to FDI and FDI incentives as well as my contention that
Poland’s parliamentary system would engender stable coalitions in support
of FDI incentives, a few questions remain. Additional research is needed into
the reasons why the initial SEZ legislation was rolled out in 1994 and why
the PO government has supported SEZs.
5.10 Agriculture
Despite the apparent political consensus about FDI and FDI incentives
in Poland, there are significant interests opposed to FDI inflows to particular
sectors of the economy. Strong resistance to FDI in Poland was and can
continue to be found in the country’s agricultural sector. As compared with
the Soviet Union and other former Warsaw Pact countries, Polish farmers
successfully resisted agricultural collectivization to a great extent (Szurek
1987). The collectivization that did take place happened in western Poland
on territories claimed from Germany after World War II, but this accounted
10Author interview, October 31, 2014, Cambridge MA
11Author interview, November 17, 2014, Warsaw, Poland
12Author interviews, November 20, 2014, Gdansk, Poland
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for a relatively small portion of Poland’s agricultural land. As such, most
of Poland’s agricultural land remained in the hands of small family farms
throughout the communist period (Dries and Swinnen 2004).
As plans for restructuring the Polish economy in preparation for the
transition from communism took place, Polish farmers were at the forefront
of resistance to reforms (Tridico 2007). According to Nowak (1992), Polish
farmers were both highly organized and heavily opposed to restructuring.
Given the small size of most Polish farms around the time of transition, the
introduction of market reforms and opening up of the Polish agricultural
sector would have laid bare the significant inefficiency of Polish farms. Mod-
ernization of agriculture in Poland would require the elimination of many
farms, the necessity of population shifts as well as changes in occupation and
the traditional lifestyle of a large part of the rural population. It follows,
then, that farmers saw radical reform as a threat to not only their economic
well-being, but also to their culture and lifestyle. Indeed, as Zarycki (2000)
notes, Polish farmers fear global competition and are absolutely unready to
abandon the villages they have worked for generations, having previously
resisted successfully several periods of economic and political repression.
While the opening of the Polish economy to market forces, spurred
in large part by the country’s EU membership, has brought about some de-
gree of liberalization of the country’s agricultural sector, farmers and their
political representatives have prevented large scale restructuring and foreign
investment to the sector. The main tool farmers have used to slow restructur-
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ing has been stringent land-ownership rules, which are set to expire in 2016,
following agreement with the EU after Poland’s accession (Banski 2004). Po-
litically, agricultural protectionism has been the mainstay of the Polish Peo-
ple’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe).13 The Polish People’s Party (PSL)
is the direct heir of the Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe (United Peasants
Party), which was one of Polish Communist Party’s main allies. The appeal
of the PSL is primarily in its commitment to retaining the traditional mode of
farming in Poland (Ingham and Ingham 2004; Jasiewicz 2008; Pienkos 2010).
The PSL has advocated larger government subsidies to agriculture and has
resisted modernization efforts (Jackson, Klich, and Poznanska 2003). Most
recently, the PSL advanced a bill in the Polish Parliament that authorizes
a state body, the Agricultural Property Agency, to serve as an intermediary
for all land purchases to sellers whose current holdings do not border that
land targeted for acquisition.14 The bill, supported by PO, PSL’s coalition
partner, would basically place state veto power over agricultural land sales.
In effect, the bill continues Poland’s long-standing agricultural protectionism
to the purported benefit of PSL’s main constituency, despite evidence that
FDI inflows to Polish agriculture may have economy-wide benefits (Dries and
Swinnen 2004).
13Author Interviews November 17, 2014; November 18, 2014; and November 19, 2014,
Warsaw, Poland
14Gazeta Wyborcza “Ziemia tylko dla rolnikow. PSL nie chce spekulacji, 9 Jan 2015
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5.11 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have examined the mechanisms of my theory in the
context of Poland. I first discuss an episode of legislative/executive deliber-
ation around a specific FDI policy, the passage of corporate tax reform in
1999. I use this episode to preview how legislative cohesion works in prac-
tice with respect to FDI policy. I find preliminary evidence in support of
my contentions that labor supports FDI and FDI incentives, while domestic
business opposes FDI and FDI incentives. I also show that Poland’s par-
liamentary system has produced stable, consistent coalitions in support of
one type of FDI incentive, special economic zones (SEZs). However, the
timing of the initial rollout of Poland’s SEZs policy and recent support for
SEZs by the pro-business PO party raise important questions. As a result, I
posit that the findings in this chapter provide only tentative support for my
theoretical prediction that high levels of legislative cohesion in Poland’s par-
liamentary system have led to stable, consistent support for FDI incentives
in the country.
My analysis of the Polish case has produced an interesting result that
may have consequences for political economy models of the distributional
consequences of FDI inflows. These models, such as the one used in this
dissertation, include two actors: labor and capital. However, Poland’s tra-
ditional agricultural sector has clearly and successfully opposed FDI, given
the likely negative distributional consequences the sector would face under
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greater openness to global competition. As agriculture retains a shrinking
share of global GDP,15 it may be unsurprising if opposition to FDI is driven
by agricultural interests in other countries as well. I examine the theoretical
implications of this finding in Chapter 8.
In Chapter 6, I turn to an examination of preferences towards FDI and
FDI incentives, executive regime type, and FDI incentives provided in the
context of Romania’s semi-presidential system. Romania’s transition from
communism, which lacked the mass political character of Poland’s, empow-
ered the former Communist elite, and did not feature initial, robust eco-
nomic reforms. Mass support for economic change in Romania was signif-
icantly more tepid, while the domestic business elite maintained suspicions
about FDI. In this context, I show that Romania’s semi-presidential system,
embodying low levels of legislative cohesion, has led to low levels of FDI
incentives in the country.
15World Bank, World Development Indicators 2014
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Chapter 6
Semi-presidentialism and FDI
incentives in Romania
6.1 Introduction
The empirical evidence I present in Chapter 4 provides tentative support
for my central hypothesis, that in democracies with higher levels of legislative
cohesion, FDI incentives are provided at more generous levels. In Chapter
5, I begin a case comparison exercise by examining the mechanisms of my
theory in the context of Poland. I find preliminary support for my theoret-
ical predictions regarding the distributional consequences of FDI inflows in
Poland. In other words, I produce evidence suggesting that labor has been
supportive of FDI and FDI incentives, while domestic business has opposed
FDI and FDI incentives. I also demonstrate that Poland’s parliamentary
130
6.1. INTRODUCTION
system has been associated with stable, consistent coalitions that support
one type of FDI incentives, special economic zones (SEZs). However, this
evidence is accompanied by a few important caveats.
In this chapter, I turn the focus to Romania, which is a semi-presidential
democracy and like Poland, a member of the European Union. I expect that
in the context of Romania’s semi-presidential system, which features low
legislative cohesion, that the level of FDI incentives will be lower. Romania’s
semi-presidential system means that executive and legislature and separately
elected, which facilitates unstable coalitions. These unstable coalitions make
consistent for FDI incentives more challenging, as detailed below.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. I first examine Ro-
mania’s transition from communism in order to provide context about the
attitudes of labor and domestic business in the country towards FDI and FDI
incentives. I next characterize an episode of legislative/executive delibera-
tion which helps to preview how low legislative cohesion affects FDI policy
in Romania. Then, I describe Romania’s executive regime type, which is
semi-presidential with presidential tendencies. I next discuss my operational-
ization of FDI incentives, namely the adoption and expansion of industrial
parks (IPs). These are functionally the same as SEZs, which I demonstrate
below. Based on the evidence provided, I evaluate my theoretical prediction.
I conclude with a summary of findings.
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6.2 Transition
As noted in Chapter 5, the end of communism meant at least three
simultaneous transformations in former communist countries, including de-
mocratization, marketization, and institution-building. While Poland did
not face the challenge of nation-building, the presence of significant minority
populations, including Hungarians, Roma, and Germans, has made national
cohesiveness more problematic in Romania. According to Vachudova and
Snyder (1996), Romanians are particularly suspicious of Hungarians. From
1878 until the end of the Habsburg monarchy in 1918, the lands of Transylva-
nia were under Hungarian rule. The Treaty of Trianon restored Transylvania
to Romania in 1920, but Hungary regained control in 1940 under the terms of
the German and Italian-backed Vienna Award. After World War II, Romania
regained the territory, but Romanian suspicions about the threat Hungarians
posed to the Romanian state have yet to dissipate.
In the 1970s and 1980s, Romanian dictator Nicolai Ceausescu carried
out a brutal anti-Hungarian campaign. As part of a massive forced reset-
tlement campaign, thousands of Romanians were resettled in Transylvania
and many Hungarian villages were emptied. One of the results of the cam-
paign was that Hungarians were left a minority in districts where they had
previously been the majority (Vachudova and Snyder 1996). The collapse
of the Ceausescu regime in 1989 saw the emergence of an ethnic Romanian
extremist group, Romanian Cradle, which had a hand in anti-Hungarian ri-
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ots which caused the deaths of a still unknown number of Romanians and
Hungarians in March 1990. State-run media outlets and the transitional
government, led by the so-called National Salvation Front (NSF), dominated
by former nomenklatura, took strikingly anti-Hungarian positions, which set
the tone for deep distrust between the state and the Hungarian community
in the early post-transition years. In 1996, however, a broad coalition led by
the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR) defeated the NSF-successor
Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR). The CDR-led coalition in-
cluded the Hungarian minority party and promoted widespread tolerance
of minorities (Spendzharova and Vachudova 2012). Then, in 2000, parties
across the political spectrum came together in opposition to the strong show-
ing of the nationalist, anti-Semitic, anti-Hungarian, authoritarian Corneliu
Vadim Tudor in presidential elections (Tismaneanu and Kligman 2001). The
election of Klaus Iohannis, a member of Romania’s once prominent German
minority, as president in 2014 serves as further evidence pointing to growing
national cohesiveness in the country.
While Romania may be well on the way to resolving ethnic tensions,
political and economic progress have been less clear, nearly thirty years after
the fall of communism. Gallagher (2005) asserts that Communist Romania
under Ceausescu possessed more attributes of a totalitarian dictatorship than
any of the other East European party-states. In this view, the more intense
the authoritarian experience, the greater the presence of an administrative
class which is entirely unwilling to let go of power. Indeed, the remarkably
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quick capture, trial, and execution of Ceausescu and his wife was arguably
done in order maintain silence about the crimes committed by Romania’s
post-communist leaders, all of whom were members of the nomenklatura.
Although mass protests ultimately brought down Ceausescu’s regime, former
Communists in the guise of the NSF swiftly took advantage of the political
vacuum (McFaul 2002). In contrast to other post-communist countries, there
were no pacts, no negotiations, and no compromises during the initial transi-
tion (Welsh 1994). Newly emerging political actors were intensely fragmented
and unable to participate as equals in talks with the former Communists. As
a result, the NSF triumphed in Romania’s first post-communist elections in
May 1990 and was able to form a government without participation by any
opposition groups.
Tismaneanu (1993) characterizes the immediate post-Ceausescu period
as featuring many elements that had been part of the political style of the
Communist bureaucracy. These included a quasi-charismatic party/movement
with a strong leader opposed to impersonal democratic procedures and regu-
lations; promotion of the majority ethnic population at the expense of minor-
ity groups; hostility to market capitalism; and regime anxiety demonstrated
by a strong rhetoric of solidarity that insists on the need for Romanians
to close ranks against all alleged foreign conspiracies. The main tools for
achieving this state of affairs were NSF leader and Romanian president Ion
Iliescu’s political cadres, the economic oligarchy recruited from the ranks of
ex-domestic intelligence officials, government controlled media, and the emer-
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gence of fundamentalist-populist political groups that served to ”moderate”
Iliescu’s views.
Until 1996 and 1997, when Iliescu and his supporters were defeated
in national elections, there were few meaningful reforms (Ibrahim and Galt
2002). In coming to power in 1996 and 1997, the opposition CDR promised
to regulate property rights, speed up privatization, and improve the business
climate. However, these efforts were thwarted by entrenched former Com-
munists and the state continued to control most the economy even by 2000
(Mungiu-Pippidi 2003). In part due to continuing economic hardship as well
as rampant political infighting and perceived ineffectiveness, the CDR-led
coalition was rejected by the electorate in the late 1990s, paving the way for
the return of Iliescu.
For a number of scholars, the defeat of Iliescu’s chosen successor in
the 2004 elections, marked the end of the post-socialist transition in Ro-
mania and represented determined steps towards democratic consolidation
(Gross and Tismaneanu 2005; Stan 2005; Downs and Miller 2006; King and
Marian 2014). While it appears that Romania has made progress towards
political normalization, helped in part by the need to meet requirements for
accession to the European Union, Pop-Eleches (2008) points out that Roma-
nia’s political scene has been dominated by two major parties, both of which
succeeded the NSF. In other words, Romania stands out as the only democ-
racy in Europe where representatives of the Communist successor parties
have been participants in nearly every government since the fall of Commu-
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nism. The two dominant parties in contemporary Romanian politics are the
Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL).
While the PSD has a center-left orientation and the PDL has a center-right
orientation, both emerged from the NSF. Following the November 2014 pres-
idential elections, the PDL merged with the pre-communist National Liberal
Party (PNL), from which the current Romanian president, Klaus Iohannis,
was elected. The influence of communist successor parties in Romania will
unlikely diminish in years to come.
Romania’s authorities have pursued a particularly uneven approach to
economic reform since 1989. As with other former members of COMECON,
Romania suffered from the loss of established trade and supply chains as well
as new pressures from international competition with the fall of communism.
To make matters worse, Romania’s economy was one of the most highly
centralized in Central and Eastern Europe. This meant that reforms needed
to go particularly deep in order to facilitate the marketization of Romania’s
economy. Though the initial post-communist Prime Minister Petre Roman
sought to engage in extensive economic reforms, reluctance on the part of
President Iliescu and his supporters ultimately thwarted any serious reform
efforts (Gallagher 2005).
Until the election of the opposition CDR in 1996, Romania’s economic
reform was complicated by frequent delays and reversals. This of course did
little to endear the country to foreign investors. The situation was further
complicated by the fact that Romania’s former communist political class
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continued to see the state as a source of economic accumulation. Foreign
competition, then, would only pose problems to Romania’s grossly inefficient
and non-competitive state-run companies. The opposition victory in 1996,
though, disrupted the formation of an all-powerful economic oligarchy in
Romania. Had the opposition not taken power, even if weakly, it appears
likely that Romania would have fallen victim to Hellman’s (1998) partial
reform equilibrium.
Accession discussions with the European Union greatly assisted subse-
quent efforts to reform Romania’s economy.. Despite the resumption of power
by Iliescu and his cadre of ex-communists in 2000, EU membership remained
a highly desirable goal across the Romanian political spectrum. Romania’s
progress in meeting the EU’s accession criteria was slow, particularly with re-
spect to economic reforms, such as facilitating a functioning market economy
and building capacity to face the pressure of competition and market forces
within the EU (Constantin, Goschin, and Danciu 2011). After a two year
delay, Romania received EU membership in 2007. EU accession prospects
and a favorable external economic environment led to Romania’s experienc-
ing continuous growth until 2008, when the effects of the global financial
crisis finally hit. According to Voinea and Mihaescu (2009), Romania’s crisis
can be traced largely to structural problems, which have been exacerbated
by external factors. It is possible that Romania’s uneven reform path, over-
shadowed by eight years of economic growth during the first decade of the
2000’s, has returned with a vengeance.
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In contrast to Poland, Romania’s transition from socialism has been
much more uneven. A multi-ethnic society, Romania has faced the chal-
lenging prospect of nation-building alongside political and economic transi-
tions, while Poland’s monoethnic composition obviated the need for nation-
building. Romania’s incomplete break with the communist past, in contrast
to Poland’s relatively clean transition, is evidenced by the continuing power of
two communist successor parties in Romanian politics. In addition, repeated
delays in economic reform distinguish Romania’s post-socialist economic tra-
jectory from that of Poland.
6.3 FDI, cohesion, and legislative/executive
deliberations
In Chapter 5, I used legislative/executive deliberations around the pas-
sage of corporate income tax reform in 1999 in order to preview how leg-
islative cohesion works in practice in Poland. The ultimate result was that
corporate income tax reform, an important signal to foreign investors, was
passed. While the reform package proposed fell significantly short of what
a key member of the governing coalition wanted, this politician ultimately
choose to support the reforms, remain in the coalition, and retain key agenda
setting powers. By contrast, I present an episode of legislative/executive de-
liberation from Romania focusing on economic liberalization, which has con-
sequences for FDI inflows into the country. Although this discussion does not
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focus on a specific instance of FDI policy, it is illustrative of how low legisla-
tive cohesion leads to weaker FDI policy under Romania’s semi-presidential
system.
Despite the fact that they originally had a shared political home in the
ex-communist NSF, Romania’s first president, Ion Iliescu, and prime minis-
ter, Petre Roman experienced significant conflict soon after being elected in
1989. With significant powers allocated to both president and parliament,
Iliescu and Roman were constantly battling to take credit for successes and
blame each other for failures. The split between Iliescu and Roman wors-
ened to the point where Iliescu’s supporters formed a breakaway party in
1991 (Baylis 1996). One particular locus of conflict was the pace of economic
liberalization. According to Jeffries (2002), Roman sought a “leap to the
market economy.” By contrast, Iliescu favored a more gradualist approach,
which slowed liberalization reforms considerably (Turnock 2007). After Ro-
man turned up the heat on Iliescu, Bucharest was invaded by thousands of
angry miners from the Jiu Valley, who forced Roman’s resignation as prime
minister. Although Roman’s replacement as prime minister, Theodore Stolo-
jan, managed to push through limited reforms, Iliescu served as a major block
(Carothers 1997). This brief description helps to show that low legislative
cohesion in the country’s political system had negative consequences for eco-
nomic liberalization reforms, which sent a signal to foreign investors about
the locational attractiveness of Romania as an FDI destination.
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6.4 Romanian Labor
In 1989, a vast majority of Romanians appeared ready to accept the
goal of marketization, but wanted to avoid the difficult consequences of re-
form. By contrast, initial support for marketization and acceptance of the
consequences was stronger in Poland. Supporters of the ex-Communist NSF,
which governed the country in the immediate post-communist period, in-
cluded blue-collar workers in inefficient industries that had little chance of
competing successfully against external competition. However, labor unions
supported and encouraged market reforms, even as strikes took place against
the negative effects (Gotia 2011). While structural conditions, such as cor-
ruption and the slow pace of reform limited FDI inflows in the early post-
communist period, popular attitudes towards foreign capital began to change
as FDI inflows picked up steam in the mid-1990s (Gheorghiu and Gheorghiu
2011). Similar to Poland, empirical evidence exists to suggest that FDI has
a positive effect on wages in Romania. Using data from 2002-2009, Mutascu
and Fleischer (2010) find that FDI levels are positively associated with wages
in Romania.
Romanian trade unions successfully affected state policy in the early
post-transition period. In the years of uneven economic reform during Ili-
escu’s first term as president, unions were able to stop plant closures and
limit the effects of price liberalization. After the former trade unionist Vic-
tor Ciorbea became prime minister following the opposition victory in 1996,
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union influence arguably reached its peak. Generally speaking, Bohle and
Greskovits (2012) maintain that Romanian trade unions have relatively high
mobilization power. To this point, Trif (2010) notes how Romania had a
comprehensive industrial relations system with widespread collective bar-
gaining at national, sectoral, and company levels and with the legal system
supporting bipartite and tripartite consultations and negotiations between
trade unions, employers, and government. However, Trif (2013) points out
that in recent years the Romanian government has radically overhauled the
system, forcing a decentralization of collective bargaining and making it more
difficult for unions to bargain collectively, basically leveraging the fiscal pres-
sures of the 2008 recession to push back against the unions. Though unions
were able to oppose privatizations and push through renationalizations, pri-
vatization and industrial restructuring greatly expanded in subsequent years
(Varga and Freyberg-Inan 2014). Despite some union opposition to aspects
of economic reform, other unions strongly supported privatization and FDI.
According to Ban (2011), Cartel Alfa, a national trade union with an esti-
mated 325,000 members, has been an ardent proponent of privatization to
foreign investors. Compared to Poland’s highly politicized trade unions, Ro-
manian unions appear to have been more consistent in supporting or opposing
foreign investment. Though trade unions have exerted significant influence
in Romanian politics, the close connections between particular trade unions
and political parties never took on the same intensity in Romania. Also
compared to Poland, union density remains much higher, at 33% (OECD
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and Visser 2013). In light of the evidence provided here, I suggest that only
partial support exists for my contention that labor supports FDI and FDI
incentives in Romania.
6.5 Domestic business
As noted above, the role of the ex-Communist nomenklatura in the po-
litical and economic life of post-socialist Romania cannot be understated.
Members of the administrative elite, having seen the writing on the wall
with respect to the end of communism in Romania, began converting their
administrative power into economic control. Unlike Poland, Romania had a
business class right at transition, as the former communists took advantage
of the power vacuum to develop significant business interests. One approach
was to create lucrative subcontracting relationships with small private firms
in which managers of state enterprises had a personal interest. Once pri-
vatization began, the power of these enterprise managers only grew (Stoica
2004). In addition, early reforms enabled predatory elites to seize directly or
indirectly significant holdings in state-owned enterprises. As Noutcheva and
Bechev (2008) note, key figures from the political establishment, particularly
the NSF, developed patron-client relationships that facilitated the movement
of substantial state resources into loss-making public sector and quasi-private
sector companies. According to Dorobantu (2010), many of the so-called oli-
garchs who built their business empires in the early transition years continue
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to be closely associated with the center-left NSF successor party, the PSD.
In the 2009 presidential election, the close relationship between the PSD
candidate, Mircea Geoana, and a number of Romania’s oligarchs may have
adversely affected Geoana’s electoral fortunes. As it turned out, Geoana had
made a house call to one of the oligarchs the night before the final presidential
debate.
It may be fair to refer to post-socialist Romania as exhibiting political
capitalism, meaning capitalism built not on but with the ruins of socialism
(Stoica 2004; Bluhm and Trappman 2008). Although Poland too experienced
an influx of ex-nomenklatura into the private sector, shock reforms and a
relatively clean political break with socialist makes the political capitalism
thesis less relevant in the Polish context. Vachudova (2005) calls the first
seven years of the Romanian transition “a textbook case of the capture of a
partially reformed economy by former communist cadres linked closely to the
ruling political parties.” The period between 1996 and 2000, when the anti-
communist CDR coalition ruled, is also considered a disappointment from
the view of economic and state reform (Gallagher 2005; Pop-Eleches 2005).
In addition, Pociovalisteanu (2008) suggests that incomplete reforms in the
early postcommunist period facilitated the development of a special form of
post-socialist capitalism, in which political clientilism plays a major role.
According to Young (2010), the increased competition faced by Roma-
nian entrepreneurs in recent years as well as political changes and banking
reform have combined to weaken the political power of the old nomenklatura
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business elite. In this view, the Romanian economic elite no longer consists
mainly of communist-era enterprise managers with little market acumen, who
require political connections for success and take advantage of uncertainty
surrounding property rights and market institutions. Instead, Young argues
that Romania’s contemporary business elite consists of individuals who were
relatively young at the beginning of transition and who have learned the rules
of market capitalism quickly. While these new elites almost assuredly bene-
fitted from shady privatization deals and government contracts, exploitation
of corrupt links to state is not the primary mode of operation for Romania’s
new business elite.
Empirical evidence exists to suggest that domestic business in Roma-
nia may have been wise to oppose foreign investment. Similar to Poland, a
number of studies indicate that FDI has adverse effects for domestic busi-
ness in Romania. First, Konings (2001) uses data from 1993-1997 to find
evidence of a significant competition effect from foreign firms on domestic
firms. Altomonte and Pennings (2009) analyze data from 1995-2001 to find
that the competition effect becomes a particularly significant problem after
FDI levels reach a certain point.
With regard to attitudes towards FDI, Verdery (2002) contends that
anti-foreign capital attitudes have been strong among Romania elites. Verdery
claims that relative economic backwardness in Romania obstructed the pos-
sibilities of enrichment through the market, which led to protectionist views
of FDI. Stoica (2004) adds that the ex-nomenklatura needed time to con-
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vert their political capital, organizational experience, and managerial skills
into economic capital, and, therefore, had no interest in an early and radical
break with the past. This translated into suspicious attitudes towards FDI
in the early post-transition years.
However, this status quo begin to dissolve in the early 2000s as Ro-
mania began serious negotiations with the EU regarding eventual accession.
According to Stoica (2004), the PSD oligarchy in the early 2000s gave lucra-
tive infrastructure projects and sold premium state factories and banks to key
west European companies. At the same time, though, Ganev (2013) points
out that the opening of Romania to FDI should not be construed as the
entrance of honest foreign investors seeking to contribute to the rule of law
and market development in Romania. Instead, successful foreign investors
were high bidders who could make offers that corrupt officeholders found
appealing. The above suggests reasonably strong support for my contention
that domestic business in Romania opposes FDI and FDI incentives.
6.6 Romania’s executive regime type
Despite some ambiguity, the prevailing view holds that Romania has a
semi-presidential executive regime type ( Elgie 2007; Vergottini 2012; Gilia
2013; Tomescu and Levai 2013). A simple reading of the Romanian consti-
tution suggests that the French constitution of 1958 served as the model.
Duverger (1980) notes that the semi-presidential system is one in which the
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president, who is directly elected by the people, becomes a referee between
state powers, while executive authority actually belongs to the government,
which is led by the prime minister. According to the Romanian constitu-
tion, the president is elected in a direct vote by the electoral body, as is
Parliament. This implies that both president and parliament enjoy the same
popular legitimacy. Yet, parliament is characterized as “the supreme repre-
sentative body of the Romanian people.” While the government is politically
liable only before Parliament, the president has the constitutional right to
designate candidates for prime minister as well as the right to appoint a
government following the parliamentary investiture vote. In addition, the
president may dissolve parliament when certain circumstances are met. At
the same time, the president must cooperate with other state authorities,
such as parliament, the government, or judiciary in order to exercise his
responsibilities.
Prior to the 2003 constitutional reforms, both president and parliamen-
tarians enjoyed terms in office of similar length. However, the 2003 reforms
sought to limit the role played by the president in influencing parliamentary
elections by extending the president’s term in office to five years. By law,
the president is not allowed to be member of a political party. Even still,
Draganu (1998) probably remains correct in suggesting that the “ban on the
president being a member of a political party was bound to be just on paper.
Even if, after the elections, the president will not be the formal leader of the
political party on whose support he won, he will continue to be the invisible
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guide of his party, at least in terms of the most important political matters.”
Conflict between president and Parliament has been an ever-present
issue in Romanian politics since the fall of Ceausescu. For most of Roma-
nia’s postcommunist history, successive presidents have sought to expand
the power of the presidency, while Parliament and government seek to retain
whatever constitutional discretion that may be available. Unfortunately,
constitutional ambiguity, combined with strong personalities in the politi-
cal arena have meant that instability and uncertainty are the key features
of Romanian politics (Tananescu 2013). Similar to the acrimony described
above between Iliescu and Roman in the early 1990s, Romania continued to
experience conflict between president and legislature during the supposedly
reformist presidency of Emil Constantinescu, 1996-2000. After the failing to
make good on his electoral promises, prime minister and ostensible Constan-
tinescu ally Victor Ciorbea was quickly forced from office. Once out of office,
Ciorbea publicly blamed Constantinescu for the failures of reform. Constan-
tinescu also faced further dissent from his supposed allies in Parliament, who
helped prevent any additional reforms Constantinescu had promised the pub-
lic (Gallagher 2005). Most recently, the presidency of Traian Basescu was
marred by serious conflict between president and Parliament after Basescu
tried to manipulate important parliamentary appointments. In response,
parliament voted in 2012 to suspend Basescu for abuse of powers (Tananescu
2013). In sum, conflict between president and Parliament as well as low
legislative cohesion in Romania have been the cause of serious political in-
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stability and uncertainty.
6.7 Industrial parks in Romania
Similar to Poland’s strategy of constructing a network of special eco-
nomic zones (SEZs), Romania has embarked on efforts to attract foreign
investment in the guise of industrial parks (IPs). In light of Romania’s on-
going de-industrialization, policymakers have sought to use IPs in order to
attract new jobs to areas affected by the economic restructuring (Popescu
2010). However, development of IPs in Romania only began in 2002 with
the passage of Law 490/2002 “Regarding creation and function of indus-
trial parks,” compared to Poland’s start date of 1994. The law defines an
industrial park as a “delimited area in which economic activities, scientific
activities, industrial production activities, services and scientific research,
and/or technological development valorization are development, specifically
facilitating working conditions, to render valuable the human and material
zone potential” (Popescu and Ungureanu 2008). Incentives for businesses, as
stipulated by Law 490/2002, include income tax, local real estate tax breaks,
and other local government tax incentives, as well as delays in value-added
tax (VAT) payments for materials and capital equipment installed in the IP.
The incentives offered in Romanian IPs resemble those provided in Polish
SEZs. The law was passed under the tutelage of Prime Minister Adrian Nas-
tase, with the approval of President Iliescu. It should be noted that both
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Nastase and Iliescu represented the post-communist successor party PSD and
shared a relatively strong working relationship. This stands in contrast to
the otherwise fractious political scene in Romania, driven by the nature of
the country’s semi-presidential system.
Figure 6.1: Industrial Parks in Romania
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Figure 6.1 depicts the distribution of IPs in Romania as of 2010, where
the bold-faced numbers indicate the number of IPs in a particular district.
Though the initial IP legislation had been on the books for eight years al-
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ready, the 52 IPs developed cover only 2500 hectares of land. Poland, features
SEZs that cover 16200 hectares, which is more than six times greater than
that of Romania. Of the IPs currently in existence, the Eurobusiness Park
in Oradea is among the most successful. The Oradea IP began operation in
2008 and features industrial processing facilities, finance and banking com-
panies, consulting, design, R & D, logistics, and other companies. The main
investors in the Oradea IP are from the United States and South Korea,
with an estimated 30 million Euro invested, having created close to 1500
jobs (Dodescu and Chirila 2012).
Despite such successes, the IPs overall have been less effective in at-
tracting jobs to economically depressed areas. According to Popescu and
Ungureanu (2008), Romanian IPs simply cannot compete with similar incen-
tive structures in Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, in large part due
to the fact that markets are more developed and project results are expected
to be of higher quality in these countries. Additionally, Romanian efforts
regarding industrial parks have been greatly delayed compared to those of
neighboring countries.
6.8 Legislative cohesion
According to my theory of the politics of FDI incentives provision, I
expected that labor in Romania supports FDI and FDI incentives, while
domestic business opposes FDI and FDI incentives. I also expected Roma-
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nia’s presidential regime, which features lower levels of legislative cohesion,
to have supported lower levels of FDI incentives. Based on the evidence pro-
vided above, I find partial support for my theoretical expectations. First, it
appears that the Romanian public has mixed views towards FDI and FDI
incentives. For instance, some unions have publicly supported foreign invest-
ment, while others have publicly opposed foreign investment. However, I find
significant support for my contention regarding opposition to foreign invest-
ment on the part of domestic capital in Romania. In large part due to the
country’s incomplete transition from communism, former members of com-
munist elite, the nomenklatura, have remained singularly powerful. Many of
these individuals used their political power to gain significant footholds in the
postcommunist economy. The business interests of the former nomenklatura
have been or remain tied to former or currently state-owned assets, which
would have little chance of success under conditions of global competition.
As a result, Romania’s domestic business class has largely opposed foreign
investment.
Finally, I present evidence that Romania’s semi-presidential executive
regime has featured significant conflicts over economic reforms and other is-
sues between president and parliament. I suggest that low levels of legislative
cohesion in Romania’s executive have negatively impacted the country’s pro-
vision of FDI incentives, one example of which is the country’s relatively low
level of industrial parks.
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6.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have provided an examination of the mechanisms of
my theory of the politics of FDI incentives provision by contrasting a case of
low legislative cohesion with the case of high legislative cohesion described
in Chapter 5. As compared to Poland’s parliamentary system, Romania’s
semi-presidential system features lower levels of legislative cohesion. This is
best evidenced by severe conflict between president and prime minister in
a number of instances. Compared to evidence in Chapter 5 supporting my
theoretical expectation that labor supports FDI, the evidence for Romania in
Chapter 6 is less robust. However, I do find strong evidence in both cases in
support of my contention about the negative attitudes of domestic business
towards FDI policy. In the main analysis of the chapter, I discussed how low
legislative cohesion adversely affected the development of industrial parks
in Romania. By contrast, I discuss in Chapter 5 how legislative cohesion
has served to assist the growth of the analogous special economic zones in
Poland. In sum, I find tentative support for my theoretical predictions
Chapter 7 extends my analysis of the politics of FDI incentives in a
different direction. Whereas previous empirical chapters have been direct
examinations of my theory of FDI incentives, I use original survey data from
Poland to draw conclusions about the determinants of individual-level atti-
tudes towards FDI incentives.
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Chapter 7
Preferences towards FDI
incentives: survey evidence
7.1 Introduction
In Chapters 5 and 6, I rely on qualitative evidence to examine the mech-
anisms of my theory of the politics of FDI incentives provision. The main
premise of Chapter 5 is that because Poland has a parliamentary executive
regime, the country would feature more generous FDI incentives. By con-
trast, I expected Romania, the concern of Chapter 6, to have lower levels of
FDI incentives because of its presidential executive regime. While my expec-
tations with respect to the relationships between executive regime type and
FDI incentives were upheld, the evidence was mixed regarding the prefer-
ences of labor and domestic business with respect to FDI and FDI incentives
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provision.
In order to examine these findings a little more closely, I shift gears to
focus on individual-level attitudes towards FDI incentives. In this chapter,
I analyze the preferences of labor and capital towards FDI incentives using
the results of a unique public opinion survey conducted Poland in Novem-
ber 2015.1 As asserted previously, I expect labor to support FDI and FDI
incentives because FDI raises labor demand. Local business owners, by con-
trast, oppose FDI and FDI incentives because the higher demand for labor
associated with FDI inflows drives up production costs and cuts into income.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. I next provide a short
literature review of recent political economy studies that employ survey evi-
dence. I then describe the data analyzed in this chapter, with full descriptive
statistics provided in the chapter’s appendix. Before proceeding to the cen-
tral analytical portion of the chapter, I use confirmatory factor analysis to
examine the three survey questions which I designed to address attitudes
towards FDI incentives. Based on the results from the confirmatory factor
analysis, I then use ordinal probit models to explore the attitudes of labor
and capital towards FDI incentives. I conduct robustness checks and then
summarize the ground covered in the chapter in a concluding section.
1This survey received approval from the University of Minnesota Institutional Review
Board, study #1409E53862. The survey was made possible by generous support from the
Alexander Dubcek Fund and the Andrew Dickinson Fellowship.
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7.2 Literature review
A number of studies in both international and comparative political econ-
omy make use of public opinion data in order to examine individual prefer-
ences over economic policy. Much of this work finds significant support for
the contention that policy attitudes are affected by distributional concerns.
Using data from a survey of 2500 Canadians in 1988, Balistreri (1997) shows
that distributional considerations appear to be important determinants of an
individual’s preferences over trade policy. In addition, Scheve and Slaughter
(2001) find that factor type dominates industry of employment in explaining
support for trade barriers, based on analysis of 1736 individual level obser-
vations from the 1992 National Election Studies dataset.
Baker (2005) adds texture to the distributional consequences of trade
approach, noting that consumer tastes also play role. In analyzing 53,000
observations from 41 countries between 1995-1997 from the World Values
Survey, Baker notes that individuals who prefer their country’s exportable
goods are more protectionist than individuals who prefer imports. Though
14 post-socialist cases are included in Baker’s analysis, the cases are not an-
alyzed separately from the rest of the world. While providing support for
the factor endowments approach, Mayda and Rodrik (2005) find that trade
preferences are correlated with trade exposure to the sector in which an in-
dividual works, an individual’s relative economic status, and an individual’s
values, identities, and attachments. Mayda and Rodrik use 20,000 obser-
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vations covering 23 countries from the International Social Survey Program
from 1995 as well as the data used in Baker (2005). Mayda and Rodrik in-
clude 8 post-socialist cases in the analysis, but also do not provide a separate
analysis.
Political economy research, however, has only recently begun to use
public opinion data to explore individual preferences regarding FDI and FDI
incentives. Of existing work, Pandya (2010) is the most prominent. In this
study, Pandya finds support for factor-based preferences for FDI, using 37,000
observations from the Latinobarometer Survey from 1995, 1998, and 2001.
There are two major reasons why the survey analysis in this chapter is a
worthwhile contribution to the existing body of literature. First, political
economy studies of public opinion and FDI have yet to focus on post-socialist
countries alone. Second, no existing studies have explored individual-level
determinants of preferences over FDI incentives. As such, the analysis I con-
duct in this chapter is an important step in examining theoretical predictions
about individual attitudes towards FDI incentives.
7.3 Data
The data I use in this chapter are drawn from an original survey con-
ducted in November 2014 in Poland by the Public Opinion Research Center
(CBOS), a respected Polish survey company. After I constructed a series of
questions aimed at uncovering attitudes towards my outcomes of interest,
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I worked with CBOS to develop appropriate translations of the questions.
Once this process was complete, the questions were included in CBOS’s
November 2014 omnibus survey. Summary statistics for all variables are
provided in the appendix.
With respect to the dependent variable, the survey data provides three
candidate questions that probe respondent attitudes towards FDI incentives.
The first question asks: “Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly
disagree with the statement: the government should provide incentives to at-
tract foreign direct investment?” This question is represented by the variable
providefdiinc, which is equal to 1 if the respondent replied strongly disagree,
equal to 2 if the respondent replied disagree, equal to 3 if the respondent
replied agree, and equal to 4 if the respondent replied strongly agree. The
second question asks: “Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly
disagree with the statement: Poland’s government consistently supports in-
centives to attract foreign direct investment because members of the govern-
ment coalition are afraid of losing power?” This question is represented by
the variable fdisupport, which is equal to 1 if the respondent replied strongly
disagree, equal to 2 if the respondent replied disagree, equal to 3 if the respon-
dent replied agree, and equal to 4 if the respondent replied strongly agree.
The third question asks “How beneficial to the economy are government in-
centives to attract foreign direct investment?” This question is represented
by the variable fdiincgood. The variable equals 1 if the respondent replied
strongly harmful, 2 if the respondent replied harmful, 3 if the respondent
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replied beneficial, and 4 if the respondent replied very beneficial. I provide
descriptive statistics for each of the three dependent variables below.
Figure 7.1: Univariate Distribution of providefdiinc
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Figure 7.2: Univariate Distribution of fdisupport
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Figure 7.3: Univariate Distribution of fdiincgood
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The independent variable, Income, was constructed based on survey
responses to a question about monthly household incomes.2 Of the five pos-
sible responses, I isolated the top category and combined the bottom four
categories. The intuition is that owners of capital are the high income mem-
bers of society and are relatively few in number. By contrast, labor is more
numerous and has lower income. In the analysis, 0 represents labor and
1 represents capital for the Income variable. I provide a histogram of this
variable below.
2Capital ownership would have been a more appropriate measure here, but this infor-
mation was not available. While the income level variable may not match exactly on to
capital ownership, income is the best available measure from the survey.
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Figure 7.4: Univariate Distribution of Income
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I also include two additional variables, which have attracted consid-
erable attention in the literature. The first is nationalism. Previous work
examining the connection between national pride and attitudes towards eco-
nomic policy have found that increasing levels of nationalism are associated
with protectionist preferences (Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and Sin-
not 2006; and Jakobsen and Jakobsen 2011). The variable Nationalism rep-
resents the following question “Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or
strongly disagree with the statement: Poland should follow its own inter-
ests?” The variable equals 1 if the respondent replied strongly disagree, 2 if
the respondent replied disagree, 3 if the respondent replied agree, and 4 if
the respondent replied strongly agree.
Considerable scholarship examining the determinants of economic pol-
icy preferences has explored the role of skill level. Using data from the 1992
and 1996 NES rounds and the 1995 ISSP iteration, Hiscox and Hainmueller
(2006) provide support for the contention that individuals with higher edu-
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cation have the greater economic literacy necessary to appreciate the welfare
gains of free trade, independent of individual income effects. As regards atti-
tudes towards MNCs, Kaya and Walker (2012) use data from the 2003 ISSP
to find that highly-skilled individuals are less likely to see MNCs as damaging
to local businesses.
Using original survey data from China, Zhu (2011) concludes that sup-
port for FDI depends on an individual’s skill level as well as the level of skill
required by a particular FDI project. Pandya (2010) shows that support for
FDI inflows increases with a respondent’s skill level. In particular, Pandya
demonstrates that respondents with a university education are between 7-
10% more likely to support FDI inflows. Following this approach, I proxy
for skill level with an ordinal variable of respondent self-reported educational
levels. The variable Skill level equals 1 if a respondent reports no schooling; 2
if elementary school; 3 if high school or vocational school or some university;
and 4 if a university degree or higher.
I also provide controls for gender, age, city size and region. Burgoon
and Hiscox (2008) use 2003 survey data from the United States to suggest
that women are far more likely to be protectionist than men with respect to
economic policy. The authors posit that this gender gap is due to differences
in exposure to economic ideas and information. The variable Gender equals
0 if the respondent is a man and equals 1 if the respondent is a woman. Age
is predicted to be positively associated with support for protection, following
Mayda and Rodrik (2001) and O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001). The variable
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Age is an ordinal variable which equals 1 if the respondent’s age is 18-24; 2 if
25-34; 3 if 35-44; 4 if 45-54; 5 if 55-64; and 6 if 65 and up. City size is predicted
to be negatively related to free trade because protectionism may be associated
with industrial sectors, which are located in more urban areas (Baker 2003).
The variable City size equals 1 if the population of the respondent’s town
is rural; 2 if urban up to 19,999; 3 if urban from 20,000 to 49,999; 4 if
urban from 50,000 to 99,999; 5 if urban from 100,000 to 499,999; and 6
if 500,000 and above. Finally, the Region dummy variable is included to
control for locational or geographic characteristics that may affect attitudes
towards FDI incentives. I organize Poland’s 16 wojewodstwa (provinces) into
5 geographical regions, with northern provinces as the omitted category.
7.4 Confirmatory factor analysis
The first step I take is to assess the latent variable, or factor, that I
hypothesize as accounting for commonality among the three survey questions
pertaining to FDI incentives in the CBOS 2014 survey results. A factor is
an unobservable variable that influences more than one observed measure
and which accounts for correlations among these observed measures (Brown
and Moore 2012). I use confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to explore the
hypothesis that the three survey questions are related to the latent factor,
which I define as FDI Incentives Attitudes. CFA is a special case of structural
equation modeling (SEM), corresponding to the measurement model of SEM
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that links a set of observed variables to a smaller set of latent variables. My
goal in using CFA here is to generate a more accurate measure of attitudes
towards FDI incentives by potentially combining two or three of the survey
measures. In combining the measures, I limit the effects of measurement
bias, which adds to the validity of the outcome covariate.
Figure 7.5: Path Diagram
FDI_Incentives_Attitudes
providefdiinc?1
fdiincsupport?2
fdiincgood?3
Figure 7.5 shows the hypothesized relationship between the latent fac-
tor, FDI Incentives Attitudes, and the three observed measures. Errors are
represented by the three  terms. The arrows running from the latent fac-
tor to the three observed measures represent factor loadings. According to
Joreskog (1971), a factor loading is defined as the relationship between a
factor and an observed measure. Another way to understand factor load-
ings in CFA is as the correlations between the observed measures, given the
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latent construct. Higher factor loadings suggest stronger relationships be-
tween observed measures. If the latent construct were to be partialled out,
the intercorrelations among the observed measures would be zero.
Table 7.1: Confirmatory Factor Analysis: FDI Incentives Attitudes
Variable Loading Uniqueness
providefdiinc -0.811 0.342
fdiincsupport 0.419 0.825
fdiincgood 0.665 0.557
N 534
CFI 0.730
χ2 46.25
Prob > χ2 0.000
CFA results are depicted in Table 7.1, which provides factor loadings,
uniqueness statistics, and two goodness of fit statistics, the comparative fit
index (CFI) and the χ2 score. Compared to the number of observations for
each individual measures of attitudes towards FDI incentives, the number
of observations for the CFA analysis is significantly lower. This is because
respondents did not answer all three questions. Loading for the providefdiinc
variable is strongly negative. Loadings for fdiincsupport and fdiincgood sug-
gest reasonably strong positive relationships for these variables. Uniqueness,
according to Niemi, Craig, and Mattei (1991), is the percentage of variance
that is not explained by the common factors. As such, high uniqueness scores
may suggest that a particular factor model may not be particularly useful.
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The relatively high uniqueness scores for fdiincsupport and fdiincgood may
support such a conclusion. The χ2 score, as it were, also raises questions
about the appropriateness of the factor model presented. For CFA, signifi-
cant χ2 scores suggest poor model fit. However, Joreskog (1971) points out
that the χ2 test may be somewhat problematic. As such, the CFI score may
help to moderate these concerns as CFI scores closer to 0.95 are seen as more
positive assessments of model fit.
Despite the above concerns, I move forward with building a composite
measure of attitudes towards FDI incentives. By creating this composite de-
pendent variable, I attempt to limit the impact of measurement bias that may
be associated with each individual variable. I choose the fdiincsupport and
fdiincgood variables because they have positive factor loadings, suggesting a
positive relationship with the latent factor, FDI Incentives Attitudes. I cre-
ate the composite variable by adding fdiincsupport and fdiincgood together,
which yields a preliminary variable comprising seven categories ranging from
2 to 8. I assume that scores of 2, 3, and 4 correspond to cases in which the
respondent either strongly disagreed (an original score of 1) or disagreed (an
original score of 2) with the survey question. As a result, I transform these
scores into scores of 1, which indicate that a respondent disagrees. Similarly,
I assume that scores of 6, 7, and 8 correspond to cases in which the respon-
dent either agrees (an original score of 3) or strongly agrees (a original score
of 4). I assign these cases scores of 3. Because scores of 5 on the preliminary
composite variable are combinations of 2 (disagree) and 3 (agree), I assume
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that these scores comprise a middle category of 2. In sum, the composite
variable consists of three categories: 1 (disagree), 2 (disagree/agree), and 3
(agree). A histogram of this variable is depicted below.
Figure 7.6: Univariate Distribution of Composite Dependent Variable
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Before moving to the main empirical analysis of the chapter, I first
provide a cross tabulation of the composite dependent and income variables.
As Table 7.2 indicates, labor is increasingly supportive of FDI incentives.
Support for FDI incentives by capital initially rises, but then decreases.
Table 7.2: Composite DV and Income
Response Labor Capital Total
Disagree 77 40 117
Agree/Disagree 153 64 217
Agree 165 48 213
Total 395 152 547
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7.5 Ordinal analysis
7.5.1 Empirical strategy
As suggested above, attitudes towards FDI incentives are arrayed upon
a latent and unobservable continuum. However, the composite variable I
construct from the two observed survey variables is observable and has four
distinct categories. The latent model is specified below:
y∗i = β0 + β1Income+ βkControli + i (7.1)
where y∗ is the continuous latent variable, the βs are unknown parameters for
independent variables and various control variables, while i is the error term.
β1 provides my measure of the distinction between labor and capital, based
on self-reported income levels. As per my theoretical expectations, I predict
a negative association between income and attitudes towards FDI incentives.
Instead of y∗i , I observe the composite FDI Incentives Attitudes variable yi,
which is rank ordered and limited in terms of the number of categories. I
therefore use ordered probit to estimate the effects of the explanatory vari-
able, Income. Because hypotheses are directional, I use a one-tailed test.
7.5.2 Results
In Table 7.3, I present the results of the ordinal probit analysis. Model 1
includes only the income variable and three controls, while Model 2 adds the
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nationalism variable and Model 3 includes both nationalism and skill level
variables.3
Table 7.3: Attitudes towards FDI Incentives, Composite Dependent Variable
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Income -0.209∗ -0.219∗∗∗ -.166
(0.111) (0.115) (0.108)
Gender 0.092 0.096 0.104
(0.097) (0.1) (0.101)
Age 0.099∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗
(0.029) (0.031) (0.032)
City Size -0.057∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.032
(0.176) (0.029 (0.031)
Nationalism - 0.119∗∗ 0.116∗∗
(0.058) (0.059)
Skill level - - -0.238∗∗∗
(0.086)
N 547 516 516
AIC 1159.705 1096.58 1090.872
(Std. errors in parentheses; Dummy variables excluded )
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10
3I do not report results for region dummy covariates, as these were not statistically
significant across the models.
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As Table 7.3 shows, I find significant results for Models 1 and 2. The
effect of Income is statistically significant and negative in Models 1 and 2,
as expected. However, the inclusion of the Skill level variable in Model 3
appears to affect the significance of Income. Age is significant and positive
across all three models, which suggests that attitudes towards FDI incentives
grow more positive as respondents become older. City size is significant and
negative, which lines up with the predicted result. Puzzlingly, Nationalism
is significant and positive in Models 2 and 3, which suggests that stronger
nationalist sentiments are associated with more favorable attitudes towards
FDI incentives. The result in Model 3 that Skill level is significant and
negatively associated with attitudes towards FDI incentives is also rather
puzzling. I provide AIC scores, which give an assessment of relative model
fit. Based on these metrics, Models 2 and 3 provide better fits to the data
as compared to Model 1.
7.5.3 Model robustness
Given the somewhat uncertain results from the confirmatory factor anal-
ysis above, I conduct two robustness checks. The first replaces the composite
outcome variable with the fdiincgood variable. Table 7.4 presents the results
of this robustness check. The second approach reconstructs the composite
variable by multiplying fdiincgood and fdiincsupport together to create a con-
tinuous variable. I use OLS to conduct this analysis and report the results
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in Table 7.4.4
Table 7.4: Attitudes towards FDI Incentives, fdiincgood variable
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Income -0.203∗∗ -0.233∗∗ -0.222∗∗
(0.096) (0.099) (0.102)
Gender 0.076 0.081 0.083
(0.082) (0.087) (0.087)
Age 0.091∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.025) (0.027) (0.028)
City Size 0.04∗ 0.044∗ 0.049∗
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026)
Nationalism - -0.07 -0.073
(0.151) (0.05)
Skill level - - -0.052
(0.075)
N 693 635 635
AIC 1651.846 1523.012 1524.524
(Std. errors in parentheses; Dummy variables excluded)
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10
4As before, I do not report results for region dummy covariates, as these were not
significant across any of the models.
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Table 7.5: Attitudes towards FDI Incentives, Composite Variable Alternative
Approach
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Income -0.644∗∗ -0.662∗∗ -0.539∗
(0.096) (0.316) (0.322)
Gender 0.288 0.309 0.335
(0.082) (0.274) (0.274)
Age 0.267∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗
(0.081) (0.086) (0.087)
City Size -0.04 -0.022 0.02
(0.024) (0.080 (0.084)
Nationalism - 0.366∗∗ 0.366∗∗
(0.022) (0.159)
Skill level - - -0.085∗
(0.075)
N 547 516 516
AIC 2795.039 2635.351 2680.839
(Std. errors in parentheses; Dummy variables excluded)
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10
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Using this alternative dependent variable, I find significant results for
Income across all models. In Table 7.4, the effect of Income on the fdiincgood
variable is statistically significant and negative, as expected. Age remains
significant and positive, while City Size is now positive and significant. Na-
tionalism and Skill level are not found to be significant in this robustness
check. Similar to the pattern above, AIC scores suggest that Models 2 and
3 are fits for the data. Based on AIC scores, all three models provide better
fits to the data than the three models in the original analysis. Table 7.5 also
shows that Income has a negative effect on attitudes towards FDI incentives,
as represented here by the alternative composite variable. As in the original
analysis, Age and Nationalism remain positive, while Skill level is negative.
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I examine the attitudes of labor and capital towards
FDI incentives by conducting empirical analysis on a unique public opin-
ion survey from Poland. My theoretical expectations that labor seeks FDI
incentives and capital opposes them are supported by two of three models
in the main analysis and all six models in robustness checks. Although the
data used in this chapter are from Poland alone, they are perhaps suggestive
of attitudes towards FDI incentives in other countries in Central and East-
ern Europe that have recently acceded to the European Union, have similar
per capita incomes, and levels of democracy. In order to generalize further
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about attitudes towards FDI incentives around the world, additional survey
research is needed.
This study of attitudes towards FDI incentives helps to build the foun-
dation for a broader theory of FDI demand. As Pandya (2010) notes, prefer-
ences underlie more aggregate phenomenon such as decisions about interna-
tional investment cooperation, issues regarding national FDI regulation and
lobbying for FDI policies. Given that little is known about these aspects of
the political economy of FDI, additional understanding is welcome.
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7.7 Appendix
Table 7.6: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Unit Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Composite DV Index 547 2.176 0.757 1 3
Alt. Composite DV Index 547 6.963 3.117 1 16
providefdiinc Index 852 3.282 0.739 1 4
fdiincsupport Index 662 2.693 0.777 1 4
fdiincgood Index 693 2.599 0.818 1 4
Income Binary 934 0.246 0.431 0 1
Gender Binary 934 0.55 0.498 0 1
Age Index 934 3.845 1.654 1 6
City Size Index 934 2.734 1.817 1 6
Region Dummy 934 3.484 1,361 1 5
Nationalism Index 817 2.659 0.867 1 4
Skill level Index 934 3.052 0.66 1 4
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
8.1 Introduction
Existing approaches to the study of the politics of foreign direct invest-
ment incentives are adversely affected by an important oversight: considera-
tion of certain aspects of domestic politics. In order to address this issue, I
develop an argument that explains why some democracies offer generous in-
centives to attract FDI, while other democracies do not. First, I suggest that
FDI inflows have distributional consequences, drawing on the specific factors
model of international trade. This approach suggests that labor benefits and
domestic capital is harmed from FDI inflows. A major implication of this is
that labor supports FDI inflows and FDI incentives, while domestic capital
opposes FDI inflows and FDI incentives. However, these preferences for FDI
incentives are moderated by a key political institution, executive regime type.
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I argue that higher levels of legislative cohesion in parliamentary regimes lead
to higher levels of FDI incentives offered. By contrast, separation of powers
in presidential regimes leads to lower levels of FDI incentives provided.
In this concluding chapter, I recap the theoretical and empirical ground
covered in my dissertation. I note the literature in which I situate my theory
of the politics of foreign direct investment incentives, then I summarize the
theory. Next, I describe the game theoretic approach I use to characterize
the testable hypotheses I examine in the empirical chapters. I summarize the
findings of the cross-national statistical chapter, the case studies of Poland
and Romania, and the survey analysis chapter. Finally, I provide a few
caveats and potential extensions of my dissertation.
8.2 The politics of foreign direct investment
incentives
FDI incentives and bureaucratic support for foreign investors factor into
decisions by multi-national corporations (MNCs) to invest abroad. Accord-
ing to Li and Resnick (2003), investment incentives represent a transfer of
benefits from domestic taxpayers to foreign investors. Incentives to attract
foreign investors can be seen as direct government intervention in capital
markets, which affects the allocation of scarce financial resources, influences
government revenues, and favors particular groups at the expense of others
(Antaloczy, Sass, and Szanyi 2011). The literature puts forward two main
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explanations for the politics of FDI incentives. First, proponents of the con-
vergence thesis suggest that governments have increasingly chosen to adopt
incentive programs under conditions of intensifying competition among na-
tional governments for limited investment capital (Guisinger 1985; Stopford
and Strange 1991; Thomas 2000). Under conditions of increasing capital
mobility and financial integration, governments have to compete with one
another to keep existing capital and attract additional mobile factors of pro-
duction, such as foreign capital. In order to attract FDI, a government might
intensify use of a policy instrument that increases the rate of return to foreign
investment, such as corporate tax exemptions, deployment of investment pro-
motion agency resources, or direct subsidies to companies. However, these
policy changes create negative externalities for other states competing for a
mobile factor such as foreign investment. Thomas (2000) suggests that this
situation resembles a n-person “Prisoner’s Dilemma” in which every govern-
ment has a dominant strategy of seeking to make its market more attractive
than its neighbors’ markets. The suboptimal equilibrium outcome to this
game is that all countries and their citizens are worse off due to the costs of
providing tax exemptions, funding investment promotion agencies, or paying
subsidies, while the mobile factor may remain distributed as before. On the
other hand, the owners of the mobile factor of production reap increased
rewards in the guise of greater FDI incentives.
The second main explanation focuses on the effect of democratic or au-
tocratic political institutions on a country’s provision of FDI incentives. Tax
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incentives may affect investment via the “illusory compensating effect” (Shah
and Toye 1978). In other words, generous FDI incentives might be an attrac-
tive way to compensate for the absence of proper infrastructure, outdated
technology, and a paucity of natural resources. Additionally, countries with
low policy credibility are not attractive hosts for FDI and so governments
in these countries may offer incentives to make up for the credibility gap
(Janeba 2002). As such, host countries with better economic and political
locational conditions provide a better investment environment and therefore
higher returns. In order for host countries with more benign locational char-
acteristics to successfully attract FDI, governments need not offer the same
levels of incentives as countries with worse locational conditions. Weak prop-
erty rights protection and low policy credibility are predicted to be associated
with generous incentives to attract FDI.
Li (2006) argues that democracies and autocracies offer different lev-
els of FDI incentives because of differences with regard to property rights
protection and policy credibility. A constrained executive, an independent
judiciary, and an open civil society, which are the features of democratic
political systems, support the rule of law and defense of property rights.
By limiting the power of politicians, democratic political institutions permit
greater representation and raise the costs of providing private benefits. This
makes a state’s commitment to the rule of law more credible (North and
Weingast 1989). For Li (2006), strong property rights protection and policy
credibility in democracies lead to lower levels of FDI incentives provided, as
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compared to autocracies. Investors expect governments in these countries to
uphold bargains, therefore democratic governments offer fewer incentives to
foreign investors (Simmons 2000).
8.3 Gaps in the literature and theoretical ap-
proach
The politics of FDI incentives literature ignores important dimensions
of domestic politics, particularly the domestic distributional consequences
of capital flows and the policy implications associated with executive regime
types. The theoretical predictions I formulate are intended to bring domestic
politics into sharper focus in this literature. My understanding of the distri-
butional consequences of FDI inflows relies on the specific factors model of
international trade. In an economy with three factors and two industries, I
assume that labor is mobile across industries while capital is immobile and
fixed to each of the two industries. After FDI has entered one of the two
industries, this has the effect of increasing the supply of productive capital
in that industry. Given a certain technology that determines the ability of
the foreign investor to complement either factor of production, an inflow of
FDI affects the returns to labor and capital in the host country across in-
dustries. FDI inflows compete wages up and push rents down by increasing
demand for labor across the economy. The key result is that labor prefers
that the government offer higher levels of FDI incentives, while domestic cap-
179
8.3. GAPS IN THE LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL APPROACH
ital prefers few or no incentives to attract FDI (Pandya 2010 and 2014; Pinto
2013). Though FDI incentives are not direct transfers to labor, these forms
of government spending can be considered resource allocations designed to
favor one constituency, labor, over another constituency, domestic capital. It
follows that those harmed by FDI would be opposed to FDI incentives, while
those benefitting from FDI inflows would be supportive of FDI incentives.
The preferences of labor and capital for FDI incentives, however, are
moderated by a country’s executive regime type. Persson et al. (1997, 1998b,
2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2005) develop a sophisticated explanation
for differences between presidential and parliamentary regimes. Presidential
regimes are characterized by separation of powers between legislative and
executive authority, which means that more institutional actors must be
satisfied in order for policy changes to be enacted. An important feature
of the presidential system is the prevalence of unstable political coalitions.
This means that the beneficiaries of FDI incentives have to “sell” the FDI
incentives policy to the institutional actors. This drives down the level of FDI
incentives because some institutional actors prefer lower levels of incentives as
compared to others. The beneficiaries of FDI incentives, however, will accept
whatever level of incentives is offered. The implication is that presidential
systems offer lower levels of FDI incentives.
Building on the work of Diermeier and Feddersen (1996), Persson et
al. (2000) use the idea of legislative cohesion to characterize parliamen-
tary regimes. Legislative cohesion refers to disciplined voting by members of
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a governing coalition. Parliamentary regimes feature large governing coali-
tions, which necessarily are more broadly representative. As labor constitutes
a greater number of individuals in society, parliamentary coalitions are more
representative of labor than of capital. The parliamentary coalition chooses
to offer a higher level of FDI incentives in order to maximize labor’s sup-
port within the larger bloc of voters which needs to be satisfied to maintain
coalition stability and keep politicians in office.
In Chapter 3, I provide a formal derivation of the logic underpinning
my theory of the politics of FDI incentives provision. I first assume that both
parliamentary and presidential regimes lie on a legislative cohesion contin-
uum, where parliamentary regimes feature high levels of legislative cohesion
and presidential regimes have low levels of legislative cohesion. This assump-
tion greatly assists in the empirical analysis conducted in Chapters 4, 5, and
6.
My game theoretic approach draws on Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989)
model of policy choice in small groups, or “legislative bargaining.” Baron
and Ferejohn, in turn, build upon Rubinstein’s (1982) model of two-player
bargaining. In the two models presented, I assume that bargaining takes
place over the distribution of a shared tax base. In the presidential regime,
bargaining happens within the legislature and between the legislature and
executive. In the parliamentary context, bargaining occurs only within the
legislature. As each legislator represents only her individual district, which
bears only part of the cost of spending on FDI incentives but all of the
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benefits, each legislator has incentive to overspend. On the other hand, the
executive represents the entire country, meaning that her district bears the
full cost of spending on FDI incentives as well as the full benefit. This implies
that the executive lacks the same incentive to overspend as the individual
legislator. Bargaining occurs in a simple one-period legislative “ultimatum
game,” in which the agenda setter makes a take-it or leave-it offer to the
other actors.
Using these tools, I derive a testable hypothesis of my main theoreti-
cal prediction, that democratic governments with higher levels of legislative
cohesion offer higher levels of FDI incentives. I also derive a secondary hy-
pothesis, which suggests that the interaction between legislative cohesion
and FDI inflows has a negative effect on levels of FDI incentives provided in
democratic parliamentary and presidential regimes.
8.4 Evidence: cross-national analysis
In order to test the hypotheses presented, I first conduct cross-national
empirical analysis of an original dataset. I constructed this dataset by col-
lecting 1400 “Investment Climate Statements” from 2005-2014 from the U.S.
Commercial Service. I used the R software program to implement webscrap-
ing techniques for collecting and preprocessing the documents (Feinerer et
al. 2008), then hand coded 140 of the documents for FDI incentives as per Li
(2006), with one addition. Once manual coding had been completed, I used
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R to run four training algorithms, which classified uncoded documents as
per the manually coded documents. After running all four algorithms, I no-
ticed that two, support vector machines (SVM) and random forests (Forests),
coded the country documents much less consistently than the other two, Log-
itboost and generalized linear models (GLM). In order to address this lack of
consistency, I re-ran the training algorithms with only Logitboost and GLM,
which provided more consistent results. I then combined my original FDI
incentives dataset with data from the Quality of Government database.
I ran two sets of analyses. The first used pooled ordinal probit models,
the results of which provide mixed support for my contention that govern-
ments with higher levels of legislative cohesion are associated with higher
levels of FDI incentives provided. However, the pooled ordinal model results
support my second hypothesis, that as moderated by the level of FDI inflows,
the effect of legislative cohesion on FDI incentives provided is negative.
However, as the dataset I use can be described as an unbalanced panel,
there are two issues that the pooled ordinal model specification does not
address. For one, the pooled ordinal model does not account for country-level
heterogeneity. In other words, there may be omitted variables that impact
why countries differ with regard to levels of FDI incentives. As my theory
assumes that differences between countries do have an impact on the level of
FDI incentives offered, it may be important to account for this heterogeneity.
Second, the pooled ordinal model does not address the effect of time on the
levels of FDI incentives offered.
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In order to address these issues, I specify a different model, an ordinal
probit model with region and time fixed effects. Using the fixed effects model,
I find the relationship between legislative cohesion and the level of FDI in-
centives provided to be statistically significant and positive, as suggested in
Hypothesis 1. I also find support for Hypothesis 2 that, as moderated by
the level of FDI inflows, the effect of legislative cohesion on FDI incentives
provided is negative.
8.5 Evidence: case studies
In an effort to examine the mechanisms of my theory, I examined two
case studies. Building off of descriptive statistics of the post-socialist cases
compared to other countries in Chapter 4, I explore two post-socialist case
studies in Chapter 5 and 6. The post-socialist countries are unique for a
number of reasons. First, these countries embarked on complex political and
market transitions at roughly the same time. The post-socialist countries
also started the transition with relatively similar relatively similar economic
conditions, due to the shared legacy of the socialist planned economy. Sec-
ond, the world was beginning to feel the full force of globalization at the
initial stages of post-socialist transition, which had significant consequences
for these countries. In effect, the post-socialist countries can be treated as a
quasi-experimental context in which to examine policy choice.
The two post-socialist cases, Poland and Romania, have transitioned to
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market democracy and gained membership to the European Union in 2004
and 2007, respectively. Poland has been a parliamentary democracy since
1997, while Romania has maintained a semi-presidential system since 1989.
In each case study, I discuss transitions from communism, briefly note an
episode of the politics of FDI policy, examine the preferences of labor and
capital as regards FDI and FDI incentives, characterize the nature of the
executive regime in each country, and present an operationalization of FDI
incentives, in the form of special economic zones (SEZs) in Poland and in-
dustrial parks (IPs) in Romania. Both SEZs and IPs are similar policy tools
designed to promote economic activity of a particular kind in a designated
geographical area, often one that has experienced decline after the implemen-
tation of post-communist structural reforms. In Chapter 5, I also discuss
aspects of union strength in post-socialist countries, note consequences of
union-party links, and characterize explanations of varying strength of union
opposition to neoliberal reforms. In each case study, I then draw conclusions
about why SEZs have developed quickly as compared to IPs, based on my
theoretical expectations.
8.5.1 Poland
A large part of Poland’s successful economic and political transition can
be traced to the role played by the trade union Solidarity, which facili-
tated mass political action crucial to the fall of Poland’s Communist regime.
Poland was unique in the post-communist world for having developed a non-
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regime oriented mass following during the Communist period (Jowitt 1992).
In the early post-transition years, Solidarity played a major role in govern-
ment, marshalling popular support for political and economic reforms. Eco-
nomic reform, in the short-term, would mean increased unemployment and
greater social inequalities, the burden of which would fall upon Solidarity’s
most important constituency, workers. Nevertheless, key Solidarity leaders
such as Lech Walesa saw market reforms and the encouragement of foreign
investment as leading to new jobs, technology, management, corporate cul-
ture, and ethics, all of which would assist Poland’s entrance into the global
economy.1 However, scholars have noted an interesting pattern of politicized
labor union support for economic reforms, as Solidarity and its main union
competitor, the All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions, have waxed and waned
in terms of support for economic reforms. As regards popular attitudes to-
wards FDI and FDI incentives, workers began to see over time that foreign
investment improved the competitiveness of Polish firms, which increased
support for FDI (Domanski 2004). In addition, empirical studies suggests
that FDI has a positive effect on wages in Poland (Faggio 2001; Bedi and
Cieslik 2002). With this evidence in mind, I find support for my expectation
that labor supports FDI and FDI incentives in Poland.
The emergence of a robust non-Communist elite and a mass social move-
ment in Poland meant that regime insiders would find it more difficult to
1Lech Walesa Institute, “Foreign Investors in the last 25 Years,” Lech Walesa Institute
2014, Warsaw, Poland
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remain in power. Additionally, the pace of reform in the initial postcom-
munist period ensured former communist insiders would be unable to cap-
ture sectors of the economy nor sufficiently retain political power to block
change (Roland 2002). As such, there was no business lobby to speak of until
Poland’s economy gained steam in the late 1990s.2 Existing Polish business
owners, though, did voice opposition to FDI, successfully blocking foreign in-
vestment into SEZs (Domanski 2004). Economic nationalism among business
owners has grown in recent years as the effects of the global economic crisis
have been felt more strongly in Poland. In particular, representatives of the
pro-business Platforma Obywatelska, in power since 2007, have made noises
about promoting Polish “national champions” while also supporting mea-
sures to make foreign takeovers of Polish companies more difficult (Parkiet
2010). As predicted by my theory, I find the above as evidence that Pol-
ish domestic business has begun to more forcefully oppose the influence of
foreign capital.
While Poland initially had a semi-presidential executive regime, par-
liamentary democracy was instituted after constitutional changes in 1997
(Orenstein 2010). Under the 1992 interim constitution, the Polish president
had power to dissolve parliament and exercise discretion over the formation
of the cabinet, made up of parliamentarians from the winning coalition and
led by the prime minister as formal head of government. The 1997 consti-
tution removed the president’s consultative powers as well as the ability to
2Author interviews, November 17, 2014, Warsaw, Poland
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reject requests by the prime minister for appointing or dismissing ministers.
The president also lost the right to chair the cabinet and otherwise influence
cabinet decisionmaking as well as veto the budget (Zubek 2011).
SEZs are one tool that the Polish government uses to attract FDI,
through preferential tax conditions, such as tax holidays and import duty
exemptions, as well as non-tax incentives usually relating to employment
and licensing (Gaugliano and Riela 2005). Poland’s 14 SEZs have attracted
impressive investments from large multi-national corporations, such as Saint-
Gobain, Fiat Powertrain Technologies Poland, Dell, Procter and Gamble,
Mondi Packaging Paper Swiecie, Sharp, Swedwood Poland, LG Electronics,
Shell Polska, and Rockwool Polska (PAIZ Poland, 2014). What is striking
about the development of SEZs in Poland is the immense proliferation, cur-
rently covering 16,200 hectares in the country.
The Poland case provides tentative support for my theoretical predic-
tions. There are a few reasons why this support is only tentative. First, my
theory predicts that Platforma Obywatelska would have been consistently op-
posed to FDI incentives, such as SEZs, but this was not the case. Second, my
theory does not predict that the establishment of SEZs in Poland would have
taken place during the existence of the country’s semi-presidential system.
Conflicts between the president and parliament were particularly intense in
1995, when the SEZs were created. One explanation for the timing of the
establishment of the SEZs, however, was the existence of strong consensus
across the political spectrum about Poland’s interest in attracting foreign
188
8.5. EVIDENCE: CASE STUDIES
investment in the early post-transition years. At the same time, I describe
an episode of deliberations between the Polish legislature and executive over
FDI policy, the corporate income tax rate, which helps provide support for
my argument.
8.5.2 Romania
According to Gallagher (2005), Romania under Ceausescu possessed more
attributes of a totalitarian dictatorship than any other East European party-
state. In countries with intense authoritarian experiences, it is implied that
the administrative class which prospered under authoritarianism is much less
willing to abdicate power. Although mass protests brought down Ceausescu’s
regime, former Communists swiftly took advantage of the resulting political
vacuum (McFaul 2002). There were no pacts, no negotiations, and no com-
promises during the initial transition. Until 1997, when the ex-communists
experienced their first major electoral defeat, there were few meaningful re-
forms (Ibrahim and Galt 2004). In effect, Romania’s authoritarian past facil-
itated a much less complete break with communism, as compared to Poland.
Opposition control of key political institutions, such as from 1996 and
2000, however, did not result in successful reform efforts in large part due
to pushback by entrenched former Communists. Scholars mark the 2004
elections as the end of the post-communist transition and the beginning of
determined steps towards democratic consolidation (King and Marian 2013;
Downs and Miller 2006; Stan 2005; Gross and Tismaneanu 2004). Romania
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stands out as the only democracy in Central Europe where representatives
of the Communist successor parties have been participants in nearly every
government since the fall of Communism.
Most Romanians in 1989 appeared ready to accept the goal of marke-
tization, but resisted the difficult consequences of reform (Datculescu 1992).
Similar to Poland, popular attitudes towards FDI became more positive as
FDI inflows increased in the mid-1990s. In addition, empirical evidence sug-
gests that FDI is positively associated with wages in Romania. Although
Romanian labor unions did not exhibit the same degree of politicization as
their Polish counterparts, unions in Romania have played a role in shaping
policy in the post-socialist period. Unions supported and even encouraged
market reforms, even as strikes took place against the negative effects of the
reforms (Gotia 2011). Despite higher union density than Poland, scholars
suggest that recent changes by the Romanian government are significantly
weakening union power (Trif 2013).
With regard to business attitudes towards FDI, Vachudova (2005) calls
the first seven years of the Romanian transition “a textbook case of the
capture of a partially reformed economy by former communist cadres linked
closely to the ruling political parties.” As such, Romania had a business class
at transition, unlike Poland. According to Verdery (2002), Romania’s relative
economic backwardness obstructed wealth attainment through the market,
which led to protectionist views of FDI among elites. The ex-nomenklatura,
which dominated the elite, required time to convert their political capital into
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economic capital, which translated into suspicious attitudes towards FDI in
the early post-transition years (Stoica 2004). Though these attitudes began
to break down in the early 2000s, elite attitudes towards FDI and FDI incen-
tives have remained skeptical and opportunistic. It appears that domestic
business owners have been properly motivated in their opposition to FDI,
as a number of studies have shown that FDI inflows are accompanied by a
significant negative competition effect in Romania (Konings 2001; Altomonte
and Pennings 2009).
Romania’s semi-presidential executive system, modeled roughly after
the 1958 French constitution, has engendered serious political conflict since
the country’s transition from communism. A succession of presidents have
sought to expand the power of the presidency, while the parliament and gov-
ernment seek to retain whatever discretion there might be available for them
in the constitution. As Tananescu (2008) notes, constitutional ambiguity,
combined with strong personalities in the political arena have meant that
instability and uncertainty are the key features of Romanian politics.
Similar to SEZs in Poland, Romania has used industrial parks (IPs) to
attract foreign investment. In light of Romania’s ongoing de-industrialization,
policymakers have sought to use IPs in order to attract new jobs to areas
affected by the economic restructuring (Popescu 2012). Incentives for busi-
nesses include income tax, local real estate tax breaks, and other local gov-
ernment tax incentives, as well as delays in VAT payments for materials and
capital equipment installed in the IP. As discussed in Chapter 6, territory and
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extent of business is much less than in Poland, amounting to 2500 hectacres.
Overall, the Romanian case provides tentative support for my theory of
the politics of FDI incentives provision. My expectations about labor’s atti-
tudes in favor of FDI and FDI incentives in Romania are partially supported,
while I find stronger evidence in favor of my contention about negative at-
titudes of Romanian domestic business towards FDI and FDI incentives. A
brief discussion of legislative/executive deliberations over economic liberal-
ization, though, provides additional support for the predicted effect of low
legislative cohesion leading to lower FDI incentives in Romania’s presidential
system. Given the rather small size of IPs in Romania compared to the large
size of SEZs in Poland, it appears that Romania’s semi-presidential system
plays a role in limiting the level of FDI incentives provided in the country.
8.6 Evidence: survey analysis
In Chapter 7, I explore the preferences of labor and capital towards
FDI incentives by analyzing unique public opinion survey data from Poland.
My theoretical expectations that labor supports FDI incentives and capital
opposes them are supported by eight of the nine models run in the analysis.
While the data used in the survey analysis are from Poland alone, the results
are perhaps suggestive of attitudes towards FDI incentives in other countries
of Central and Eastern Europe, which have recently joined the European
Union, have similar per capita incomes, and levels of democracy. The idea is
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that individuals in the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
which share a common political and economic legacy and began the transition
to market democracy at the same time, may share Polish attitudes towards
FDI incentives.
8.7 Caveats, extensions, and final thoughts
8.7.1 Caveats
Though my theory of the politics of FDI incentives provision is an im-
portant step towards explaining why some countries offer high levels of FDI
incentives, while other countries do not, there are a few caveats worth men-
tioning. The first concerns the broad outline of my theory. Put simply, I
begin with the distributional consequences of FDI, namely that labor ben-
efits from FDI inflows and capital is harmed. I then link the distributional
consequences dimension directly to one form of political institutions, execu-
tive regime type. I posit here that presidential regimes are associated with
lower levels of spending on policies such as FDI incentives, while parliamen-
tary regimes are associated with higher levels of spending on FDI incentives.
Next, I assume that government FDI policies have consequences for FDI in-
flows, which influence the preferences of these groups with respect to FDI
incentives.
In effect, my theory covers only two of the steps described above: distri-
butional consequences and the policy implications of executive regime types.
193
8.7. CAVEATS, EXTENSIONS, AND FINAL THOUGHTS
A stronger theory would perhaps fill in a few gaps. First, in moving from
distributional consequences to executive regime type policy implications, it
could be worthwhile to explore how labor and capital mobilize to articulate
preferences over FDI incentives. It is likely that labor and capital address the
collective action problem associated with political mobilization in different
ways.
Second, the theory could be strengthened by examining the impact of
government FDI policy on FDI inflows. Policies may be designed to achieve
a particular outcome, but it is not always the case that policy goals are
perfectly attained. I argue that when governments spend money on FDI
incentives, this increases FDI inflows. The literature, however, maintains
some degree of ambiguity on this subject. On one hand, Banga (2003) uses
data from south and southeast Asia to show that fiscal incentives have a
negligible impact on FDI inflows. Relying on interviews and case studies
from South Africa, Tuomi (2011) finds that fiscal incentives did not influence
MNC investment decisions. On the other hand, Blomstrom and Kokko (2003)
argue that under the right circumstances, FDI incentives have positive effects
on the host economy. Cleve (2008) conducts an empirical study of countries
in sub-Saharan Africa and finds that certain fiscal incentives, such as tax
holidays, are important for attracting FDI inflows.
A useful contribution to addressing ambiguity in the literature about
the connection between FDI incentives and inflows would start with building
a comprehensive panel dataset that aggregates data on FDI inflows and FDI
194
8.7. CAVEATS, EXTENSIONS, AND FINAL THOUGHTS
incentives, as well as relevant political, economic, and other controls. This
approach could help pave the way towards more rigorous and comprehensive
macro-level studies of the relationship between the two variables.
Third, additional exploration of the connection between FDI inflows
and overall macroeconomic outcomes is worthwhile. I split this contention
into two parts. One aspect concerns the effect of FDI inflows on labor and
capital. In regards to this dimension, a number of empirical studies suggest
strong evidence of a wage premium in foreign-owned firms. Brown, Earle, and
Telegdy (2013) use 18 years of data from Hungary to find a 12-28% effect on
average wages, across worker types, occupations, and wage quantiles. Lipsey
and Sjoholm (2004) analyze data from Indonesia and conclude that wages in
locally owned plants were high in industries with a large foreign presence as
well as in provinces with a large foreign industrial presence. This is taken to
mean that because foreign plants pay higher wages than local plants, foreign
presence raises the general wage level in a province and industry. In addition,
Figlio and Blonigen (2000) use data from South Carolina to demonstrate that
FDI raises local wages. By contrast, empirical work shows that FDI inflows
can harm domestic firms by way of increased competition. In a study of firm-
level data from Central Europe, Konings (2001) finds evidence of negative
spillovers from FDI to domestic firms, due to the competition effect. Aitken
and Harrison (1999) use data from Venezuela to show that domestic plants
are negatively affected by FDI inflows. Nevertheless, this aspect deserves
more systematic study in the future.
195
8.7. CAVEATS, EXTENSIONS, AND FINAL THOUGHTS
The second dimension of the connection between FDI inflows and over-
all macroeconomic outcomes relates to distinctions between different labor
segments with regard to attitudes towards FDI incentives. In other words,
do high-skilled workers differ in their support for FDI incentives as compared
to low-skilled workers? An empirical study by Driffield and Taylor (2000)
uses data from the United Kingdom to suggest that inward FDI substitutes
for unskilled labor and complements more skilled labor, because multina-
tionals demand more skilled labor, and domestic firms increase their demand
for skilled labor due to technological spillovers. Scheve and Slaughter (2001)
find that low-skilled workers are more protectionist than high-skilled workers,
based on analysis of results of data from the U.S. Pandya (2010) studies three
years of survey data from the Latinobarometer to conclude that preferences
over FDI inflows are consistent with FDI’s expected effect on individual in-
come. In effect, Pandya finds that high-skilled workers are more supportive
of FDI than low-skilled workers. Taken together, the literature suggests that
an important cleavage between high- and low-skilled workers exists with re-
gard to attitudes towards FDI incentives. This is certainly a worthy topic of
future study.
8.7.2 Extensions
There are at least three potentially fruitful extensions of my disserta-
tion. The first is an empirical approach involving the impact of international
agreements on FDI incentives, while the second concerns the distributional
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consequences of FDI and FDI incentives. The third considers the relationship
between income inequality and demand for FDI incentives.
One extension might examine the relationship between international
agreements, such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs) or preferential trade
agreements (PTAs), and FDI incentives. By entering into international agree-
ments that commit a country to the liberal economic policies seen as most
desirable by foreign investors, a country can create a favorable environment
for FDI (Buthe and Milner 2008). Tobin and Busch (2010) add that BITs
and PTAs are especially conducive to attracting FDI. The World Bank (2014)
reports that 330 PTAs currently active, while UNCTAD (2013) notes that
more than 2500 BITs are in effect today. However, Tobin and Ackerman
(2011) complicate the story by suggesting that BITs stimulate FDI, but only
under specific conditions. First, BITs cannot replace an otherwise weak in-
vestment environment, meaning that countries must have some moderately
credible domestic political institutions. Second, as the coverage of BITs in-
creases, the marginal effect of a country’s BITs on its own FDI might decrease
because of competition for FDI from other countries with BITs. As this lit-
erature has yet to consider the effect of international agreements on FDI
incentives offered, there is ample room for exploration of this relationship.
Second, the case study of Poland in Chapter 5 returned a number of in-
teresting results, one of which was evidence that resistance to FDI in Poland
was and can continue to be found in the country’s agricultural sector. As
noted above, Polish farmers were at the forefront of resistance to plans for re-
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structuring the Polish economy (Tridico 2004). In order to modernize Polish
agriculture, many farms would need to be eliminated, while rural popula-
tions would need to shift to cities and undergo changes in occupation, all of
which challenge the traditional rural lifestyle dramatically. Poland’s acces-
sion to the European Union has already opened the country’s economy to
market forces and brought some degree of liberalization to the agricultural
sector. However, farmers and their political representatives, such as the
Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe), have prevented large
scale restructuring and foreign investment,3 mainly through imposition and
defense of stringent land-ownership rules (Banski 2004).
Given that agriculture, at least in Poland and likely in many other
countries, offers significant resistance to FDI and incentives to attract FDI,
theories utilizing the distributional consequences of FDI approach might con-
sider incorporating the agricultural sector. As it stands, the variant of the
specific factors model employed in this dissertation postulates three factors
and two industries, with capital specific to each industry and labor being
mobile between the two industries. To include agriculture, I suggest the fol-
lowing adjustments to the model. First, two factors and two sectors could be
added. The two additional factors are landowners and are specific to each of
the two new sectors, both of which are agricultural. This brings the number
of factors to five and the number of sectors to four. Labor, however, is mobile
only between the two capital sectors and between the two new agricultural
3Author Interviews November 17, 2014; November 18, 2014; and November 19, 2014
198
8.7. CAVEATS, EXTENSIONS, AND FINAL THOUGHTS
sectors.
Inflows of foreign capital have similar effects on this economy as in the
model I employ above. Capital flows to one of the industrial and one of the
agricultural sectors raise demand for labor, which increases labor’s welfare.
Increases in labor’s welfare correspond to decreases in the rents available to
capital and landowners in the economy. As a result, labor continues to prefer
FDI and FDI incentives, while capital and landowners oppose FDI and FDI
incentives. Though simple, this adjustment to the specific factors model may
stimulate worthwhile explorations into the mechanisms of the distributional
consequences approach to the study of the politics of FDI and FDI incentives.
Third, the relationship between income inequality and demand for FDI
incentives is worth exploring. If labor market attributes, such as skill level,
condition the effect of income inequality on FDI inflows, then it seems likely
that labor market institutions play a role in the impact of income inequality
on the demand for FDI incentives. Drawing on the varieties of capitalism
approach (Hall 2001), countries with coordinated market economies (CMEs)
may condition the impact of income inequality on demand for FDI incentives
as opposed to liberal market economies (LMEs). CMEs can be characterized
as facilitating strategic interaction between firms, government bodies, and
other actors as well as a stronger social safety net. As a result demand for FDI
incentives remains strong among workers because the potential inequality
effects of FDI inflows are softened. By contrast, LMEs feature economic
activity coordinate primarily through hierarchies and competitive market
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arrangements. The prediction would be that the potential inequality effects
of FDI inflows weaken support for FDI incentives in LMEs.
8.7.3 Final thoughts
This dissertation has contributed to the political economy literature by
examining the politics behind the provision of FDI incentives in democracies.
Building on recent, impressive efforts in the political economy literature, I
have used the tools of game theory, quantitative analysis, and case study
research to develop, test, probe, and defend my theoretical approach. Future
scholarly efforts on the politics of FDI and FDI incentives will undoubtedly
broaden our understanding of the workings of the global political economy.
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